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Summary
The study presented here focuses on the treatment accorded to
Northern Ireland by the British press since 1969.	 It argues that the
press has failed to provide the public with an impartial or meaningful
account of the conflict in the North, and explores some of the factors
that have contributed to this failure.
Chapter One outlines the primary functions that have been
ascribed to journalists and the press in democratic society, and
provides a standard against which press performance may be judged.
Chapter Two evaluates a range of commentaries on the British media's
reporting of Northern Ireland from Partition to the present day.
The study moves on to examine the debate over the media's
representation of "terrorism" and assesses the consequences of this
debate for the British media's reporting of Northern Ireland.
Chapter Four provides an account of the research methods employed in
the study and reflects on some of the practical problems encountered
during the course of the fieldwork.	 Chapter Five presents the
findings of a content analysis of the coverage accorded to civilian
assassinations by seven British and two Northern Irish newspapers
during a five week period in 1972.
	
Chapter Six outlines the
development of the information services operated by the army and the
police, and describes how these forces have used their strategic
position as a news source to gain the edge in the propaganda war.
Picking up on some of the themes and issues raised in previous chapters,
Chapter Seven focuses on those involved in the production of news and
presents the findings of a series of interviews undertaken with
journalists in Belfast and London.	 The final chapter summarises the
principal findings of the study and reflects on the prospects of a
reversal in the present approach to the reporting of Northern Ireland
by the British press.
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INTRODUCTION
"A nation's understanding of any conflict its government has
become involved in", David Brazil has argued, "is inevitably determined
in the first instance by the information received from newspapers,
radio and television". 	 These new outlets, he continues, "form the
basic working material also for the historian and the importance, or at
least the significance,of the individual's reporting of the conflict
soon emerges as crucial to the widespread conception of the rights and
wrongs, the methods of the conflict in questiont.W
The case of Northern Ireland is no exception. 	 For almost two
decades now the British state has been involved in the most protracted
and violent conflict experienced by any European democracy since 191+5.
For the British public, the primary, if not the only, source of
information about this conflict and their state's role in it, has been
provided by the established media. 	 Unable to witness or experience at
first hand the conflict taking place less than fifty miles away across
the Irish Sea, the British people are heavily reliant upon the
broadcasting and print media not only to make them aware of events
taking place in the Six Counties, but also to provide them with the
contextual information needed if they are to fully comprehend the
significance of those events.
The level of political awareness in Britain about the conflict in
Northern Ireland, and the level of understanding about the social and
political factors that give rise to it, is of major political
significance.	 For, if the public is to play a meaningful role in
guiding and shaping government policy on Northern Ireland, over which
it has the ultimate veto, then this can only be on the basis of all the
information requisite to that task.
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Given the virtual monopoly that the press enjoys over the
dissemination of information on matters beyond the direct experience
of individuals, the responsibility this places on the press and
journalists who work for it in their reporting of Northern Ireland is
considerable.	 Nevertheless, it is a responsibility which, in public
at least, British journalists have not only accepted, but have actively
claimed.	 Over the course of several centuries, the British press has
evolved a definition of itself as a vital organ of public enlightenment;
it has taken upon itself a responsibility to provide its readers with
all the information necessary for them to make basic and informed
judgements on political policy in their capacity as voting citizens of
a democracy.	 For journalists and newspapers to adequately perform such
a role, they would need to rigorously seek out, and give voice to, the
views and interpretations of all those whose actions have a bearing on
the conflict; they would need to present systematically,
comprehensively and impartially all the factors which underpin it, and,
above all, they would need to clarify the options open to the policy
makers and assess how well the course they are steering is working out.
Anything less than this would be to deny the public the information it
requires if it is to participate in a rational and informed discussion
as to how the situation in the North can best be resolved.
Ordinary people have a vital interest in how well journalists and
the press perform this role.	 Since the imposition of Direct Rule in
1972, successive Labour and Conservative administrations have ruled over
the North in the name of the British people. 	 Furthermore, through
their taxes, the British people have shouldered the financial burden of
the British military and political presence in the Six Counties. 	 Thus,
while the British public may not be directly responsible for the
violence on the streets of Belfast and Derry, Britain collectively
bears a degree of' responsibility for the background against which this
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violence takes place. 	 In the light of these factors, it would be hard
to	 that the British public does not, thus, have a right to be
kept informed as to the nature and the impact of the policies being
implemented in its name.
The primary objective of this study is to assess how well the
British press, and those who work for it, have dispensed with their
responsibility to provide an objective, comprehensive and impartial
account of' the Northern Ireland conflict since 1969.
Chap ter contents
The way in which the social and political role of' the press has
been perceived, the expectations that readers have of newspapers, and
the values, beliefs and functions by reference to which journalists both
define and legitimate their role in the news process, have all undergone
substantial modification since the arrival of the first newspapers in
the early seventeenth century.	 Developments in newspapers technology,
improvements in communications, and in particular the advent of the
telegraph and shorthand, are just some of the factors that have helped
shape the activity of journalism as we presently know it.
	 Chapter One
provides an historical overview of the changing nature of' the press from
its origins in the early seventeenth century to its apotheosis into the
Fourth Estate in the late nineteenth century.	 Isolating as it does the
primary functions that have been ascribed to journalists and the press in
democratic society by liberal free press theorists, the primary purpose
of this chapter is to provide a standard against which the performance
of the British press in its reporting of Northern Ireland may be judged.
Chapter Two draws together and evaluates a range of' existing
commentaries on the role and performance of the British media in their
reporting of Northern Ireland prior to and since 1968.
	
Generally
speaking, the material examined in this chapter emanates from three
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principal sources, each with its own particular frame of reference, and
each with its own particular view of the key issues raised by the
British media's reporting of the Irish conflict: from academics of
various critical leanings whose primary concern has been to evaluate
the coverage given to Northern Ireland and the factors that help shape
it; from counter-insurgency "experts" and conservative academics, whose
primary concern has been to formulate information strategies designed to
prevent newspapers and television from acting as channels for "terrorist"
propaganda; and from journalists at various levels of the news process,
whose primary concern has been with the practical and political problems
of reporting an ongoing and violent conflict involving their own nation
state.	 Taking each of these sources separately, Chapter Two assesses
the contributions they have made to our understanding of how Northern
Ireland has been reported by the British media.
Chapter Three broadens the focus of the study and addresses itself
to the wider debate over the relationship between the media and
"terrorism".	 Since the late l960s, the debate over the media's
representation of violence in general, and political violence in
particular, has been elevated to a highly ideological plane.
	 Drawing
upon arguments about the social and political effects of media
representations of violence and violent conflict, which at best
constituted a series of tentative hypotheses rather than empirically
validated facts, a small group of' counter-insurgency "experts" have
provided both the terms of reference and the intellectual backing for
a concerted attack on the autonomy of broadcasting and the press.
Chapter Three begins by examining the key assumptions underlying this
debate, and the continuing controversy that surrounds them, before
proceeding to assess its consequences for the British media's reporting
of anti-state violence in.general, and Irish political violence in
particular.
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Before proceeding to examine the coverage accorded to Northern
Ireland by the British press and the factors that help shape it,
Chapter Four provides an account of the methodological approaches
employed in the study, and reflects on some of the practical problems
encountered during the course of the fieldwork.
Chapter Five presents the findings of a content analysis of the
coverage accorded to civilian assassinations by seven British and two
Northern Irish newspapers during a five week period in 1972.	 It argues
that, despite the number of civilian assassinations during the period
studied, and the likely impact of these killings on the two communities,
the British press generally failed to provide its readership with the
information or the analysis necessary for it to arrive at a meaningful
understanding of this particular form of inter-communal violence, or the
social and political factors which underpin it.
Since 1969, the British army and the Royal Ulster Constabulary
have been both major participants to the Irish conflict and, at the
same time, major sources of information about it. Chapter Six examines
how journalists have sought to resolve this potential conflict of
interests, and assesses the consequences of this for the day to day
reporting of political violence. 	 It argues that since 1969 the
relationship between journalists and the information services operated
by the army and the RUC has evolved through three quite distinct phases
which, it is suggested, correspond to, and indeed reflect, the changing
military and political goals of the British state. 	 It describes how,
following an initial period of consolidation, the army was to set in
train a sophisticated policy of news management and misinformation which
was to give them a strategic edge in the propaganda war.
Picking up on some of the themes and issues raised in previous
chapters, Chapter Seven focuses on those involved in the production of
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news and presents the findings of a series of interviews undertaken
with journalists in Belfast and London.	 The primary purpose of this
chapter is to establish what it is about the way journalists approach
the routine task of newsgathering that helps make news about Northern
Ireland the way it is. 	 Together with providing an historical overview
of how reporting conditions have changed since 1969, Chapter Seven can
be read as an answer to the following questions:
What are the staple sources of information for journalists
working in Northern Ireland and how do these sources help
shape what emerges as news?
How are such concepts as "news-value", "objectivity" and
"impartiality" applied on a daily basis by journalists,
and how does their application influence the selection
and presentation of news?
What is the nature of the relationship between journalists
and their news desk, and how does this relationship
influence the journalists' approach to newsgathering?
How much autonomy do journalists enjoy on a daily basis to
determine the selection and presentation of news about
Northern Ireland and what are the effective limits to this
autonomy?
Chapter Eight draws the threads together and reflects on the
prospects for a reversal in the present approach to the reporting of
Northern Ireland by the British media.
Notes
Brazil, D.	 "War Reporting", The British Media and
Ireland, Truth the First Casual
Information on Ireland, London,
1979, p 1•
CHAPTER 1
Democracy and the Press: The Fourth Estate Thesis
The history of the British press from the late seventeenth century
to the mid-nineteenth century, as recorded in a number of standard
histories, is largely a story of glorious victories: over the licensing
system, over the right to report parliament, over the freedom to report
the affairs of' state without fear of prosecution, and over the newspaper
duties.	 These victories and their dates have provided many historians
of the period with a series of chronological reference points by which
to chart the emergence of a politically "free" and economically
independent press.	 Nowhere was this conception of the historical
development of the British press more vigorously expressed than in the
writings of Henry Reeve. 	 Writing in 1855, the year in which the tax
that had been imposed on the British press for the best part of 150
years was finally repealed, Reeve described the press as the tgreatest
fact" of the age.
	
In a style typical of much writing on the press in
the nineteenth century, Reeve was to write:
In common with everything of signal strength, Journalism
is a plant of slow and gradual growth.	 The Fourth
Estate, like the Third Estate, has reached its present
dimensions and its actual power from slight beginnings,
by continuous accretions, and through a long course of
systematic and unremitting encroachments. 	 Of a far more
modern date than the other estates of the realm, it has
overshadowed and surpassed them all.	 It has created
the want which it supplies.
	
It has obtained paramount
influence and authority partly by assuming them, but
still more by deserving them. 	 Of all puissances in the
political world, it is at once the mightiest, the most
irresponsible, the best administered, and the least
misused.	 And, taken in its history, position, and
relations, it is unquestionably the most grave, noticeable,
formidable phenomenon - the "greatest fact" - of our times.
(1)
According to Reeve, the press of the mid-nineteenth century owed
its influence to three factors: ittO the special value of the functions
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it exercises; to the remarkable talent with which it is habitually
conducted; and to the generally high and pure character which it
maintains". (2)	 In what was to be a classic statement on the role and
social significance of the press, Reeve went on to outline what he
considered to be the essential functions performed by the press in
democratic society:
In the first place, it is a necessary portion, complement,
and guardian of free institutions.	 In a country where
the people - i.e. the great mass of the educated classes -
govern, where they take the ceaseless and paramount
interest in public affairs which is at once the inseparable
symptom and the surest safeguard of political and civil
liberty, where, in a word, they are the participating
citizens, not passive subjects, of the state, - it is of
the most essential consequence that they should be
furnished from day to day with the materials for informing
their minds and enlightening their judgement.	 II' they
are in any degree to control, to guide, to stimulate the
administration, they must, as far as possible, become
qualified to do so. 	 They need, therefore, to be kept
au courant of all transactions and events which bear upon
the interests or credit of their country.
Though it was to be a further six years before the final vestige
of governmental control over the press - the Paper Duty - was to be
repealed, the abolition of the tax on newspapers in 1855 was, for those
who fought for its repeal, the end of a long and bitter struggle - the
press had finally shaken off the heavy hand of government and was now,
at least technically, free.
The newspaper of the mid-nineteenth century, so lauded by Reeve
and many of his contemporaries, was without doubt the child of a slow
and difficult birth. 	 Ever since Caxtori first brought the art of
printing to England in 1476, the press has been viewed by the state and
the ruling-classes as a dangerous instrument of subversion to be
smashed if possible, controlled, intimidated and persecuted if not.
The sixteenth and seventeenth centuries in particular, were to witness
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a rapid extension in the state's control over the press as a succession
of Tudor and Stuart monarchs built up a comprehensive and complex
system of control and regulation in an effort to check public opinion
at source. 4	The principal instruments for controlling the press
during this period were the Stationers' Company, which regulated the
printing trade through a system of special "permits" or "patents"; the
licensing system, which required that published works in certain
specific areas such as religion and politics be submitted for prior
examination by representatives of the state - usually the Archbishop
of Canterbury and the Bishop of London; and the laws of treason and
seditious libel)
Though the system of control and regulation established during
this period was to be both more repressive and more ruthlessly enforced
than any subsequent system, as a means of controlling and limiting the
spread and influence of printing it was to prove ineffective. 	 Once
the genie of printing was out of the bottle, even the most repressive
legislation, ruthlessly backed up by the state, was incapable of
putting it back.
	 The social, political and religious forces which the
system of' control over the press was designed to contain could at best
be stalled; they could not be stopped - least of all, as Curran has
rightly pointed out, by a state so ill-equipped for the task:
Direct censorship of the printed word in Britain was
never fully effective.	 Even during the period of' the
most systematic repression under the early Stuart
monarchy when the offending authors could be publically
whipped, their faces branded, their nostrils slit, and
their ears chopped off (on alternative weeks allowing
for recuperation), the absence of modern law enforcement
agencies prevented the effective control of print
the state lacked the sophisticated apparatus necessary
to control production, monitor output, regulate
distribution, stop the import of prohibited material and
neutralize or destroy dissident elements in society -
essential if coercive censorship were to be effective.
(6)
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In the late seventeenth century the system for regulating the
press which had been built up over the preceding 180 years was subjected
to strains and stresses which it could scarcely withstand, and
ultimately, under the combined pressure of religious, political and
trade interests, it collapsed.
Controlling the Press Phase Two: The "Taxes on Knowledge"
In the period immediately following the demise of the licensing
system in 1695, the future of the press looked secure. 	 Stimulated by
the absence of control, newspaper production expanded and, by the end
of the opening decade of the eighteenth century, twenty papers of two
or four pages were appearing weekly, twice-weekly, and in one case
daily in London a1one. 7	This expansion, though at a much slower
rate, was also being repeated in the provinces with the development of
a weekly press.	 Two weekly papers were established in the period
1695-1701; eight in 1701-10; nine in l7ll_20.(8)	 When judged in
terms of its content the press during this period, and in particular
the daily press such as it was, took few, if any, liberties with its
new-found freedom. 	 The pioneer of daily journalism, the
Daily Courant established in 1702, was scarcely a threat to the
established order.	 Ignoring completely political events on its own
doorstep, the Daily Courant, like many of the earlier newsbooks,
confined itself to reprinting extracts from continental news-sheets.
Home news, such as it was, was tailored almost exclusively to the
needs and concerns of the commercial middle-classes: lists of
imports and exports, dealings in stocks, lists of bankruptcies,
together with a small body of commercial advertisements.9
The era of freedom ushered in by the collapse of the licensing
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system, however, was to prove shortlived; the growing popularity of
newspapers, particularly among the working-class, was enough to
reactivate old fears among the ruling-classes of the potentially
subversive nature of the press.'°
	 Fearful of what might happen if
newspaper reading became general, and backed up by an increasingly
overcrowded printing trade, Parliament again toyed with the idea of
(11)licensing.	 Though attempts to resuscitate some form of direct
control over the press were to prove unsuccessful, it was obvious that
the climate of opinion within Parliament was again in favour of control.
It was against this background of expanding newspaper production
and ruling-class fear that Parliament revealed its new strategy for
controlling the press.	 In 1712, against a background of war, the
first of a series of Stamp Acts (10 Anne, cap. 18) was introduced by
Lord Bolingbroke.	 The Act, which was to set the pattern of
governmental control over the press for the next 150 years, contained
four provisions affecting the press: a tax on newspapers and pamphlets
(initially levied atid. per sheet but progressively increased to L+d.
a copy by 1815); a tax on advertisements (initially set at is. per
advertisement carried but increased to the prohibitive level of 3s. 6d.
by 1815); an excise duty on paper; and the requirement that all
newspapers bear the name and address of the publisher (for ready
identification) and be registered at the Stamp Office - failure to
comply incurred a penalty of £20 together with the loss of all
copyrights.2
The principal aim of this new strategy as it evolved from 1712
onwards, was not to destroy the press, for if properly controlled,
newspapers could be used to secure support for government policies,
but to neutralize its potential as an instrument of dissent. 	 Simply
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conceived as it was, the strategy of controlling the press through
fiscal means rather than through direct censorship and control, had the
advantage of killing several birds with the same stone: by
artificially inflating the cost of newspapers the tax would place the
price of the press beyond the means of the working-class and, by
pushing up the cost of publishing and thereby making it difficult to
operate newspapers at a profit, restrict newspaper ownership to the
"respectable" middle- and upper-classes.
	
This latter aim was further
served by the establishment of a security system in 1819 which, in an
attempt to exclude "pauper" management, required the payment of
substantial security bonds - £300 in London and £200 in the provinces.
It was widely believed at the time that the increased costs imposed
by the 1712 Act would lead to the financial collapse of the press.
Writing in the Spectator in August, 1712, Joseph Addison predicted that
the press would sink under the "Weight of the Stamp":
This is the Day on which many eminent Authors will
probably Publish their Last Words.	 I am afraid that
few of our Weekly Historians, who are Men that above
all delight in War, will be able to subsist under the
Weight of the Stamp, and an approaching Peace.
A Sheet of Blank Paper that must have this new
imprimatur clapt upon it, before it is qualified to
Communicate anything to the Publick, will make its way
in the World but very heavily. 	 In short, the
Necessity of carrying a Stamp, and the Improbability
of notifying a Bloody Battle, will, I am afraid, both
concur to the sinking of those thin Folios, which
have every Day retailed to us the History of Europe
for several years past. (13)
In the event, Addison's obituary was to prove somewhat premature.
The tax did claim its victims, but the collapse anticipated by Addison
was to be neither complete nor permanent. 	 In London at least five
papers were suspended due to the impost while a similar number were
able to survive the Act by raising their retail price from ld. to lid.
(14)
-13-
The effect of the tax on the provincial press was more severe with at
least seven weekly papers closing.
In the short term the 1712 Act served only to retard temporarily
the circulation of those papers that survived its enactment; in the
long term it did little to reverse the rising demand for newspapers:
The forces seeking expression through an expansion
of the press were too strong. 	 Trade was increasing
and with it the size and power of the commercial
classes.	 The development of industrialisation made
necessary a more educated artisan class.	 Population
rose: by the end of the century it was to be nine
million compared with five and a quarter at the
beginning.	 Everywhere the habit of newspaper reading
was increasing.	 Within forty years the circulation
figures anxiously noted by Queen Anne's Ministers had
trebled. (16)
Even had the legislation been tightly drafted and rigorously
enforced, and it was neither, it is unlikely that the 1712 Act would
have succeeded in destroying the press.	 As it was, inadequate drafting
left a number of loopholes which newspaper proprietors were quick to
exploit, and within months of becoming law, the new strategy was already
in a state of some disrepair.	 By failing to allow for papers of more
than one sheet, the Act opened the way for the extended newspaper
registered as a pamphlet and paying a lower duty. 	 Newspaper
proprietors were not slow in exploiting this loophole and by 1713
evasion of the duty was widespread. 8	Moreover, though this defect
in the Act was immediately apparent, no action was taken to remedy it
until 1725 when a new Stamp Act (11 George 1, cap. 8. 1725) applied the
existing legislation to all newspapers regardless of their length.
Indeed, the ability of the publishers to identify and exploit
inadequacies in the legislation was to be a consistent feature of the
Newspaper Duties from 1712 onwards, necessitating the periodic closure
of loopholes and the strengthening of law enforcement measures.9
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As a strategy for controlling the spread and influence of the press,
the "taxes on knowledge" were to prove even less effective than the
systems of control which preceded it. 	 Despite successive increases in
the level of taxation, and the resulting increased price of the stamped
press, the demand for newspapers continued to grow throughout the
eighteenth and nineteenth centuries. 20
	Moreover, as a means of
neutralising the press as an instrument of political dissent, the
strategy of using fiscal controls had one significant flaw: its success
or failure depended upon the willingness of publishers to pay the duty.
For those newspapers that complied to the law, the effect of the taxes
was significant:
Only if denied the hope of economic independence could
the press be intimidated and bribed, changed from a
potentially dangerous instrument of public opinion
into the servant of Government and factions: a tamed
animal.	 Once tamed it became, as those bred for
freedom often do in captivity, sour and mangy. 	 As a
consequence the history of the press throughout most
of the eighteenth and early part of the nineteenth
centuries is mainly that of a journalism corrupted by
bribes and subsidies, usually partisan to the extreme,
mostly ill-conducted, almost always easily intimidated
and still more easily bought. (21)
Deprived of economic independence, large sections of the stamped
press became little more than the chattel of those wealthy enough to
afford its services, and throughout much of the eighteenth and
nineteenth centuries journalism became a synonym for corruption,
dishonesty, and political intrigue.22
The paradox of the "taxes on knowledge tt , however, was that, by
closing off one potential source of political dissent by emasculating
the stamped press, it stimulated the development of another far more
subversive source - the radical unstamped press. 23	Produced,
financed, distributed, and espousing the class interests of the
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working-class, during the l830s the radical press was to have a
significant impact on working-class culture and politics. 	 According
to Curran, the radical press played an important part in promoting
directly and indirectly the growth of working-class political and
industrial organisations; eroded passive adherence to the existing
social order; helped foster a sense of corporate class consciousness
among the working-class; undermined normative support for the social
order by challenging the legitimacy of' the political and economic
institutions on which it was based; and, by reflecting the
perspectives of the vanguard of the working-class movement, profoundly
influenced the attitudes and beliefs of large numbers of working-class
(24)people.
Addressing a House of Commons debate on the Newspaper Duties in
1832, Edward Bulwer-Lytton, a central figure in the anti-tax movement,
isolated the paradoxical effect of the taxes as being in itself
sufficient to justify their abolition.	 Attacking those who opposed a
reduction in the level of taxation, Bulwer-Lytton observed:
Did Honourable Members know the class of publications
thus suffered to influence the opinions of their fellow
countrymen? ... were they not aware that some of them
struck at the very root of property, talked of the
injustice of paying rent, insisted on the unanimous
seizure of all lands in the kingdom, declared that there
was no moral guilt in the violation of law, and even
advocated assassination itself.	 Thus, then, it was
clear that the stamp duty did not prevent the
circulation of dangerous doctrines.
	
It gave them, on
the contrary, by the interest which the mere risk of
prosecution always begets in the popular mind, a value,
a weight, and a circulation, which they could not
otherwise acquire. (25)
In Buiwer-Lytton's view, and it was one shared by many of the key
figures in the middle-class opposition to the taxes, the high price of
the "respectable" press was a major obstacle to winning the
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working-class over to the virtues of capitalism. 	 By supporting the
"taxes on knowledge" Buiwer-Lytton complained, "you sell the poison for
(26)
a penny, and the antidote at seven pence".	 In the long term this,
rather than any other argument, was to prove the most decisive factor
in bringing about the end of the "taxes on knowledge")27
The historical significance of the "taxes on knowledge" however,
lies not in whether or not they were successful in their intended aim,
but rather in the ideological legacy which those who fought against them
were to bequeath coritemporarypress theory.
	
For, during the course of
the campaign which was to be waged against these taxes, a series of
concepts first propounded by Puritan and non-conformist thinkers as a
defence against religious intolerance, were to be revived and utilised
by eighteenth and nineteenth century radicals in a concerted attack
against governmental control over the press. 	 During the course of
this attack, a theory of the press was to be developed which even to-day,
nearly two centuries later, remains the most cogent theory as to the
role and social significance of the press in liberal democratic society,
and remains one of the clearest statements as to the proper
relationship between the press, the state and the people.
Stated briefly, the Fourth Estate, or free press theory, as it is
more commonly known, posits a historical link between the development
of a free press and the development and maintenance of a politically
free society.	 According to advocates of this theory, the emergence of
a press free from state control from the late nineteenth century onwards,
formed part of a much wider process of political change in British
society - the movement away from government by divine right or
government by inheritance, to a form of government which derived its
ultimate authority from the will of the people.	 The emergence of a
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press free from state control, economically independent, and acting as
a forum of public opinion, supporters of the theory have argued, did
not simply reflect the movement towards greater individual freedom,
social justice, and participant democracy; it was an indispensable and
chronological corollary of it.
	
According to Herd:
A free Press has made possible the realisation of
the ideal of government by the people in this and
other countries; a fearless, critical free Press
is the one indispensable safeguard to ensure the
survival of democracy in the present dangerous
crisis of civilization. (28)
This conceptualisation of the role of the press in the development
and maintenance of democratic society has been a dominant and recurring
theme in many historical studies on the British press.
	
According to
this perspective, as well as servicing the economic system by bringing
together the buyers and sellers of goods through the medium of
advertising and providing entertainment, the rise of an independent
press helped democratize British political institutions by exposing
them to the full blast of public opinion; facilitated the emergence of
a rational and informed electorate by acting as a channel for the flow
of ideas and information; acted as both a "watchdog" over, and a check
on, the abuse of governmental power by bringing to public attention
instances of corruption, waste and incompetence; functioned as a
counter-balance to concentrations of power brought about by economic
inequality; and, by facilitating the flow of information between
political institutions and the people, acted as an essential link
between the state and its citizens.(29)	 The nineteenth century writer
Frederick Grimke neatly encapsulated this theory when he wrote that
the press:
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is a component part of the machinery of free
government.	 There would be an inconsistency, then,
in arguing whether it should be free. 	 It is the
organ of public opinion, and the great office which
it performs is to effect the redistribution of power
throughout the community.	 It accomplishes this
purpose by distributing knowledge and diffusing a
common sympathy among the great maof the
population. (30)
Despite the criticisms that have been levelled against the Fourth
Estate theory, and, as we shall see below, there have been many, the
notion that the press has a unique and specific responsibility for the
shaping of ideas and the formation of public policies, and exercises, or
ought to exercise, a beneficent power separate from, and morally
superior to, that of government has, from the mid-nineteenth century
onwards, been established as part of orthodox thinking on the role of
the press in liberal democratic society. 	 Indeed, so entrenched has
this conception of the press become that, in the late twentieth century,
it is rare to find an analysis of the British press which does not at
some stage or other address itself to the political role of the press -
even if it is only to observe that it is not performing this role as
well as it might.
Even the advent of television, which nightly attracts audiences
for news bulletins greater than the total circulation of the national
daily press put together, has done little to erode the dominant
conception of the British press as a vital element in the dialogue
of democracy:
Although it is fashionable to play down the influence
of the press and be mesmerised instead by the millions
that watch television, newspapers exert a huge influence
on the debate of democracy. 	 This influence radiates
out from the quality press. 	 The subjects it plays up
in the news, the issues it selects, the comment it
makes on public personalities, they all filter into the
popular press and on television and shape our lives and
the decisions which affect them. (32)
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Nowhere is this concept of the press and its role in the
democratic process more deeply entrenched than within the profession of
journalism itself.	 Almost two centuries after they were first
formulated, two of the central concepts of' the Fourth Estate theory -
the notion of journalists as the "watchdog" of government, and the
public's right and need to be kept informed if they are meaningfully to
participate in the decision-making process - continues to provide
journalists with the clearest definition of' their professional role and
the central legitimation for that role. 	 In 1971, Sir Charles Curran,
former Director General of the BBC, echoing the words of Henry Reeve
over a century earlier, described the role of the broadcaster in the
following terms:
We have a responsibility ... to provide a rationally
based and balanced service of news which will enable
adult people to make basic judgments about political
policy in their capacity as voting citizens of a
democracy ... we have to add to this basic supply of
news a service of contextual comment which will give
understanding as well as information.	 The moral
responsibility of the broadcaster here is not simply
to keep the ring open for all opinion but to see
that everybody has a chance to appear in it.
The Fourth Estate theory not only provides us with a particular
way of understanding the role of the press in democratic society, but
perhaps equally as important, it also oi'feus a standard against which
its performance of that role may be judged.	 This chapter examines the
central principles of the theory as they have evolved from the
eighteenth and nineteenth centuries to the present day. 	 No attempt is
made to provide a detailed account of the struggle that was waged
against the "taxes on knowledge" since this material is already
(34)
available in a number of' standard histories. 	 Nor is any attempt
made to examine or evaluate competing theories as to the role and
social significance of the press in advanced capitalist society, as it
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would not be possible to do justice to such theories within the scope
of a single chapter.	 Instead, this, the first chapter in the thesis,
has two main aims.	 First, to isolate the key theoretical principles
which underpin the Fourth Estate theory, and by reference to which
journalists seek to legitimate their claim to perform a vital function
in the democratic process. 	 And, secondly, by isolating these
principles, provide a coherent theoretical standard against which the
performance of the British press in its coverage of Northern Ireland
may be judged.
Underlying assumptions
The democratic doctrine of freedom of speech and of the
press, whether we regard it as a natural and inalienable
right or not, rests upon certain assumptions. 	 One of
these is that men desire to know the truth and will be
disposed to be guided by it. 	 Another is that the sole
method of' arriving at the truth in the long run is by the
free competition of opinion in the open market. 	 Another
is that, since men will invariably differ in their
opinions, each man must be permitted to urge freely and
even strenuously, his own opinion, provided he accords
others the same right.	 And the final assumption is that
from this mutual toleration and comparison of diverse
opinions the one that seems most rational will emerge and
be generally accepted.
Though the struggle against the "taxes on knowledge" in the
nineteenth century was conducted on many different fronts and by
groups motivated and representing different class interests, the
theory that was to emerge from this struggle was essentially a liberal
construct.	 Not only was the struggle against governmental control
over the press (which was simply one front in the wider struggle of
the middle-classes against aristocratic authority and hierarchy)
largely waged in the rhetoric of' liberalism, but liberalism also
provided the Fourth Estate theory with its intellectual, political and
economic framework.	 Indeed, as Siebert among others has pointed out,
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in order to understand the principles governing the role of the press
in democratic society, one needs to understand the basic philosophy of
liberalism s it developed in the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries.
(36)
Stated briefly, the principles of liberal philosophy, as with
any other philosophy, are based on the answers to questions about the
nature of man, the nature of society and man's relation to it, and the
nature of knowledge and truth.
The classical liberal model of society, as developed over the
period 1650-1850, was a model, in its essentials, of the free play of
individuals leading ultimately to social progress, harmony and
equilibrium.	 Man, according to liberal philosophy, was a rational
being capable of' organising the world around him and making decisions
which advanced his own interest.	 In the long run the aggregate of
these individuals' decisions, each taken as rationally as possible in
pursuit of individual self-interest, would, liberals argued, advance
the general cause of civilization.
The liberal view of society and the state was also heavily
influenced by the belief that man was naturally the sole proprietor of
his own person, capacity and destiny. 	 As Manning observes, in its
earlier phases, from Locke to Mill, "liberalism treats the individual
as prior to society as a historical and philosophical concept. 	 Many
liberals assert that society is not more than the sum total of its
members whose rights or interests its institutions are properly
concerned to protect".	 This view, that man existed prior to
society, was also to provide the key rallying cry in the wider liberal
struggle against the old order of status, privilege and hierarchy -
the claim to natural rights and the assertion that all men were
inherently equal.
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Although men "contracted" into society in order to remedy the
defects of life outside it - the "state of nature" - they entered into
this contract already possessed of certain fundamental or natural
rights.	 Given that these rights were anterior to those given to them
by society, society could neither take them away or abridge them.
Within this perspective, the desirability of society and its
institutions was evaluated in terms of the degree of' freedom it
allowed its citizens in their sociRl, political and economic
activities.	 As Siebert has observed:
Many adherents of liberalism cast a nostalgic eye
at man in a state of nature where he was unencumbered
by much of the paraphernalia of civilization.
Although society undoubtedly can contribute much to
the well-being of' man, at the same time protections
should be found against the tendency of society to
take over the major role and become an end in itself.
The philosophers of liberalism emphatically deny that
the state is the highest expression of human endeavour,
although they admit with some hesitancy that the state
is a useful and even necessary instrument.	 The state
exists as a method of providing the individual with a
milieu in which he can realize his own potentialities.
When it fails to further this end, it becomes a
handicap which should be either abolished or
drastically modified.	 Liberal philosophy does not
accept the proposition that a society becomes a
separate entity of' greater importance than the
individual members which comprise it. (38)
The liberal theory of the nature of knowledge and truth also
gives paramount importance to the individual whose consciousness is
viewed as the absolute origin of all knowledge.
The libertarian theory of knowledge and truth strongly
resembles the theological doctrines of early Christianity.
The power to reason was God-given just as the knowledge
of' good and evil was God-given.	 With such an inheritance
from his Maker, man could achieve an awareness of the
world around him through his own efforts. 	 On this
foundation, the libertarians built a superstructure which
differed drastically from that developed by the
philosophers of the Middle Ages.	 Man's inheritance
became less important and his individual ability to solve
the problems of the universe more obvious. 	 Reason was to
act upon the evidence of' the senses, not as in earlier
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times after all authority had been exhausted, but as the
only way to find an authoritative explanation ... The
conception that there is one basic unassailable and
demonstrable explanation for natural phenomena as
developed by mechanistic experimentation and observation
became the model upon which libertarian philosophers
proceeded to generalize in all areas of' knowledge.
Although the path to truth might lie through a morass of
argument and dispute, that which lay at the end of the
path was definite, provable and acceptable to
rational men.
It was these central assumptions about the social priority of
the individual in social, political and economic matters, their
ability to use their powers of reasoning in the pursuit of truth and
self-interest, and the concept of natural rights, that were to provide
the philosophical basis for the Fourth Estate theory.
Basic principles
The basic and original argument for a free press is the same as
that for any freedom of expression of' idea. 	 And though it long
predates John Milton, it was perhaps most eloquently and persuasively
expressed by him.
	 The immediate occasion for Milton's interest in
the liberty of the press was the difficulties he faced with the
Stationers' Company over his pamphlet on divorce. 	 In Areopagitica,
published in 1644, Milton laid out a case against preventive
censorship which, though largely neglected at the time, was to
influence the thinking of successive generations of' liberals in the
eighteenth and nineteenth centuries.
Milton's opposition to censorship was based partly on the ground
of free will, and partly on the ground that it retarded rather than
advanced the cause of' truth and progress. 	 He argued first, that
mistaken censorship might result in the irremediable loss of an
element of truth, and that only continual debate could safeguard
against this danger.	 Secondly, that with censorship men were more
-24-
likely to make mistakes, because truth could only be properly
distinguished by comparison with evil:
what wisdom can there be to choose, what continence
to forbear, without knowledge of evil? ... I cannot
praise a fugitive and cloistered virtue unexercised
and unbreathed, that never sallies out and seeks her
adversary, but slinks out of the race, where that
immortal garland is to be run, not without heat
and dust.(40)
Thirdly, that as truth is always stranger than falsehood, censorship
did it a disservice by denying it the opportunity of' proving its
strength in open competition:
And though all the winds of doctrine were let loose
to play upon the earth, so truth be in the field, we
do injuriously by licensing and prohibiting to misdoubt
her strength ... who ever knew truth put to the worse,
in free and open encounter?	 Her confuting is the best
and surest suppressing ... For who knows not that truth
is strong, next to the Almighty; she needs no policies,
nor stratagems, nor licensing to make her victorious;
those are the shifts and the defences that error uses
against her power: give her but room, and do not bind
her when she sleeps. (41)
Fourthly, that rather than procuring any good, preliminary
censorship could in the long term prove harmful.	 The requirement
that written works be submitted for prior examination would paralyse
research and discourage writers.	 Finally, and at the core of Milton's
argument, was his conviction that men must search for the truth because
rio truth could be regarded as sufficient for all time and it was not
enough to hold a belief on the grounds of tradition or convention:
Truth is compared in scripture to a streaming fountain;
if her waters flow not in a perpetual progression, they
sicken into a muddy pool of conformity and tradition
if Ca man] believes things only because his master
says so ... though his belief be true, yet the very
truth he holds becomes his heresy. (42)
In seeking to deprive men of' their right to choose between good
and evil, truth and falsehood, preliminary censorship, Milton contended
-25-
also deprived them of their intellectual independence.
	
For without
the right to choose, and the right to make their own mistakes, men
could never be truly independent:
Many there be that complain of divine Providence
suffering Adam to transgress. Foolish tongues!
when God gave him reason, he gave him freedom to
choose, for reason is but choosing; he had else
been an artificial Adam as he is in motions.
As a principle relating to the proper relationship between the
state and the press, the one advocated by Milton in the Areopagitica
was relatively simple: no attempt should be made by the state to
censor or prohibit written works in advance. 	 Lacking as it does the
prescriptive character associated with later free press theory, the
Areopagitica falls far short of being a comprehensive statement on the
liberty of the press.	 Nevertheless, it did bequeath to subsequent
press theorists two central and interrelated concepts, which, to this
day, continue to inform thinking about the nature and role of the press
in democratic society: the "open market of ideas" and the "self-
righting process".
The self-regulating market of ideas.
RAILMEN can take a lot of credit in this country for
a free press.	 It is because the railways normally
carry newspapers from end to end of the island overnight
that newspapers enjoy the large sales which give them
the economic strength which delivers them from
government or party subsidy. 	 That function gives
railmen power - which certain Aslef members have been
trying to exercise, in their anger at a story in last
Friday's Sun about unconscientious engine drivers.
But it gives them no rights.	 If newspapers needed an
Aslef ticket before they travelled, control by a single
authority would be substituted for our present
comparative diversity.
Mr. Steven Fcrey, an Aslef branch secretary at King's
Cross, says he believes in the freedom of the press
except when it tells lies; what he sees as lies that is.
But this is a subjective, one-sided approach to the truth
which has nothing to do with press freedom.
	 What one
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man sees as a lie another regards as the truth. 	 The
diversity of the press provides the way out of this
confusion.	 Impeding the spread of that diversity
damages press freedom and does the cause of the train
drivers no good whatsoever.
The concept of a "free market in ideas", though of an earlier date,
paralleled the liberal case for economic freedom.	 And during the first
half of the nineteenth century, the movement for the repeal of the
"taxes on knowledge" was integrated into the wider liberal campaign for
free trade.	 According to classical liberal theory, economic freedom
was embodied in the right of individual proprietors to pursue their
economic interests free from external interference.
	
For the state to
interfere in the market to the advantage of one party or another, not
only went against natural justice, it also retarded progress,
restricted the diversity of products available to the consumer, and in
the process restricted individual choice. 	 According to this view,
only the furnace of open competition in a free market could ensure that
the consumer was the final arbiter in deciding the success or failure
of a given product.
The principle of free and open competition in the market,
opponents of the "taxes on knowledge" argued, was applicable to all
markets whether they traded in minerals or ideas:
Let all with something to say be free to express
themselves.	 The true and sound will survive; the
false and unsound will be vanquished.	 Government
should keep out of the battle and not weigh the odds
in favour of one side or the other.	 And even
though the false may gain a temporary victory, that
which is true, by drawing to its defence additional
forces, will through the self-righting process,
ultimately survive.
(46)
As Weiner, in his study of' the War of' the Unstainped 	 points
out, during the 1830s and 1840s, the argument that news was a commodity
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analogous to any other, and that the principle of free discussion was
fully comprehensive only within a commercial context, was one advanced
by many within the anti-tax movement:
To check inquiry and attempt to regulate the progress
and direction of opinions, by prescription and
penalties, is to disturb the order of nature, and is
analogous, in its mischievous tendency, to the system
of forcing the capital and industry of the comunity
into channels, which they would never spontaneously
seek, instead of suffering private interests to
direct them to their most predictable employment. (47)
In drawing support for their argument that only free competition
in the marketplace was capable of ensuring the dissemination of sound
doctrines throughout the country, middle-class reformers increasingly
pointed to the radical unstamped press which was a constant thorn in
the side of government and which espoused increasingly pernicious
doctrines.	 The success of these papers, it was argued, demonstrated
that newspaper taxes rather than preventing subversion were actually
encouraging it.	 By making it difficult to operate newspapers at a
profit, it was argued, the taxes discouraged men of sound doctrines
and a respect for authority from educating the lower classes.
According to Collet Dobson Collet, a key figure in the parliamentary
campaign:
The imposition of the Security System on all newspapers
that did pay the Stamp Duty brought the professional
critics of the Government into a sort of corporation,
enjoying free postage for their taxed newspapers, but
having a prospective rod held over them calculated to
moderate any excessive zeal against the Government of
the day.	 Those public-minded private men who were
anxious to educate the people and to permit them to
educate themselves were forbidden the only process by
which their views could be carried out. 	 This was
rendered impossible by the Stamp Duty.	 A penny paper
could not pay for a fourpenny stamp.	 The field of
public instruction was therefore left open only to
those who were poor enough to have little to lose by
breaking the law. (48)
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This argument that the Stamp Duty deprived the lower classes of
newspapers of quality and moderation was to dominate the parliamentary
debate of 1834 on a motion to repeal the taxes.	 Forwarding the
motion, Bulwer-Lytton was to argue:
You either forbid to the poor by this tax, in a great
measure all political knowledge, or you give to them,
unanswered and unpurified, doctrines the most dangerous -
you put the medicine under lock and key, and you leave
the poison on the shelf; ... you create two publics; to
the one public of educated men, in the upper and middle
ranks, whom no newspaper could, on moral points, very
dangerously mislead, you give the safe and rational
papers; to the other public of men far more easily
influenced - poor, ignorant, distressed - men for whom
all the conclusions and disorders of society arise (for
the crimes of the poor are the punishment of the rich)
- to the other public, whom you ought to be most careful
to sooth, to guide, and to enlighten, you give the
heated invective of demagogues and fanatics.
In supporting the motion another speaker also stressed the
subversive nature of the radical unstamped press:
Could such individuals be safely intrusted with the
teaching of the people of this country? Were their
honest opinions likely to be in favour of order, of
the institutions on which the particular form of
Government in this country was founded, and of the
institutions on which society itself depended? 	 Yet
the existing law gave a bounty to this class of
writers, whilst it imposed a tax on the publications
of men of respectability, station, and education,
whose honest opinions were likely to be in favour
of the institutions of this country.
"Ignorance", the speaker went on to argue, might make the working-class
"enemies of the Government, why not take steps as would make them its
friends". (51)
If the taxes were abolished and the laws of supply and demand
permitted to operate in a free and open market, then the present
monopoly enjoyed by the radical unstamped press would be broken as they
were forced to give way to their natural superiors: a cheap capitalist
press espousing the virtues of law and order, property, and free
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enterprise.	 The experience of the radical unstamped press in the
period following the repeal of the taxes suggests that such arguments
were not without an element of truth. (52)
In its most basic form the concept of a self-regulating free
market of ideas defines press freedom in a negative rather than a
positive sense: freedom is defined in terms of freedom from prior
constraint.	 So long as there are no obstacles (financial, political
or legal) to entering the marketplace of ideas, all who wanted to
express an opinion could do so.	 Whether individual newspapers
espoused the truth, or were politically neutral, was unimportant;
if an individual or group could not find a newspaper to their liking,
they could enter the market and produce their own. 	 The result	 would
be a myriad of opinions all competing for the public's attention.
Those opinions which survived in the market by attracting sufficient
buyers would most clearly reflect the demand for those opinions in the
market.	 Those who fared badly were thus left with two options:
respond to public demand, or go under.	 If the proprietor wished to
make a profit (and according to liberal theory all individuals were by
nature self-maximising), then he would have to respond to public demand.
The market-based system, thus formulated, functioned not only to produce
a diversity of opinions for public consumption, but also rendered the
power of newspaper proprietors accountable to the public.
Since the mid-nineteenth century this view that only privately
owned newspapers, independently financed by advertising revenue and
conducted as a property right, was capable of' ensuring a diversity of
opinions independent from the state has been established as part of
orthodox thinking on the press.	 And, as we shall see below, despite
the economic transformation of the British press following the gradual
abolition of the "taxes on knowledge" over the period 1833-61, it
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remains a vital item of belief for free press theorists.
Democracy and the press
The doubt, the fear, the conscious ignorance, the
consequent errors and exaggerated fancies of the
governments of countries where the Press is gagged,
constitute at once the inevitable consequence and the
appropriate punishment of that foolish sin.	 There
is panic because there is darkness; there is tyranny
because there is terror.
	
Here, thanks to our many-
headed and unfettered Press, the authorities are amply
informed, and they are informed in time.	 They have
early warning when they are treading in paths which
public sympathy will not go with them, and tending
towards proceedings for which the popular voice would
not grant absolution.	 In a country which has reached
this stage of freedom and self-government on which
England now stands, ministers must govern in conformity
with the will of the effective body of the nation;
and how can they ascertain this save through those
great organs of utterance which somtimes form and
sometimes express the general opinion, but can never
be ignorant of it or out of harmony with it.
If the liberal doctrine of free trade in conjunction with the
Miltonian concept of a free market in ideas, gave the press its market-
based rationale, then democratic theory, especially where it relates to
public opinion and party government, provided it with an ideology and
a social purpose.	 During the first half of the nineteenth century
the claim advanced by liberal philosophers and free press theorists,
that a press free from state control was not only a symbol of a
politically free society but a necessary condition of such a society,
was to provide press reformers with their most powerful argument
against the "taxes on knowledge".
Nowhere was the importance of a free press stressed more
vociferously than within the political philosophy of the Utilitarians.
Indeed, so central is the role of a free press within Utilitarian
theory that it is difficult to exaggerate its importance.	 For Bentham
without a free press there could be neither good government nor
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indirect legislation.	 In A Fragment of Government Bentham had asked,
what is the difference between free and despotic government?	 It is
not a question of more or less power, he answered, but of its use.
A free government depends:
on the responsibility of the governors; or the right
which the subject has of having the reasons publicly
assigned and canvassed of every act of power that is
exerted over him - on the liberty of the press; or
the security with which every man ... may make known
his complaints and remonstrances to the whole
community.
Newspapers, Bentharn was to write in. 1773:
propagate to every corner of the Empire alarms for
the people's security, circumstances of felicity for
their joy and lessons for their instruction ... break
down by degrees fragments from the bulky pile of Science
to knead them into the mass of general intelligence
display examples of Vice for their avoidance, and of
Virtue for their imitation. 	 The infallible
preservatives against devotions and superstitious
imposture - which making every part labour for the whole,
joy for the whole, sorrow for the whole, contribute more
than any regulations that can be devised to strengthen
that social bond which collects the scattered citizens
into members of one great family: which exercises the
minds of men for the public service as the games in
Greece and Rome did their bodies - which are sources of
amusement to so many to whom misfortune have denied
domestic comforts, and help them to support the fatigue
of being.
It is only when combined with that other central tenet of
Utilitarianism, the concept of public opinion as a moral sanction
against bad government, that the real significance of the press for
the philosophical radicals of the eighteenth and nineteenth century is
revealed.	 As Rosen, in his study 6 of Benthain points out, despite
being a relatively new concept in political theory, the appeal to
public opinion as a standard of legitimacy and the stimulation of
public opinion as a political strategy was an acknowledged part of the
programme of philosophical radicalism in Bentham's day.
	
For Benthain,
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who provided one of the first detailed discussions on the subject,
public opinion was a vital element in the success of constitutional
democracy.	 Commenting on the power and importance of public opinion
in the Constitutional Code, he was to write:
To the pernicious exercise of the power of
government it is the only check; to the beneficial,
an indispensable supplement. 	 Able rulers lead it;
prudent rulers lead or follow it; foolish rulers
disregard it.	 Even at the present stage in the
career of civilization, its dictates coincide, on
most points, with those of the greatest happiness
principle; on some, however, it still deviates
from them: but, as its deviations have all along
been less and less numerous, and less wide, sooner
or later they will cease to be discernible;
aberration will vanish, coincidence will be complete.
(57)
Writing forty years later, John Stuart Mill thought that the case
for a free press as a means of ensuring good government was so
irrefutable that it no longer needed to be put:
The time, it is to be hoped, is gone by when any
defence would be necessary of the "liberty of the
press" as one of the securities against corrupt or
tyrannical government. 	 No argument, we may suppose,
can now be needed against permitting a legislature
or an executive, not identified in interest with
the people, to proscribe opinions to them and
determine what doctrines or what arguments they
should be allowed to hear.	 This aspect of the
question, besides, has been so often and so
triumphantly enforced by preceding writers that it
needs not to be specifically insisted on in
this piece.
For those who saw public opinion as the ultimate sanction against
bad government, the power of the press knew no bounds.	 Addressing the
House of Commons in 1810, Sheridan was to declare:
Give me the liberty of the press, and I will give
the Minister a venal House of Peers, I will give him
a corrupt and servile House of Commons, I will give
him the full swing of the patronage of office,
I will give him the whole host of ministerial
influence, I will give him all the power that place
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can confer upon him to purchase submission and
overawe resistance and yet, armed with the liberty
of the Press, I will go forth to meet him
undismayed	 (60)
The emphasis placed on the press as a check on bad government by
liberal reformers and philosophers during the early part of the
nineteenth century, is hardly surprising given the inadequacies of the
democratic system that prevailed in England.	 As Henry Reeve, one of
the most vociferous advocates of the free press, was to complain
in 1855:
The House of Commons is not, and perhaps never can
be made, a complete and perfect representative of all
classes, all interests, all shades of opinion.
Certainly it has not realised that bright ideal.
Non-electors are more numerous than electors.
Thousands of Englishmen of nearly every rank -
dwellers in towns that are not boroughs, dwellers in
in counties who are not freeholders nor large tenants,
residents in cities who are not householders - have
no members of Parliament to listen to them and to
speak for them.	 The holders of unusual opinions, or
of moderate or philosophic doctrines, votaries of
'coming' creeds, the members of minorities in a word,
are unrepresented in Parliament, unless by some
happy accident.	 The House of Commons, too, is even
more inadequate and insufficient than it is incomplete
and partial as a representation of the acting, thinking,
stirring, discussing crowds of political Englishmen.
It sits only half' the year.	 It. is overwhelmed with
details of business.	 It cannot suffice to give
utterance to half the thoughts that are bursting for
expression, or ask half the questions that the
country is bursting to have answered. (61)
Until the ideal of democracy was realised, Reeve went on to argue,
only a free press could ensure that those denied access to the
decision-making process could have their voices heard:
We all feel that we could not do without the vent for
expression which the Newspaper Press affords us. 	 We
would explode were it not for such an immediate and
ample safety-valve. We could not possibly wait for
the slow expression, the inadequate and inaccurate
exposition of our sentiments and opinions which only
could be furnished to us by our senators in St. Stephens!
It is not too much to say that if by any accident
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journalism were to become extinct, such a Parliamentary
Reform as the wildest of us have never dreamed of,
would become an instant and paramount necessity.
Those who have no share in the choice of members, those
who feel themselves inadequately represented or
misrepresented, those who find in Parliament none who
hold their peculiar doctrines or who are qualified to
give them effective utterance - would all join to
insist upon such an entire renovation and
reconstitution of the representative assembly as would
throw all previous 'organic changes' into the shade.
(62)
For the Utilitarian, however, the press was a multi-purposed
instrument, and its contribution to the democratic process went far
beyond its ability to function as a check on bad government. 	 Indeed
so important were the political functions claimed on behalf of the
press by liberal reformers that without them representative democracy
was destined to remain little more than a hollow fiction. 	 "It is
perfectly clear," wrote James Mill in advancing the case for a free
press as a prerequisite of democratic government:
that all chance of the advantage to the people, from
having the choice of their rulers, depends upon their
making a good choice. 	 If they make a bad choice - if
they elect people either incapable, or disinclined, to
use well the power entrusted to them, they incur the
same evils to which they are doomed when they are
deprived of the due control over those by whom their
affairs are administered.
We may then ask, if there is any possible means by which
the people can make a good choice, besides the liberty
of the press?	 The very foundation of a good choice is
knowledge.	 The fuller and more perfect the knowledge,
the better the chance, where all sinister interest is
absent, of a good choice.	 How can people receive the
most perfect knowledge relative to the characters of
those who present themselves for their choice, but by
information conveyed freely, and without reserve, from
one to another? (63)
As an instrument for creating an informed and enlightened public
opinion, and thus create the conditions necessary for self-government,
the press was ideally suited. 	 Located in the gap between electors and
elected, it not only assisted the people to understand the policies of
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government and thereby enable them to guide and stimulate the
administration, but, by acting as a barometer of public opinion, it
also functioned to link political representatives and their
constituents in the period between elections. 	 In doing so, it was
argued, the press was more than simply a channel for information -
it was an essential link between political institutions and the people.
(64)
For Bentham the press was "not only the appropriate organ of the
public opinion tribunal, but the only regularly and constantly acting
one". 6	The press, W.T. Stead apostrophized in Government by
Journalism, were the "great inspector, with a myriad eyes, who never
sleeps, and whose daily reports are submitted, not to a functionary or
(66)
a department, but to the whole people". 	 Newspapers, he argued,
were the "phonograph of the world", the "ear and tongue of the people",
and the "visible speech if not the voice of the democracy". 6	For
Reeve no instrument was better suited to the task of political
instruction, and its influence on political life was so great that it
was difficult to exaggerate:
Journalism is now truly an estate of the realm; more
powerful than any of the other estates; more powerful
than all of them combined if it could ever be brought
to act as a united and concentrated whole.	 Nor need
we wonder at its sway.
	
It furnishes the exclusive
reading of hundreds of thousands. Not only does it
supply the nation with nearly all the information on
public topics which it possesses, but it supplies it
with notions and opinions in addition. 	 It furnishes
not only the material on which our conclusions must be
founded: it furnishes the conclusions themselves, cut
and dried - coined, stamped and polished. 	 It inquires,
reflects, decides for us.	 For five pence or a penny
(as the case may be) it does all the thinking of the
nation: saves us the trouble of weighing and
perpending, of comparing and deliberating; and
presents us with ready-made opinions clearly and
forcibly expressed. (68)
In calling for the abolition of the "taxes on knowledge", which
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liberal reformers saw as the main obstacle to providing the people with
the instruments of self-government, and thus as an obstacle to a ttfree
market in politics", free press theorists were keen to stress the
positive benefits that would accrue to society.	 The taxes, it was
argued, rather than providing the people with a multitude of conflicting
and mutually modifying organs, had created the vile monopoly of
The Times) 6	Moreover, they had allowed falsehood and pernicious
doctrines, in the shape of the unstamped press, to prevail over the
sound political instruction which could be provided by a cheap
capitalist press.	 The removal of the taxes would enable a myriad of
voices to be presented to the people, each criticising the doctrines of
the other, each allowing a diversity of political parties to put across
their view of the world, and each accountable to the people via the
laws of the market.	 The greater the diversity of voices competing in
the market, the stronger would be the truth that would emerge, and the
healthier the level of political debate.
Whether the eventual abolition of the taxes in 1861 reflected a
victory for the arguments advanced by Fourth Estate theorists, or
whether inadequacies in the system of fiscal control would have led to
their ultimate demise in the long term, is a question of no real
significance for, if the ideology constructed for the press in the
campaign against governmental control had any real success, it was in
elevating the status of the press from its nadir in the first quarter of
the nineteenth century.	 To this point I have restricted my focus to
the claims made on behalf of the press as an institution; the following
section widens the scope and examines the impact of the arguments
advanced by Fourth Estate theorists on the status of journalists.
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From Wastrel to Watchdog
The first duty of the press is to obtain the earliest
and most correct intelligence of the events of the
time, and instantly, by disclosing them, to make them
the common property of the nation. 	 The statesman
collects his information secretly and by secret means,
he keeps back even the current intelligence of the day
with ludicrous precautions until diplomacy is beaten
in the race with publicity.
	
The press lives by
disclosure: whatever passes into its keeping becomes
part of the knowledge and history of our times; it is
daily and for ever appealing to the enlightened force
of public opinion - anticipating, if possible, the
march of events - standing upon the breach between the
present and the future, and extending its survey to
the horizon of the world.
Throughout the course of the eighteenth and the early part of the
nineteenth centuries, the status of the press was low.
	 And, lacking
the economic independence that increased circulations and advertising
revenue was to bring from the mid 1850s onwards, it had always been
highly susceptible to political subsidisation and corruption.
	
Koss
notes that prior to this economic development of the press from the
mid l850s onwards, newspapers had generally relied on three sources for
their financial support: "Government stipends bestowed and received
without shame", "commercial capital, usually collected by syndicates in
the City", and thirdly, "subscriptions from politicians who stood
either in opposition to the government or at its rringest.(7U
Though political subsidisation of the press existed prior to the
"taxes on knowledge", the financial burden placed on the press by the
imposts made political patronage a necessity for many papers.72
The practice of subsidising newspapers for the purpose of political
gain was to reach its zenith during the long administration of
Robert Walpole, who viewed newspapers as an important factor in gaining
political support for his policies.
	
Siebert, for example, notes that
between 1730 and 1736 the proprietor and editor of the Free Briton
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received direct subsidies from Walpole's treasury73
A Committee of Secrecy, appointed in 1742 to inquire into Walpole's
conduct, revealed that Walpole paid out £50,000 of secret service money
to pamphleteers and treasury newspapers in the last ten years of his
administration alone. 74	According to Aspinall the short-lived
Shelburne Ministry spent £1,084 on bribing the press in the nine months
from 10th July, 1782, to 5th April, 1783, while the Coalition Ministry
of Fox and North bribed newspapers of all sides in their effort to gain
public support for unpopular Bills. 75	Though the practice of
offering financial inducements to the press in order to secure
favourable coverage was to diminish as the nineteenth century progressed,
it was to die hard. 	 As late as 1834 the Standard offered to sell its
services to Peel when he became Prime Minister, while the Observer
continued to accept secret service money up to as late as 1840. 	 The
press up to the second quarter of the nineteenth century, Williams
comments:
took their money and did what they were told as though
the long struggle for freedom throughout the sixteenth
and seventeenth centuries had never taken place. Most
of' them were wholly worthy of' the contempt in which all
of them came to be held. 	 The age got the press
it deserved. (76)
If' bribery and political corruption together with a range of other
disreputable practices, such as the acceptance of' suppression and
contradiction fees noted by Aspinall 77 did little for the status of
newspapers, it did even less for the status of' those who produced them.
(78)
The status of' journalism, the London Review declared in the early l800s,
was so low that men of birth and refinement would not consider it as an
occupation for fear of being outcast from "good society". 	 As a
consequence, it went on:
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The Newspaper Press is thus degraded from the rank of
a liberal profession: the employment, and the class
engaged in it, sink; and the conduct of our journals
falls too much into the hands of men of obscure birth,
imperfect education, blunt feelings and course manners,
who are accustomed to a low position in society, and
are contented to be excluded from a circle in which
they have never been used to serve.
According to Aspinall, in his study of the social status of
British journalism at the beginning of the nineteenth century, "Even
as late as the 1820s ... journalism was regarded as neither a dignified
nor a reputable profession". 80	While O'Boyle, in his comparative
study of the image of journalism in France, Germany, and England over
the period 1815-1848, found that it was not until the mid-nineteenth
century that British journalism attained a measure of respectability.(8U
The reasons for the low status of journalism until the l840s and
1850s are not difficult to explain, and in many respects Williams was
quite right when he suggested that "The age got the press it deserved".
Aspinall, for example, suggests that:
In an age when the country was still for the most part
governed by the aristocracy and its connections, it was
natural that men who wrote for the people and sought to
bring the pressure of public opinion to bear on
Parliament and the Government by appealing to the
opinions and the prejudices of the people, should be
looked upon with suspicion and even hostility. (82)
In order to understand the status of journalism at a given time,
as O'Boyle rightly points out, one needs to take account of the social,
political and economic context in which it operates.	 For O'Boyle, of
all these factors it is perhaps the economic one which best holds the
explanation for the low status of' English and European journalism until
the mid-nineteenth century:
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The economic system was determinative in that a
certain kind of newspaper press could emerge only
at a certain stage of industrial society. 	 That is,
only an economically advanced society could produce
a newspaper press that supported itself completely
from sales to a mass reading public and from paid
advertisements.	 Without such an economic base
the newspaper press was either ineffectual or had
to rely on political subsidy. Likewise journalism
as a full-time occupation with its own standards of
performance and integrity, and at least a degree of
social status could appear only when the newspaper
press had become a profitable business enterprise.
(83)
Though the economic context in which the press operated for most
of the 150 years covered by the "taxes on knowledge" may not have been
the only factor to influence the status of journalism during this period,
it was certainly one of the most significant. 84	As Elliott has noted,
the financial rewards to be gained from journalism before the commercial
development of the press in the latter half of the nineteenth century
were so low, that only a few notable editors were able to support
themselves simply by writing. 85	Apart from those at the very top of
journalism (editors, sub-editors, and senior journalists on the London
and provincial press), Lee observes, the living to be made from
journalism for the rank and file was pathetically low. 	 As late as 1913,
he notes, 2,100 of the National Union of Journalists' 3,600 members were
earning less than £160 a year, whilst the majority of the worst paid
were not even members of the union. 86	While earnings may have varied
according to the ability of the individual journalist to negotiate
improved terms with his employers, or his ability to secure ancillary
earnings (notably through the payment of suppression or contradiction
fees), the pay and conditions for many rank and file journalists
remained pathetically poor. 87	Many had no contracts, work was often
erratic, many were driven to dishonesty or corruption to supplement
their earnings.	 The insecurity of employment, and the low pay and
poor conditions, Lee suggests, was undoubtedly a contributory cause of
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the traditional and widespread addiction to alcohol among journalists.8
Such conditions were unlikely to have attracted entrants of a high
calibre, or to have elevated the status of journalism.
By the closing decade of the nineteenth century, the social status
of the press and those who worked for it had changed almost beyond
recognition.	 The press which, during the early 1800s had been little
more than a byword for corruption and licentiousness, was accepted by
many as the very oil on which the democracy operated; journalists,
from being little more than rogues and demagogues, were now portrayed
as the very guardians of democracy. 	 How is this transformation best
explained?	 What were the key factors in the transformation of
journalism from its nadir in the first quarter of the nineteenth century
to its zenith in the final quarter?
For free press theory the answer is simple, and it is located in
the economic transformation of the press from the l830s onwards.
According to the free press theorists it was the economic independence
brought about by the growth in advertising and sales revenues that
enabled the press to free itself from the stigma of the early
nineteenth century.	 O'Boyle, in support of this thesis, has argued
that, during the first half of the nineteenth century, journalists were
rescued from the political patronage of the aristocracy and the Old
Corruption largely by the demands of commerce, and that journalism
became less corrupt as it became more businesslike. 89
	Whatever the
long term implications of this commercial transformation were to be
(and, as we shall see below, they have been many), the argument advanced
by free press theory, that political independence and the elevated
status it was to bring in its wake, was to be the child of economic
independence, is not without an element of truth.
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As the commercial development of' the press, stimulated by the
reduction and then abolition of the "taxes on knowledge" speeded up
during the third quarter of the nineteenth century, newspapers became
highly profitable enterprises.	 And, as early as the 1830s, newspaper
profits were already serving to distance certain sections of the press
from government and party patronage. 	 Curran, for example, notes that
as early as 1834, The Times, the paper with the biggest news team and
the most advertising of' the time, declared that henceforth it would
desist from the practice of receiving early information from government,
because such a practice was inconsistent with "the pride and
independence of our journal", and that anyway its "own information was
earlier and surer")90
If the increase in profits brought about by advertising revenue
and rising sales was to transform the press and give it a national
significance it was previously to lack, then the impact of this
commercial development on those who worked for it was to be no less
profound.	 As a number of studies have clearly demonstrated, profits
based on advertising revenue were also to transform the economic, social
and professional condition of journalism, and give it many of the
characteristics we associate with the profession to-day.92
As the press became more profitable, then the salaries paid by
leading newspapers increased, and journalism began to attract entrants
of a much higher ca1ibre. 93	Increased profits also helped finance
the shift from casual and erratic employment to permanent and
increasingly well-paid jobs in the commercial press.	 As a consequence
journalism slowly became recognised as a full-time profession rather
than as a means of earning additional income or as a stepping-stone to
some other occupation.	 The increasing wealth of the press also served
professional ethics.	 High salaries and secure employment led to the
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development of professional loyalties among journalists and, as the
rewards for honest reporting increased, then the selling of' one's
convictions to politicians became less necessary.
As the occupation of journalism became more defined and more
respectable during the latter half of the nineteenth century, attempts
were made to organise it along professional lines. 	 The National
Association of Journalists, which was essentially a proprietors'
organisation, was founded in 1884 with the aims of improving facilities
for journalists, protecting its reputation, and providing relief for
distressed journalists. 	 The Association became the Institute and in
1889 acquired a royal charter.	 At the turn of the century one also
witnessed the organisation of working journalists independent of
proprietors and in 1907 the National Union of Journalists was founded
as the profession's first effective labour organisation.4
The other, and equally as important factor that was to shape the
character of journalism during the nineteenth century, was the
technological benefits that the press was to accrue from the industrial
revolution.	 Higher profits enabled newspaper proprietors to invest in
more sophisticated and cost efficient technology.	 It was these
technological developments that were to make the production of' a cheap
mass-produced press a reality. 	 In 1814 The Times had sent shock waves
through Fleet Street when it introduced the Koenig steam press which
was capable of printing between 1,000 and 1,200 double sized sheets per
hour: a rate of' production unheard of in Fleet Street.
	
By the l8lOs,
the web-rotary press enabled the leading newspapers to produce 10,000
copies an hour.	 By this time large numbers of smaller papers had
progressed to at least steam-driven flat-bed presses. 5	Competition
within the newspaper industry, as in other sectors of the economy, was
to ensure that technological efficiency continued to increase.
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If improvements in technology were to make a cheap press a reality,
then improvements in communications were to provide it with the market
for its product.	 The development and extension of the railway network,
and an improved road network, enabled the press to take on an
increasingly national character as newspapers slowly penetrated towns
and villages throughout the country. 	 As Lee notes, the railways were
to play an important role in extending the spread of newspapers:
The railways had played a major part in determining
the spread of the newspapers, for the older messengers,
newsboys and pedlars had become few and far between.
By the 1870s most rural areas were within reach of a
train, or at least of a milk cart. 	 Once the paper
arrived in town it was often delivered by railway
messengers to the house of the subscriber, but with
the cheap papers it became more usual to deliver them
to certain shops, tobacconists, greengrocers,
staioners, booksellers and barbers
	 (96)
The other two important developments to influence the character
of journalism in the nineteenth century, and transform it into a highly
skilled and specialised occupation, was the development of shorthand
and the telegraph.	 Smith, in his study of the changing nature of the
"truth" offered by journalism since the seventeenth century, has argued
that the combination of a fast, accurate and efficient means of
recording information brought about by shorthand and the breakdown in
the geographical barriers to communication brought about by the
telegraph, were to play an important role in shaping the definition and
practice of journalism in the latter half of the nineteenth century.
And they were to provide journalism with two of its most enduring
concepts - "objectivity" and "impartiality".97
The notion that the role of journalists was to establish and report
the "truth", or at the very least the "facts", in an objective manner,
which remain to this day two of the most enduring features of journalism,
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was a relatively late addition to the credo of journalism. Truth, and
the ability to claim it, Smith argues, was a concept that had always
been restricted by the technology of verification:
Journalism and philosophy were in the same predicament;
some formal authority was essential in guiding the
innocent towards the truth.	 Any statement fit to be
believed required an official provenance and the say-so
of the writer was clearly insufficient, since he had no
means of checking his own statements. 	 Only with a dual
communcation system, when the news flows along more than
one channel at a time, can the journalist acquire his
own specialism in the telling of accurate news.
Journalism does not become professionalised, or even
occupationalised, until it acquires the essential tool
of double checking; until then it remains a mere
appendage of' printing or, in its grander forms, a
sub-branch of diplomacy. (98)
Shorthand, in enabling journalists to report the news accurately,
appeared to make the "truth" amenable to the rigours of' scientific
method.	 Deployed in a variety of forms from as early as the l750s,
but standardised with the arrival of Pitman's universally applicable
system, shorthand was to transform the business of reporting into a kind
of science.	 In doing so it was to transform public expectations of
what journalism could and should do:
Shorthand was the first of' that long series of'
journalistic techniques which seemed to promise the
reader the complete recovery of' some semblance of
reality.	 A fully competent shorthand reporter seemed
to have acquired an almost supernatural power, and
shorthand was invested with the same sort of' social
optimism as the microphone and the television camera
in later times.	 By presenting the reader with the
ipsissima verba of speech, it seemed at first that
reporting was capable of' providing a mirror to reality.
(100)
The advent of the telegraph and the telegram, which were relatively
common by the l860s, also served to influence the character of'
journalism.	 Apart from breaking down the geographical barriers
to communication by enabling journalists to file copy quickly and
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accurately from all parts of the country, the telegraph was also to
create a pressurised world within journalism. 	 Before the advent of
the telegraph, the speed at which news about social and political events
was reported by the press was determined largely by the proximity of
those events to the printing presses.	 The greater the distance, and
this was particularly true in the reporting of foreign affairs, the
greater the gap between events and the receipt of news about them. 'O2)
The telegraph was to revolutionise the process of riewsgathering and
reporting by demolishing the logistical barriers to the reporting of
geographically disparate events. 	 As a consequence, it became possible
for the public to read about what had happened yesterday, rather than
someone's opinion of what had happened last week.
	
As early as 1844
The Times, with the aid of the electric signalling system of the Great
Western Railway, was able to announce the birth of a second son to
Queen Victoria at Windsor a mere four hours after it had taken place.
Henceforth the idea that a daily newspaper should encompass the events
of the ttdayt was slowly established as part of conventional thinking on
the nature of the newspaper.(104)
By the latter half of the nineteenth century the rehabilitation of
journalists was virtually complete. 	 And, casting his eye back over
the previous half-century, Henry Reeve confidently announced the
transformation:
The journalism of the beginning of the century would
scarcely pass muster now. 	 The truth is, that the men
who now conduct the newspaper press are a wholly
different class from those who were connected with it
thirty or forty years ago.
	 Since it attained a power
and station which both gave it a dignity and imposed
upon it the responsibilities of character; since it
became recognised as one of the great governing powers
of the realm; and since statesmen and authors of
unquestioned eminence were known to have employed its
columns as their channels of communication with the
public, - it has been taken almost entirely out of the
hands of mere hack-writers - literary workmen -
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manufacturers 'to order' - and has been placed in those
men of fixed opinions, of consumate knowledge and
deliberate purpose, who sought connexion with it, as
others sought a seat in Parliament or an officer under
Government, for the sake of influencing their age and
country, of promulgating their own sentiments, of
recommending and enforcing the principles and measures
on which their own hearts were set.(105)
Reeve was anything but alone in his view.	 For W.T. Stead,	 a
constant and vigorous exponent of the Fourth Estate school of
journalism, no praise was high enough for the journalists of the day.
A journalist, he eulogized in 1886:
can not only exercise an almost absolute power of
closure both upon individuals and upon causes, he has
also the power of declaring urgency for subjects on which
he is interested.	 He can excite interest, or allay it;
he can provoke public impatience, or convince people that
no one need worry themselves about the matter. 	 Every
day he can administer either a stimulant or a narcotic to
the minds of his readers; and he can force questions
to the front which, but for his timely aid, would have
lain dormant for many a year. 	 Of course, no journalist
is omnipotent, and even the most powerful journalist
cannot influence those who do not read his paper. 	 But
within the range of' his circulation ... he may be more
potent than any other man.(106)
If the newspaper, as many nineteenth century liberals saw it, was
the voice of an educated democracy, then for Stead, its editor was its
"uncrowned king"; the journalist its "missionary and apostle", its
"prophet" and its "watchman" (107)
The whole apparatus of journalism that was to carry the newspaper
industry through into the twentieth century was now substantially
complete - journalism, for the advocates of the Fourth Estate theory,
had truly arrived.
The Fall from Grace
Whether the press do, ever did, or indeed ever could, perform the
role accorded to it in Fourth Estate theory, has, since the middle of
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the twentieth century, attracted considerable criticism; criticism
which has undermined many of the central claims made on behalf of the
press, and which has left the theory itself looking decidedly threadbare.
At the heart of the crisis now facing the Fourth Estate theory is the
economic transformation of the newspaper industry since the turn of the
century.	 Early theory did not envisage the enormous circulations, the
financial influence of mass advertising, and the growing concentration
of ownership which have all been dominant characteristics of the British
press since the turn of the century. 	 Though a lack of space precludes
any detailed analysis of the growing crisis of legitimacy in free press
theory, a few general observations should be sufficient to indicate
just how serious this crisis is.
The attack on the Fourth Estate theory has not been restricted
solely to recent developments in the press; some critics have
questioned whether the theory, as conventionally formulated, ever
corresponded to the development and practice of the British press.
One of the foremost critics of the Fourth Estate theory as a valid
interpretation of the historical development of' the British press has
been the historian James Curran who, in a number of' convincing articles,
has argued that the orthodox view of the emergence of' a "free" press
needs not only to be critically assessed but stood on its head. "The
period around the middle of the nineteenth century", Curran argues,
"did not inaugurate a new era of press freedom and liberty: it
introduced a new system of press censorship more effective than anything
that had gone before". (108)	 Market forces, Curran contends, succeeded
where legal repression and taxation failed in establishing the press as
an instrument of social control. 	 Reversing the orthodox view of the
historical development of the British press, Curran argues that the
crucial element in this new system of control was the role occupied by
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advertising which, rather than bringing about the liberation of the
press, as it has so often been argued, merely transferred control from
the state to the marketplace: advertising in effect became a new form
of "taxation" - and, moreover, one that could not be evaded.09
In attacking the historical validity of the Fourth Estate theory,
Curran has not been alone.	 George Boyce has also cast a critical eye
over the theory and, like Curran, also found it wanting.
	
Dismissing
the theory as a "political myth" designed to secure the political
credibility of the press in the early nineteenth century, Boyce argues
that the political role accorded to the press by such writers as Reeve
and Stead was never, and indeed could never, be realised because it was
based on a "mythical" view of the relations between the press, the
government and the people.	 The argument that the press could operate
as a Fourth Estate, Boyce suggests, is belied by evidence of the
political incorporation of the press in the nineteenth and twentieth
centuries; the political commitments of journalists that made them
actors rather than neutral spectators in the political process; and the
development of the press as an entertainment industry.110
The tenacious hold that the Fourth Estate theory maintains over
the debate on the role and social significance of the press in liberal
democracy, is even more striking when one considers the changes that
have taken place in the press, and particularly the popular mass
circulation press, since the turn of the century.	 These changes,
particularly in content and ownership, have undermined the legitimacy
of the market-based press system so central to liberal theory, and the
claims made on behalf of the press as an instrument of political
(111)
communication.
The economic transformation of the press since the early 1800s,
which I have noted above, is claimed to have rescued the press from
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political patronage and corruption, has ironically served to demolish
one of the most cherished and central tenets of liberal free press
theory - that privately owned newspapers engaging in free competition
in the market was the best, and indeed the only, means of ensuring that a
diversity of newspapers, and therefore a diversity of competing opinions,
would be available to the public.
The problem of market-based economic support for the press, though
a central canon of liberal theory, was never squarely faced by free
press theorists.	 Apart from the general argument that government
control or subsidisation was undesirable in a free society, and that
the free play of market forces was the surest safeguard of political
independence, the problems inherent in allowing the market forces free
rein in the newspaper industry were generally ignored.
	 Yet, as IRobbins,
in his study of the impact of market forces on the British press since
the early l900s, observes, free market theory is based on a
problematical, and indeed contradictory, idea:
On the one hand, we believe a multitude of views,
popular and unpopular, should be available to the
public, a multitude of products to the consumer.
On the other, we believe the majority should rule,
and in almost all cases laissez-faire should
prevail.	 Majority rule and the free marketplace
are contradictory ideas.(112)
Nowhere is the contradictory nature of market forces on the press
more apparent than in their impact on newspaper competition and
ownership.	 As Baistow observes, if the history of the British press
from the mid-nineteenth century had to be summed up in one of its own
alliterative, oversimplifying headlines, it would read something like
"PRESS PARADOX: SUCCESS SPELLS CRISIS".113
In the latter half of the nineteenth century, the national and
provincial press, stimulated by the removal of' the "taxes on knowledge"
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and the growing demand for newspapers, expanded.
	 Increasing
advertising revenue from the press also provided the incentive for
entrepeneurs to launch publications directed at markets that
advertisers particularly wanted to reach and, as a consequence, the
production of all kinds of publications flourished. 	 Between 1886 and
1896 the number of magazines, many of them trade and professional
journals, increased by 557 to 2,097.
	
The number of local dailies grew
from only 2 in 1850 to 196 in 1900.	 There was also a substantial
expansion in the number of local weekly papers from less than 400 in
1856 to an estimated 2,072 in 1900.
	
This expansion was also repeated
in the national daily and Sunday market as a considerable number of new
titles were established between 1880 and	 The growing
number of publications was also accompanied by an enormous expansion in
newspaper consumption as annual newspaper sales rose from 85 million in
(115)1851 to 5,604 in 1920.
This remarkable growth in newspaper production, however, was to
prove shortlived.	 By the l920s a series of trends which had been
evident in the closing decades of the previous century slowly began to
work themselves out. 6	And it soon became clear that paradoxically,
rather than producing diversity, free competition within the newspaper
industry, as in other sections of the economy, was actually having the
opposite effect.	 Since the early l920s the effect of direct and
indirect competition arid the high cost of newspaper production was to
increase the size of the market which a daily paper required to be
financially viable.	 As a consequence, towns which in the nineteenth
century had been able to support two or more dailies could, by the
'twenties, no longer do	 The expansion in the number of titles
that had characterised the newspaper industry during the closing decades
of the nineteenth century was reversed.	 From the early l920s,
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competition led to the rapid reduction of the number of titles
available to the public, and an increasing concentration in the
ownership of those that survived.	 Between 1921 and 1930 alone, no less
than 24 daily and Sunday papers disappeared through closure and
amalganiation.	 Between 1930 and 1939, a further 15 titles were lost as
the circulation wars of the early 1930s took their toll. 	 Ironically,
and in direct contradiction to liberal free press theory, the only
respite to this pattern of steady decline came during the period from
1939 to 1949, when government control over the distribution of newsprint
kept the number of titles lost down to 2.(8)	 As Robbins notes, the
experience of governmental control made it clear that "control, rather
than leading to the loss of papers, was a positive force in maintaining
(119)the existing diversity in the newspaper business". 	 This respite,
however, did little to reverse the trend - since 1947 a further 17 daily
and Sunday nationals were to be lost. 20)
A similar pattern of closure was also to be repeated in the
provincial press which, during the closing decades of the nineteenth
(121)
century, had enjoyed such a spectacular expansion. 	 In 1921, 41
morning, 93 evening, and 135 daily (morning and evening) papers were
published.	 By 1976 these figures had fallen to 20, 79 and 99
respectively. 22)	 The net effect of these closures has been to reduce
local competition and ergo local choice. 	 In 1921 16 provincial towns
had a choice of a local morning paper; 27 a choice of a local evening
paper; and 34 a choice of a local daily paper. 	 By 1974 the respective
(123)figures were 2, 1 and 16.
	 The pattern has continued, and in 1986,
with the closure of the Morning Telegraph, Sheffield became the latest
in a long line of large provincial cities without a morning paper.
This decline in the number of national and provincial newspapers
since the early 1920s has also been accompanied by significant changes
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in the ownership of the press. 	 During the nineteenth century, the
newspaper industry was built upon the basis of the family business with
ownership passing from father to son. 	 Individual proprietorship was
to continue to be the dominant form of ownership until the latter half
of the century when it became usual to adopt at least the form of a
joint-stock company.	 By the l850s, however, "chains" of newspapers
were to be found and, by the l880s, "syndicates" and corporations.24
These developments were to lay the foundations for the amalgamation and
concentration that has been the defining characteristic of the newspaper
industry throughout the course of the twentieth century.25
The first Royal Commission on the Press, in keeping with liberal
theory, had justified the market-based rationale of the press on the
grounds that it guaranteed the autonomy of the press from vested
interest.	 "Free enterprise", it declared, "is a prerequisite of a
free press".	 "It is undoubtedly a great merit of the British press",
it continued, "that it is completely independent of outside financial
interests and that its policy is the policy of those who own and
(126)
conduct it".	 In the three decades following this report, the
legitimacy of such a claim was to be seriously eroded as large sections
of the British press were acquired by multinational corporations with
interests in almost every section of the communications industry.
By 1976, 49 per cent of national daily circulation, and 80 per cent of
Sunday circulation, were controlled by just three corporations - Reed,
Trafalgar House and News International. 	 By 1980 the same three groups
controlled 71 per cent of the national daily and 82 per cent of the
(127)
national Sunday circulation.
	 This process of concentration and
and monopolisation was also being repeated in the provincial market as
the regional chains, increasingly linked to the national press groups,
consolidated their market position.	 By 1975, the leading five chains
-54-
between them controlled 58 per cent of the regional evening circulation
(128)
and 69 per cent of the regional morning circulation. 	 As the last
Royal Commission on the Press was forced to conclude: "rather than
saying that the press has other business interests it would be truer to
argue that the press has become a subsidiary of other industries".29
If the economic transformation of the press since the middle of
the nineteenth century has served to demolish the claim made on behalf
of the market as the best safeguard of diversity and freedom, then the
increase in the capital resources needed to launch a newspaper which
attended this transformation, served to undermine another central tenet
of liberal theory - the argument that the market of ideas was open to
all.	 As I noted above, liberal free press theory is premised on the
belief that so long as no impediments were placed on entry to the
market all who wished to start their own newspaper could. 	 Such an
argument was, even before the repeal of the "taxes on knowledge",
increasingly untenable.
Since the early l800s the costs of launching and maintaining a
daily national or provincial paper have risen steadily.	 In 1818, it
was estimated that it would cost between £2,000 and £5,000 to launch
a London daily.	 By the 1830s, these costs had escalated to between
£30,000 and £50,000 for a London newspaper that could compete with
The Times, and it was estimated that it would initially lose over a
£100 per week until its sales had been consolidated.	 It is said that
£100,000 was raised for the establishment of the Daily News in 18L+6,
(130)
and that a similar sum was spent on it during its first ten years.
The maintenance or purchase of an established London daily could prove
even more expensive. 	 In 1842, £25,000 had been needed to prevent the
Morning Post from falling into the hands of free-traders, but thereafter
(131)
the sums were measured in the hundreds of thousands.
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The cost of establishing a provincial paper, though less than that
of a London daily, was also to increase steadily during the latter half
of the nineteenth century.
	 In 1810, the Leicester Mercury was
established on a capital of only £760.
	
By the 1830s, it was estimated
that a provincial newspaper could be launched and sustained for five
years with about £4,000 or £5,000, henceforth the cost was to increase
(132)
steadily.
During the twentieth century the capital resources required to
enter and survive in the newspaper market have risen to such a level
that, for those other than the rich and powerful, the notion of a free
and open market is an illusion. 	 Since the First World War, no
provincial morning paper has been established in direct competition
with another, and since the 1930s, no provincial evening paper has been
established in competition with another. 	 The record of new starts is
scarcely any better in the national market. 	 In the last 65 years only
one national Sunday (The Sunday Telegraph) and three national dailies
(The Daily Worker/Morning Star, Daily Star and Today) have been
(133)
established.	 As the third Royal Commission on the Press put it,
"anyone is free to start a daily newspaper, but few can afford to even
(134)
contemplate it".	 The Commission estimated that it would cost
between £2 and £3 million to establish even a local evening paper in a
town where there was no competition.	 The freedom to publish was not
only weighted in favour of capital but of incumbent capital.	 The huge
initial losses, and the market power of established publications, served
to place even more substantial obstacles in the path of market entry.
The launch costs of' Today, at the time of' writing, the most recent
addition to Fleet Street, were estimated to have been £20 million, and
the costs of the proposed Independent are likely, again at the time of'
writing, to be the se.(135)	 Needless to say, such sums are way
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beyond the purse of individuals.	 As the experience of the proposed
News on Sunday, the left-of-centre tabloid due for launch in 1987,
suggests, such sums are even beyond the capacity of the organised
(136)labour movement.
The impact of new technology, such as that pioneered by
Eddie Shah's Today, which many believed would usher in a new era of
press diversity as operational costs fell, is unlikely to alter the
situation significantly.	 As Patrick Wiritour points out, the argument
that "a thousand flowers are now set to bloom in glorious colour" as a
consequence of new technology, is belied by the impact such technology
is likely to have on the cost of new launches:
Generalisation is dangerous, but the extent to which
technology as opposed to deunionisation cuts costs
has to be kept in proportion. 	 In a typical Fleet
Street newspaper newsprint in the past has represented
30 per cent of total costs, all wages and salaries
around 40 per cent and the remaining expenses just
under 30 per cent.	 A leanly staffed electronic
newspaper might be able to cut these labour costs by
four fifths, but even this would represent only a
20 per cent cut in the total operating costs.(137)
Moreover, as Wintour points out, new technology is unlikely to
reverse the trend toward monopoly ownership. 	 "In the field of mass
sale papers at least", he argues, "it may be that the old technology
monopolists will simply transform themselves into the new technology
monopo1ists". 38	The slow, but steady, incorporation of the Today
paper, new technology and all, into the Tiny Rowland stable testifies
to the financial obstacles facing a newly established paper.
It could of course be argued that while the reduction in newspaper
titles and the financial obstacles to entering the market are undesirable,
the existing level of diversity and competition more than satisfies the
minimum requirement laid down by liberal free press theory. Classical
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liberal theory requires no more than this. So long as the press as a
whole provides a comprehensive news service, and so long as different
newspapers offer a range of different views, the actual number of
newspapers itself scarcely matters.(139)	 The principles of the system,
and the role of the press as a vital organ of' political communication,
would therefore be satisfied, albeit barely, by the existence of
two papers.
Convenient as this argument may be, it is scarcely supported by
recent research into the changing content and role of' the British press
which, if anything, suggests that large sections of the British press
have long since abandoned any pretensions to function as organs of
political communication.
In an important study published in 1980, which examines the space
allocated to news and current affairs in the national press over the
past fifty years, survey evidence about what people read, together with
an analysis of the economic factors that have helped shape editorial
content during this period, Curran, Douglas and Whannel contest the
conventional view of the press held by historians, sociologists and
(140)political theorists alike.	 The argument that the press, and
particularly the popular press, are best defined and understood in terms
of their explicit political content, they argue, provides a totally
misleading picture of' what is published in newspapers and what people
actually read.
During the inter-war years, the authors argue, there was an
important change in the content and market orientation of an important
section of the British press, largely brought about by the interplay of
market forces.	 In an attempt to offset high fixed costs, and attract
the advertising revenues essential if they were to survive in a highly
competitive market, the popular press, it is argued, were forced to
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adopt editorial strategies designed to maximise their circulations.
To this end the popular publishers sought to universalise the appeal
of their papers.	 In developing editorial strategies designed to
recruit new readers, there were thus strong economic pressures on the
popular press to move into the middle ground by building bigger but less
differentiated audiences, through editorial policies that appealed
equally to men and women, and that appealed to people of all social
(141)
classes.
The net effect of these editorial strategies was a shift away from
news and current affairs to material, such as sport and human interest,
which had a wider social appeal. 	 As a consequence, the authors argue,
the popular press have slowly evolved into organs whose primary function
is to entertain rather than inform.	 Between 1946 and 1976, the
proportion of space allocated to news and current affairs declined by
at least half in their sample of seven newspapers, and in three papers
by no less than two-thirds. 	 In 1976 the public affairs content in all
seven papers was dwarfed by human interest material, and at an average
of 15 per cent, was indeed accorded less space than sport in all seven
papers. 42)	 The consequence of these changes on the nature of the
popular press has been significant:
Most of what is published and read in newspapers has
very little to do with what they are generally
considered to be significant for by historians,
sociologists and policy makers concerned with the
press.	 Less than one-eighth of popular newspapers
in Britain is devoted to current affairs, and the
average reader spends less than a fifth of his time
when reading a popular national paper on current
affairs content. (143)
Though the quality press have not been exempt from these pressures
brought about by the need to attract advertising revenue in order to
survive, the impact of these pressures was to be the reverse of that
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experienced by their popular counterparts. 	 Whereas economic forces
on the popular press compelled it to universalise its appeal, the
quality press found itself under advertising pressure not to expand
into the mass market. 44	Attempts to go against these forces by
trying to build less differentiated audiences, as the experience of
The Times in the mid-l960s was clearly to prove, could be financially
disastrous. (145)
In the view of the authors, the changing nature of the British
press since the turn of the century and, in particular, the domination
of non-current affairs content in the popular press, calls for a
reassessment of its social and political role. 	 While rejecting the
simple conclusion that the political role of' the popular press has been
replaced by that of entertainer, the authors argue that it is no longer
valid to evaluate its ideological and political role in terms of' its
explicit political content. 46)
Salvain the wreck: an ideolo gy for the times
Social responsibility theory accepts the role of the
press in servicing the political system, in enlightening
the public, in safeguarding the liberties of the
individual; but it represents the opinion that the
press has been deficient in performing those tasks.
It accepts the role of the press in servicing the
economic system, but it would not have this task take
precedence over such other functions as promoting the
democratic processes or enlightening the public. 	 It
accepts the role of the press in furnishing entertainment
but with the proviso that the entertainment be "good"
entertainment.	 It accepts the need for the press as an
institution to remain financially self-supporting, but
if' necessary it would exempt certain individual media
from having to earn their way in the market Place.(147)
The first Royal Commission on the Press in 1949 had examined the
condition of the British press, and the philosophical principles which
legitimated it, and declared both fit and healthy. 	 "It is generally
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agreed" the Commission noted "that the British Press is inferior to
(148)
none in the world.	 It is free from corruption". 	 Such a
conclusion was, to say the least, optimistic in the extreme.	 Even at
the time of publication it was increasingly obvious, even to many of its
supporters, that traditional free press theory was increasingly
unconvincing in an age of' monopoly ownership, restricted entry, and
dwindling diversity and competition.	 As Jay W. Jensen, commenting on
the increasing tension between a twentieth century press and the
nineteenth century ideology that sought to legitimate it, was to
observe in 1950:
It is clear that the philosophical foundations of the
traditional concept of freedom of the press have been
precipitously undermined by the revolution in
contemporary thought. 	 The static and timeless
World-Machine of Newton has been wrecked by the idea of
evolution and the dynamic concepts of modern physics.
Locke's doctrine of natural rights has been subverted
not only by Romantic philosophy but also by present-
day social science.	 Classical laissez-faire economics
has been repudiated by most contemporary economists,
and in practice by almost every modern industrial
nation.	 Moreover, the Miltonian doctrine of the
"self-righting process" has lately become susPect.(149)
Jensen was simply one in a growing body of' press pundits, in both
Britain and America, who called for a critical re-examination of the
philosophical principles of traditional free press theory.	 The
resulting process of' ideological reinterpretation that was to gather
pace from the early 1940s onwards (stimulated in part by the constant
threat of government intervention) was conservative rather than radical
in its intentions.	 Its primary intention was to provide a scheme for
the self-regulation and independent monitoring of press performance
rather than outside intervention. 	 As Peterson points out, rather than
dispensing with the central concepts of' traditional theory, social
responsibility theory, as the emerging construct became known, sought
to establish a set of criteria, which, if satisfied, would ensure that
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the press did riot abuse its privileged position:
The theory has this major premise: Freedom carries
concomitant obligations; and the press, which enjoys
a privileged position under our government, is
obliged to be responsible to society for carrying
out certain essential functions of mass communication
in contemporary society.
	
To the extent that the
press recognises its responsibilities and makes them
the basis of operational policies, the libertarian
system will satisfy the needs of society. 	 To the
extent that the press does not assume its
responsibilities, some other agency must see that
the essential functions of mass communications are
carried out.(150)
Thus social responsibility theory, though conditionally embracing
the philosophical core of traditional free press theory, sought to
remedy existing defects in press performance by acknowledging a series
of rights which society should have if their informational needs are to
be met - with the added proviso that, should the press fail to satisfy
the needs of the public, external intervention would be necessary.
Stated in its clearest form, social responsibility theory provides
us with a benchmark against which the performance of the press in
contemporary liberal democratic society may be judged.
Requirements of press performance
The first systematic attempt to formulate a new ideology for the
press was undertaken in America by Hutchin's Commission on Freedom of
the Press, whose reports in the late 191,05 did much to establish the
idea of social responsibility theory. 52)
The Commission listed five key things or standards which
contemporary society required from the press which, it noted, were
drawn largely from requirements already embodied in the practice or
claims of those who operate the press.	 First, that the press should
provide "a truthful, comprehensive and intelligent account of the day's
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events in a context which gives them meaning". 	 This requirement
demands not only that in its reporting the press should separate fact
from opinion, but also that it should present both sides of disputed
issues.	 Secondly, that in order to ensure that newspapers did not
abuse their privileged position by denying access to views or opinions
they disapproved of, newspapers should consider themselves as "common
carriers" of information and ideas in society and provide "a forum for
the exchange of comment and criticism".	 Thirdly, that the press should
strive to project a "representative picture of the constitutional groups
in society".	 Fourthly, that the press should be responsible for the
"presentation and clarification of the goals and values of society".
The final requirement identified by the Commission was that the press
should provide "full access to the day's intelligence", in order to
provide the public with the range of' information it required if it was
(133)
to understand fully the key social and political issues of the day.
In order to secure and maintain these standards of press
performance, the Commission called on professional journalists, the
public and the government alike, to adopt a more positive orientation
towards the press.	 It appealed to journalists to adopt a more
"professional spirit" towards their practice and accept responsibility
for the standards of the profession as a whole. 	 It called for greater
public awareness of the press and the power it enjoyed, and greater
research into the media at a university and college level. 	 The
Commission also advocated the setting up of an independent agency to
appraise press performance and report on it each year. 	 Finally, it
called on government to adopt new legal remedies to rectify identified
abuses of press freedom and, where possible, to encourage new ventures
in the communications industry.4
In Britain, growing concern over the standards of the press, and
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the mass circulation popular press in particular, was reflected in the
appointment of' no less than three Royal Commissions on the Press since
1945.	 As in America, this growing concern was to force a shift away
from a strict adherence to the principles of traditional free press
theory and towards a view of the press which sought to take account of
its changing nature since the turn of the century. 	 Though many of the
proposals and reforms recommended by successive Royal Commissions have
been criticised for being too little, too late, and ineffective into
the bargain, they did reflect a move towards a version of social
responsibility theory similar to that advocated in America.
Though the majority reports of all three Commissions have been
opposed to any significant government intervention in the press industry
(which placed them out of line with many of their European partners56),
all three reports did acknowledge the need for positive action in
preventing a further concentration of ownership. 	 The first Commission
advocated a more rigorous use of the Monopolies Commission as a means
of preserving existing diversity of ownership.
	 The second Commission,
in the light of further concentrations in the ownership of the national
and provincial press, recommended that a Press Amalgamation Court be
established to restrict a further development of press monopoly.	 This
proposal was further strengthened in 1965, when it became necessary for
all new acquisitions by large press groups, already having an average
daily circulation of 500,000 or more, to obtain the assent of the
Secretary of state.
The three Royal Commissions were also united in their view of what
society could and should expect from its newspapers if they were to
dispense with their privileged power in a socially responsible manner.
"The democratic form of' societytt, the 1947-49 Commission declared:
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demands of its members an active and intelligent
participation in the affairs of their community,
whether local or national.	 It assumes that they are
sufficiently well informed about the issues of the day
to be able to form the broad judgements required by an
election, and to maintain between elections the
vigilance necessary in those whose governors are their
servants ... Democratic society, therefore, needs a
clear and truthful account of events, of their
background and their cause; a forum for discussion
and informed criticism; and a means whereby
individuals and groups can express a point of view or
advocate a cause.(158)
The Commission report also attacked any further reduction in the
diversity of the press on similar grounds:
The number and variety of papers should be such that the
press as a whole gives an opportunity for all important
points of view to be effectively presented in terms of
the varying standards of taste, political opinion and
education among the principal groups of the PoPulation.(159)
As a means of ensuring that the press lived up to the standards
expected from it by contemporary society, successive Commissions have
pursued a policy of reforming the press from within by promoting a
greater sense of public service and responsibility.	 Perhaps the most
substantive step towards improving and promoting a higher standard of
professionalism within the press was the recommendation that a
General Council of the Press should be established under a press
chairman and with:
objects ... to safeguard the freedom of the Press; to
encourage the growth of a sense of public responsibility
and public service amongst all engaged in the profession
.; and to further the efficiency of the profession
and the well-being of' those who practise it.(160)
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Conclusion
The social and political role accorded to the press in liberal free
press theory, despite the criticism that has been levelled against it
for much of the twentieth century, continues to frame the debate over
what we should expect from the press in liberal democratic society.
And, despite criticism, it remains the most cogent statement as to the
"proper" relationship between the press, government and the people.
As such, it continues to provide society with a clear and widely accepted
standard against which reporting of the key issues of the day can
be judged.
For the purpose of this thesis, it provides a standard against which
the performance of the British press, in its reporting of the continuing
conflict in Northern Ireland, can and should be judged. 	 If any issue
demanded that the press function as a Fourth Estate and provide the
public with an informed, impartial and meaningful account of events,
Northern Ireland is such an issue.	 The press, despite its defects,
constitutes a vital source of information by which people construct their
understanding of the conflict in the Six Counties, its origins, and the
range of potential solutions.	 In the creation of an informed public
capable of making rational decisions about political policy, the press
has always been quick to claim a central role. 	 The remainder of this
thesis assesses how well it has lived up to its responsibility.
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CHAPTER 2
The British Media and Northern Ireland: Ke y PersDectives
The social, political and military conflict in Northern Ireland
continues to generate a seemingly endless supply of research material
for academics across a wide range of disciplines. 	 Historians,
sociologists, criminologists, psychologists ... the list of those who
have contributed to the vast body of information presently available on
the subject of Northern Ireland is almost as diverse as the subjects
they have addressed.	 Indeed, so intense has academic interest in the
"Troubles" been that bibliographers have found the task of documenting
the constant flood of new publications a frustrating and, at times,
impossible one.	 As the compilers of a bibliography listing material
published on Northern Ireland between 1945 and 1983 were to comment,
the ever-increasing pace of new publications tends to render
bibliographic exercises quickly out of date:
the scale of the up-dating problem can be gauged by
the fact that we have included circa three hundred
items published between January and June, 1983.
Even so, we do not claim the same degree of
comprehensiveness for the first half of 1983 as we
do for the previous Period.(1)
However, while some facets of the conflict taking place in Northern
Ireland have been well served in terms of research, others have been
largely ignored or, at best, only partially investigated.	 One subject
area which has attracted surprisingly little attention to date is the
way Northern Ireland and its conflict have been represented by the
British media and the factors which have helped shape this
representation.	 For example, of the 5,842 publications listed in
A Social Science Bibliography of Northern Ireland 1945-1983, only 75
publications are listed under the general subject heading, "The Mass
Media") 2
	Indeed, of the 27 general subject headings listed in the
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bibliography, the mass media ranked 27 in terms of publications -
marginally behind "Gender and Women's Studies" with 76 publications
listed.
If the British media in general have fared poorly in terms of
research attention, the press have fared even less favourably.
Writing in 1980, Cohen and Young noted with surprise and dismay the
lack of current research available on the British press and Northern
(3)
Ireland.	 The picture may have improved since then, but only
marginally.	 Of the 75 publications listed in the above bibliography,
only 24 dealt exclusively with the press and of these, only 13
exclusively with the British press.	 Consequently, even allowing for
those publications that may have slipped through the net, and for those
published subsequent to the bibliography itself, the British mediars
reporting of the Northern Ireland conflict has not been over-exposed
to academic analysis.
The purpose of this chapter is to assess the main contribution
existing analyses have made to our understanding of the British media's
coverage of the Northern Ireland conflict.	 Given that the literature
presently available on the subject ranges from full-scale academic
studies to relatively short commentaries in journals and magazines, no
attempt is made to address every individual work in detail.	 Instead,
the primary task of this chapter is to provide a general overview of
the principal conclusions that may be drawn from the body of' material
presently available and, where possible, to isolate those areas which
would merit further attention.
Generally speaking, the material examined in this chapter emanates
from three principal sources:	 from academics of various critical
leanings whose primary concern has been to evaluate the role and
performance of the British media in its reporting of the Northern
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Ireland conflict; from counter-insurgency theorists and academics
whose primary concern has been to formulate information strategies
designed to prevent the media from acting as channels for "terrorist"
propaganda; and from journalists and senior broadcasting personnel
whose primary concern has been with the political and practical
problem of reporting an on-going conflict involving their own
nation state.
In theory, the material which has emanated from the first two of
these sources shares two features in common: first, it is critical of
certain aspects of the British media's reporting of Northern Ireland;
and secondly, its authors have approached this reporting as "outsiders",
distanced in varying degrees (and in some cases entirely) from the
factors that help shape it.	 In practice, however, the analyses
emanating from these two sources offer diametrically opposed assessments
of the role and performance of the British media in its reporting of
Northern Ireland, and diametrically opposed policy implications for
journalists.	 Consequently, in taking account of these differences, it
is possible to identify three broadly different perspectives on the
British media's reporting of Northern Ireland, each with its own frame
of reference, and each with its view of the key issues raised by this
reporting.	 For the sake of convenience, I have labelled these
perspectives the "critical", the "anti-terrorist" and the "insiders'"
perspective - the latter, for the sake of convenience, being subdivided
into the perspective of those responsible for formulating editorial
policy and those responsible for carrying it
Before moving on to examine these perspectives individually, a
number of general observations need to be made about the body of
material itself.
	 First, some of the material examined in this chapter
falls outside any strict definition of "academic research", though it is
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likely to be of interest to academic researchers. 	 This is particularly
true of the material examined under the "insiders'" perspective which
comprises almost exclusively general commentaries and the personal
accounts of journalists. 	 However, in that this material offers some
insight into how the problems of reporting Northern Ireland are viewed
from the "inside", it is of particular relevance to researchers.
The second general point to be made about the literature presently
available on the British media and Northern Ireland is that, by and
large, it concentrates on the post-1968 period. 	 Indeed, with the
exception of two works on broadcasting, there has been relatively little
research on the period prior to 1968.
The third point to be made about this material is that, in the main,
it concentrates on how Northern Ireland has been handled as a news item.
In this respect, its authors appear to share a common understanding that
the significance of the media's representation of Northern Ireland lies
in the explicit political content of its news and current affairs output.
The underlying assumption here would appear to be that "actuality"
output is more persuasive and has a more powerful impact than fictional
output.	 There have, of course, been some exceptions to this general
approach.	 Schlesinger, Murdock and Elliott's study, Televising
Terrorism 5 offers an account of how political violence has been
handled across a variety of programme forms. 	 Moreover, there have also
been a number of commentaries on how the Irish and the conflict taking
place in the Six Counties have been represented by political
cartoonists. 6	In the main, however, most commentators have tended to
ignore "non-actuality" output.
However, given that news and current affairs provides the most
frequent source of information about the Irish conflict, it is hardly
surprising that "actuality" coverage should provide the core substance
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and the primary focus of many of the analyses presently available - and
indeed provides the primary focus of my own study. 	 The tendency to
focus on news and current affairs output, however, has also been
influenced by a number of other considerations which reflect not only
the content of media output, but also the different conditions and
professional imperatives which underpin different forms of output.
Though, as we shall see below, the sensitivity surrounding Northern
Ireland within the British media has had consequences for all forms of
output, journalists engaged in "actuality" coverage operate under quite
different conditions, and are subject to much closer scrutiny than those
engaged in output of a less sensitive nature. 	 Indeed, given that
current affairs output often provides the journalist with greater
licence to go beyond the "established facts" than those engaged in news
output, it is likely that, even within "actuality" coverage, the
conditions under which journalists work may vary. (8)	 Moreover, as we
have seen in the previous chapter, it is through news and current
affairs output that the British media most clearly dispense their
responsibility to inform the public in an objective and impartial
manner.	 And it is these professional and institutional goals of
objectivity and impartiality,which journalists claim to uphold in their
reporting of social and political events, that have provided outside
observers with a standard against which their performance may be judged.
The final observation to be made about this material is that, by
and large, it has also tended to concentrate on television rather than
the press.	 This is particularly true of the analyses examined under
the "anti-terrorist" perspective and, to a lesser extent, it is also
the case with the main body of material examined under the "critical"
perspective.	 Two reasons would appear to stand out for this
concentration.	 First, television with its enormous audiences and its
combination of immediacy and visual impact, is generally considered to
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be the most powerful and influential section of the media. 	 Furthermore,
the broadcasting institutions are legitimated by an ideology of
"independence" and public service and have a clearly defined
responsibility to maintain balance and impartiality in their treatment
of important political and social issues.
The "critical" perspective
the broadcaster's role is twofold. 	 It is to
ensure that a democratic society has the full
information, through accurate and comprehensive
coverage of news, upon which to base its decisions.
It is, secondly, to ensure that a fair and free
forum is maintained for the discussion of issues of
importance.	 In deciding what is important, and
what is relevant, for inclusion in news bulletins
and in discussion programmes, the broadcasting
editor has, as clear reference points, the twin
concepts of democracy and the rule of law. It is
not his duty, or his right, to editorialise on the
question of democracy, to advocate its virtues or
attack its detractors. 	 But he has a firm duty to
see that society is not endangered either because
it is inadequately informed, or because the crucial
issues of the day have not been so probed and
debated as to establish the truth.(9)
As I have argued in the previous chapter, the British media have
evolved a definition of themselves as vital organs of public
enlightenment; they have taken upon themselves a responsibility to
inform the electorate, to provide it with all the information necessary
for it to make rational decisions on issues of social and political
importance.	 This section draws together analyses on broadcasting and
the press which challenge at various levels, and with varying degrees
of intensity, the validity of these claims in relation to media
coverage of Northern Ireland.	 Existing studies raise questions not
only about the media's claim to provide an accurate and comprehensive
account of events in the Six Counties, but also the media's claim to
occupy a neutral and objective position in relation to the state. 	 In
order to avoid unnecessary duplication of studies containing similar
_8L+_.
conclusions, those studies which merely support rather than add to the
basic arguments laid down in this section will be referred to in the
footnotes only.
The British media and Northern Ireland pre-1968
I think that we, the BBC, and the press as a whole, will
be held guilty of not having warned the people of what
was going to happen in Northern Ireland in the late
Sixties.	 There was a total silence about what went on
in Ulster during those years, and when the explosion
occurred, in 1969, people were dumbfounded.	 I think also
that there have been other areas where we have been less
than good.	 But Northern Ireland's a classic case where -
partly because of my own background knowledge - there was
a conspiracy of silence in the BBC and in the media
generally.	 And the historians will charge us with that
I susPect.(10)	 (Alasdair Milne, BBC)
Though, as the above comment by the then Assistant Director General
of the BBC suggests, it is now widely acknowledged that, prior to the
outbreak of' the present round of troubles, the British media had tended
to ignore events in Northern Ireland, there has been little detailed
research as to the precise factors which contributed to this policy.
Anthony Smith's study, which traces the role of the broadcasting
organisations both before and during the early years of' the present
conflict, remains to date the most detailed account of the BBC's
involvement in Northern Ireland politics between l92 L+ and l97l.
Given that Smith's study provides one of the few detailed accounts of
the role of the British media in the period prior to 1968, much of what
follows draws heavily from it.
British broadcasting, in the shape of the BBC, first caine to
Northern Ireland's newly created state in 1924.	 From the start, Smith
notes, it was to be heavily influenced by the special political problems
pertaining in the Six Counties - problems which in effect flowed from
the very nature of the state itself.	 While elsewhere, the BBC operated
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within a society which enjoyed a political consensus, in Northern
Ireland it did not.	 Partition had created a state whose very
legitimacy was denied by as much as forty per cent of its inhabitants.
The problem facing the broadcasters, Smith argues, was how they should
position themselves in relation to these contending forces. 	 In other
words, what role could, and should, the BBC perform in a society where
there was no general agreement as to the nature and legitimacy of the
state, and no general intellectual or political gravity? 	 As Smith
writes, from the start the broadcasters were hampered by what he calls
the "religion of objectivity" which required them above all to "reflect"
rather than "provoke":
The basic problem for the broadcasting authorities
was to prevent the coverage on radio or television of
political or social events from being itself the cause
of further events.	 The BBC ... has always been shy of
committing any act that can be construed as outright
interference in the world it is observing.	 But in a
province as tightly controlled as Northern Ireland,
living in a sense an artificial political life based
on the suppression of a series of social forces by
means of manipulated boundaries and police powers, it
was difficult to provide any kind of broadcast coverage
(in an organisation committed to objectivity) which
failed to arouse tempers and invoke the ever-latent
spirit of civil commotion.	 Broadcasting in such a
context is inevitably an agent of political action:
the facts under observation could only continue in
existence if they remained unrePorted.(12)
Smith's analysis of the period from 1924 onwards reveals how British
broadcasters dealt with this dilemma first by avoidance and then
increasingly by retreat.
Until 1959 broadcasting in the Six Counties was entirely in the
hands of the BBC, and as an institution it was firmly entrenched in the
Unionist hierarchy. 	 As Gerald Beadle, a former station master in
Northern Ireland was to recall:
mine was the task of consolidation, which meant building
the BBC into the lives of the people of the province and
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making it one of their public institutions ... I was
invited to become a member of the Ulster Club; the
Governor, the Duke of Abercorn, was immensely helpful
and friendly, and Lord Craigavon, the Prime Minister,
was a keen supporter of our work.	 In effect, I was
made a member of the Establishment of a province which
has most of' the paraphernalia of' a sovereign state and
a population no bigger than a moderate sized English
city. (13)
Being part of the Establishment, however, demands a degree of
loyalty, not least to its social and political goals, its institutions,
and its particular view of the world. 	 As Smith notes, what was
expected of the BBC and its hierarchy in its handling of events in the
North was quickly made clear to Beadle - in much the same way as it was
to be made clear to his successor. 	 In 1926 Beadle's decision to
celebrate St. Patrick's day brought a storm of protest from Unionists
and his drama department was attacked for using "southern" accents in
some of' its plays.
	
Following a pattern that was to be repeated many
times over the coming years, these protests were to be sufficient to
bring the BBC to heel.	 From then on, Smith argues, Beadle's policy
was to act as if' the "Border was an Atlantic coast". 	 In terms of'
broadcasting policy, this meant that all events South of' the border
were to be studiously ignored.
During the l930s and l940s under G.L. Marshall, the BBC's policy on
Northern Ireland was "to keep an iron grip on all local news and allow
nothing to go out which suggested that anything in Northern Ireland
(14)
could or would ever change". 	 This policy was made all the easier
due to the fact that all the BBC's news came from a locally owned - hence
Unionist - news agency.	 Marshall demanded, and was given, the right
to be consulted by all departments of the BBC on any matter which
related to Northern Ireland in any way. 	 In effect, Smith notes:
the chief in Belfast came to act as a kind of censor
over the whole of the BBC's output from London both
in its domestic and overseas services, and naturally
-87-
this tended to give a Unionist tinge to everything
that came out. 1
The net effect of this policy was that the problems facing the
nationalist minority were completely ignored. 	 Despite the obstacles
to the full enjoyment of civil rights, the excesses of the gerrymander,
and the open discrimination in housing and employment, the plight of
the nationalist community rarely surfaced as a topic on British radio
and television.
The BBC's monopoly over broadcasting was to be broken in 1959 with
the arrival of ITV.	 The emergence of commercial broadcasting and the
element of competition it introduced into broadcasting had the effect
of liberalising the broadcasting institutions - even though ITV had
strong links with the Unionist Party. 	 However, despite a degree of
relaxation, broadcasting was still acutely sensitive when it came to
the internal politics of the North, and the plight of the nationalist
community continued to be studiously ignored.	 Curtis notes how, prior
to 1968, only two programmes on the political situation in the North
were transmitted on national television, and how, in 1966, a Tonight
reporter was reputed to have left the BBC because he was refused
permission to make a film on gerrymandering. 	 With the exception of a
Sunday Times report on discrimination published in 1966, she notes, the
record of the British press was scarcely any better.
Cathcart, in his study of BBC Northern Ireland, has also argued
that the BBC was generally supportive of the Unionist regime, and that it
effectively ignored the existence of the Catholic community and the
nationalist opposition. 7	According to Cathcart:
Overall the BBC programme policy in Northern Ireland
remained what it had definitely become in 1948: the
building of political consensus in a divided society.
Such a policy involved, in effect, accentuating the
positive in community relations, stressing that which
was held or suffered in common.
	
It was unlikely to
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draw too much attention to that which divided.(18)
The growing strength of the civil rights movement in the latter
half of 1968 and the response it was to elicit from sections of the
majority community, however, was to prove a rude awakening in the
taken-for-granted world of British broadcasting.	 Tottering on the
brink of open communal violence, events in the Six Counties could no
longer be ignored.
	 How then did newspapers and television accommodate
events in Northern Ireland in the post-1968 period?
The British media and Northern Ireland post-1968
Generally speaking, the British media were initially sympathetic
to the demands of the minority community which they reported with
conventional liberal appeals to social justice and equality. 	 Kirkaldy,
in his study of British press reporting, quoted the following editorial
from the Daily Mail, which he found to be typical of the coverage
accorded to the civil rights campaign:
It is nearly 25 years since the rest of Britain
decided that everyone over 21, not just householders
and businessmen, should be able to vote for his local
council ... It is intolerable that council houses
should be allocated for reasons of religion and not
of poverty.	 It is intolerable that Catholics should
be denied an equal chance of a job.(19)
In his study of British press reporting between 1968 and 1971,
McCann also notes the general sympathy accorded to the civil rights
movement in the British press. 	 As a consequence, McCann noted, British
photographers and journalists tended to be well received in Catholic
areas; harassed and on occasions physically attacked in Paisleyite
(20)demonstrations.
This initial support for the civil rights movement was, however, to
prove shortlived. 	 Even before the entry of the army in August, 1969,
the British media's attitude to events in the North had begun to harden.
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Kirkaldy describes how frustration over the lack of Catholic gratitude
for the reforms grudgingly conceded by Stormont, annoyance at continuing
Protestant intransigence, and a growing lack of comprehension (except in
terms of Irish insanity) as the violence escalated, combined to bring
about a distinct anti-Irish tone in many newspaper reports. 	 As early
as January, 1969, Kirkaldy notes how a Daily Express editorial
complained that: ttMany of these demonstrators could not care less about
civil rights.	 They are either hooligans looking for a punch-up or
anarchists with a grudge against society". 21	McCann also noted how
this tendency to blame the continuing violence on sinister forces
(usually the IRA) became more pronounced in the period following the
entry of the army. (22)
As the political situation in the North continued to deteriorate in
the weeks and months following the entry of the army, the British media
were again faced with a dilemma in their reporting of events in the Six
Counties.	 At the heart of this dilemma were two separate but
inter-related developments.
	 First, nationalists, who had initially
welcomed the army as their protectors, increasingly came to view them in
the same light as the Black and Tans - that is as an instrument by which
the Unionists maintained their political ascendancy. 	 Secondly, and
related to this process of Catholic alienation, was the entry of the IRA
into armed conflict with the British army. 	 The dilemma facing the media
was as follows: given that the conflict in the North was not in any
conventional sense a 'war", how was it to be handled? 	 In other words,
how did broadcasting and the press position itself in relation to the
contending forces: the British state, the majority community which
conditionally supported it, and the nationalist minority which opposed
it? The history of the British media from 1969 onwards has largely
been a story of how it has sought to resolve this dilemma and the
consequences this has had for its coverage of events in the North.
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How this dilemma has been resolved by the British media has again
been most clearly documented in relation to broadcasting. 	 Indeed,
there is very little detailed information available on how the press
have resolved this dilemma at an editorial level, and one of the key
objectives of my own study is to come to some understanding of how
newspapers have sought to resolve it.
According to the "critical" perspective, confronting the problems
of reporting civil disorder in Northern Ireland has produced a
progressive tightening of editorial cOntrol within the British media
and, in the process, has significantly reduced the political space in
which journalists are able to address events in the North.
Smith notes how, as the political crisis in the North deepened,
the role of Controller Northern Ireland (a position which carried with
it the right to opt out of programmes whose content was considered
politically unsuitable for transmission in the North) became more
prominent.	 Reporters from news and current affairs, sound and vision,
working out of London, were expected to work from the Controller's
office under a high degree of supervision.
	
The BBC's policy was to
transmit all programmes nationally where possible; it therefore sought
not to produce material for the UK which was so inflammatory that the
Controller decided to opt out.	 Smith notes how the Director General
instructed producers not to do anything that might provoke the
Controller into such action. 	 In effect, editorial control was shifted
from the programme level to that of the Controller. (23)
Significant shifts in the BBC's editorial policy were to continue
as the crisis deepened with the imposition of internment without trial
and the escalation of the IRA's campaign against the army. 	 Schlesinger,
in his detailed study of BBC news, 24 argues that over the years the
BBC has adopted what he terms a "public order" broadcasting policy on
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Northern Ireland.	 This policy, according to Schlesinger, consists of
three important elements.	 First, there is a general support for the
British Army and the RUC and their role in law enforcement in the North.
Second, there is a negative evaluation of extremism and "terrorism", and
of the IRA in particular, which is presented as the principal threat to
order and stability. 	 Finally, there is a view of the need for
"responsible" coverage of the conflict, which requires especial
sensitivity to criticism of the supposed inflammatory effect of
broadcasting.
The basis of this policy, Schlesinger argues, was laid down during
the course of 1971 as the BBC found itself increasingly under attack
over its coverage of events in the North.	 Schlesinger describes how,
during the course of 1971, primarily as a response to external criticism,
the BBC began to adopt in greater detail policy guidelines for dealing
with the conflict.	 These guidelines, he suggests, not only inhibited
investigative journalism, but also brought the BBC's definition of the
conflict increasingly into line with that of the state. 	 At the heart
of this system of internal control, the author notes, was the demand
that alleditors, producers and reporters, wishing to produce items on
Northern Ireland, have to take their requests to the highest editorial
levels of their organisations. 	 This demand, he writes, "set Northern
Ireland into a special category, one in which reference upwards was a
'routine' part of news production practice") 26	Schlesinger also
details how the political sensitivity surrounding Northern Ireland has
prompted the BBC to dispense with its conventional commitment to
"impartiality" in its coverage of the conflict in the North.
So successful was this internal control system to prove that the
BBC saw no reason to alter or strengthen it until 1979, following
another bout of external criticism over its reporting.	 Curtis notes
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how, in 1979, in the wake of criticism over its decision to film an IRA
roadblock at Carrickmore, the BBC issued new guidelines which tightened
up the consultation process and further strengthened the role of
Controller Northern Ireland's strategic importance in controlling output
on Northern Ireland.
	 According to Curtis, the reference upwards system
as presently formulated has functioned to sanitise broadcasting output
on Northern Ireland of material likely to cause criticism:
The reference upwards system acts firstly as a filter
removing t undesirable' programmes or items at an early
stage and, in theory, eliminating the need for
embarrassing acts of censorship. 	 Secondly, it is an
early warning system, so that if a 'sensitive' programme
is allowed through ... not only can it be checked and
double checked, but also the upper echelons can prepare
themselves for the inevitable onslaught from the right. (27)
These restrictions do not only apply to news and current affairs or
to proposed interviews with members of illegal organisations - though
their impact has been particularly significant in these areas.
	
From
the very beginning there has always been intense sensitivity at the top
of broadcasting about the danger presented by all forms of output,
particularly plays and historical documentaries.	 In 1980, for example,
the Sunday Times reported on Harlech television's decision to suppress
a documentary dealing with events in Ireland 60 and 300 years ago.
The programme, which consisted of' a series of interviews with nine
Irish men and women who fought against the British in 1916 and 1918,
was considered to be so politically sensitive that the company sold the
rights of the film (costing an estimated £30,000) to its director for
£1, on the condition that every reference to Harlech was removed from
the credits and the director would not reveal which company had
financed the project. 	 According to the paper:
Harlech's manoeuvre will be seen as perhaps the most
extreme example yet of television's sensitivity on
Northern Ireland.	 It will also be interpreted as
yet another example of the lengths television
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companies will go to to avoid giving offence, as
their licences come up for re_allocation.(28)
Curtis provides clear evidence of how sensitive the broadcasting
authorities have been on the issue of Northern Ireland irrespective of
the form it takes.	 According to a list compiled by the author, over
forty programmes ranging from Top of the Pops to Panorama have been
banned, censored, or delayed on all four channels between 1959 and
1983.(29)	 The range of programmes included in this list gives some
indication of the scrutiny applied across the spectrum of broadcasting
output.
According to the "critical" perspective, the ramifications of the
system of internal control presently operating within British
broadcasting, and the political sensitivity surrounding the issue of
Northern Ireland in general, has been most acutely felt at the point of
news and current affairs production. 	 Schlesinger, Murdock and Elliott
point to how the tight controls presently operating within broadcasting
have meant that certain topics are virtually off-limits and that
reporters and producers have to make immense efforts to persuade the
(30)broadcasting authorities to pursue them. 	 Curtis, commenting on a
similar theme, notes how the need to argue at length over programme
suggestions and the political fuss that this may often incur, has
increased the tendency towards self-censorship within broadcasting.
In an age when job security is likely to be foremost in the minds of
many journalists, Curtis suggests, the desire not to rock the boat is
likely to be more pronounced:
The 'reference upwards' procedure, and the knowledge
that Ireland spells trouble, also acts as a deterrent
to career-conscious TV journalists, many of whom are
especially vulnerable because they are employed on
short-term contract. 	 As has been seen, for every
programme that gets banned, there are probably 20
that are never made.
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What then, according to the "critical" perspective, have been the
consequences of these developments for the kinds of information made
available to the public on the issue of Northern Ireland? 	 How well, if
at all, have newspapers and television ckt&	 with their
responsibility to provide the public with the information necessary for
it to arrive at a rational and informed understanding of the conflict
taking place in the Six Counties?
Northern Ireland as news: enlightenment or obfuscation?
According to the "critical" perspective, in its efforts to avoid
controversy in its reporting of Northern Ireland, the British media, and
broadcasting in particular, have tended to restrict their news coverage
to the symptoms of the Irish conflict rather than its causes. 	 In the
main it has been violence, rather than the socio-political factors that
give rise to it, that has provided the dominant theme for news coverage.
In his detailed analysis of the coverage accorded to Northern Ireland by
the British, Irish and Northern Irish media, Philip Elliott found that
most of the stories carried by the British media were about violence
(32)	 .
and law enforcement.	 During the periods examined in his study (each
of which contained a major election in an attempt to maxirnise the level
of political reporting), such stories accounted for 72 per cent of the
coverage accorded to Northern Ireland by national television, 58 per
cent of the coverage in the quality press, and 65 per cent in the
popular press.	 In all, only a third of the stories dealt with
politics and other matters. 	 Elliott contrasted this approach with that
of the Irish media which not only carried more stories about the North
(a ration of about 5 to 1) but were also much more concerned with the
political dimension.	 The British media's preoccupation with
violence and its related issues has also been noted by Blumler,
Curtis, (36) Kirkaldy, 37
 and Schlesinger. (38)
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Furthermore, according to these studies, news coverage has not
only concentrated on violence to the exclusion of politics, it has also
tended to present violent incidents in a decontextualised form with
little, if' any, attempt being made to go beyond the immediate details
of given incidents or to place them within an analytical framework.
As early as 1971, Blumler, in one of the earliest attempts to provide
a systematic analysis of the coverage accorded to Northern Ireland,
noted that television news bulletins were failing to explain what was
(39)happening in the North.	 According to Blumler, when the battle on
the ground (to which 26 of the 46 items carried by television during the
sample period were devoted) surfaced as an item on television news:
It was mainly strategic assessments that were neglected:
the impact of army measures on IRA resources; the nature
of the propaganda (as distinct from the physical) campaign
which the IRA was waging; Catholic attitudes to the IRA
and the army; the balance of military and political
priorities in official policy and the factors that may
determine its success or failure; and the pressures
exerted by other political forces in both Eire and Ulster.
In other words, the television news bulletins tended to
ignore much that could give some point and meaning to the
ceaseless struggle. (40)
Commenting on a similar theme, Elliott was also to find that in its
efforts to steer clear of controversy broadcasting news was largely
limited to what could be covered using a "factual and objective style
of reporting" which was preoccupied with the who, what, where and when
of given incidents, and which left "background and significance to take
care of themselvestl)4U	 Furthermore, as well as being descriptive and
non-explanatory, Elliott noted that violence was presented in such a way
as to be both simple and of imemdiate human interest. 	 "Simplicity",
Elliott argues:
involves both a lack of explanation and a lack of
historical perspective; human interest, a concentration
on the particular detail of incidents and the personal
characteristics of those involved.(42)
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According to Elliott this style of reporting has two main
consequences.	 First, by concentrating on the known facts and human
interest aspects of given events, it excludes much of that which could
give some meaning or sense to those events and thereby makes political
violence less, rather than more, explicable; the result is a continuing
procession of senseless violent episodes. 	 Secondly, it increases the
dependency of journalists on those sources best suited to providing
information in this form.	 Elliott found in the British media a
"reliance on official sources to provide accounts of incidents, to
identify victims and attribute vio1ence". 43	This led Elliott to
contrast the British media's reliance upon official information sources
with that of the Irish papers which "often went further, not just
printing alternatives but dropping versions, including the official
versions, they no longer believed and taking on themselves the
responsibility of pointing the reader in the right direction".45
A similar point was made by Chibnall, who found that the immense
pressure on journalists in Northern Ireland to accept "official"
versions of events, together with a dependency on official information
services and particularly those run by the army and police, has made
them highly susceptible to official policies of misinformation)46
The form these policies have taken and their consequences for news
coverage will be returned to in some detail in Chapter Six and need not
detain us here.
In its coverage of Northern Ireland, Elliott also found a
preoccupation within the British media with events on the mainland as
compared with those occurring in the Six Counties. 	 This tendency was
most pronounced in the coverage accorded to the bombing of two pubs in
Guildford which occurred during the first sampled period.	 Elliott
found that the Guildford bombings received nearly twice as much space
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in the British media as all the incidents in Northern Ireland during
the same period.	 Yet, in that three week period, twice as many people
were killed in Northern Ireland as in Guildford and there were also
numerous other violent incidents.4
The Guildford bombings were also exceptional in that they were the
only incidents to become a running story in the British media. 	 While
killings and other incidents of violence taking place in the North
tended to be reported once and then dropped, the Guildford bombings were
to be followed by numerous related stories. 	 The prolonged attention
given to the Guildford bombings compared with the often staccato
coverage given to violent incidents in the North did not, in Elliott's
view, simply reflect the importance British news editors attached to
events on the mainland as against events in the North. 	 In Elliott's
view, it also reflected much more fundamentally the different societies
in which those events were taking place. 	 It was rather as if British
society, united against an external threat, was daily applying a new
dressing to the wound it had received.48
A further consequence of the British media's preoccupation with
violence and its aftermath is that coverage accorded to events in the
North by all media has tended to ebb and flow according to the intensity
of the violence at any given time. 	 Kirkaldy, for example, notes how,
as violence in the North became "routine" and less frequent from 1973
onwards, press interest in the conflict was to diminish rapidly and is
now only revived when something new or spectacular happens. 4	This
tendency to devote less space and prominence to events in the North,
Kirkaldy suggests, was noticeable in the popular press even before the
violence had reached its peak.	 Schlesinger, in his study of BBC news,
also found a similar tendency within broadcasting noting how, from 1972
onwards, there was to be a steady shift in resources away from the
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Northern Ireland story.(50)	 The consequences of Northern Ireland's
diminishing news value on journalistic practice in the North will be
returned to in some detail in Chapter Seven.
Violence as news: actors and acts
In their coverage of Northern Ireland, the British media have not
only focused on violence while neglecting its causes, they have also,
the "critical" perspective contends, presented this violence in a way
which both obscures the reality of violent conflict in the North and
presents an incomplete and misleading picture of' the contribution made
to this violence by the various parties to the conflict.
Statistics on violence in the North reveal that a combination of
state, anti-state, and inter-communal violence have all made significant
contributions to the 2,500 fatalities to date.	 Between 1st June, 1969,
and 30th June, 1983, according to statistics reported by the Irish Times,
2,304 people had been killed in Northern Ireland as a direct consequence
(51)
of the conflict.	 The figures revealed that republican
pararnilitaries were responsible for 1,264 of these deaths, loyalist
paramilitaries for 613, the security forces for 264, while a further 163
were "non-classified".	 Other statistics showed that, of the 1,297
civilian victims, 773 were Catholics, 495 were Protestants and a further
29 were not natives of the North.
The complex pattern of violence suggested by these figures, critics
of the British media contend, has largely been ignored by newspapers and
television which, several studies conclude, have tended to be
preoccuped with the violence of those who oppose rather than those who
represent authority.	 Studies by Curtis, 52 El1iott, 5	Kirkaldy,54
McCann 5 and McClung Lee 6 have all noted a strong tendency within
the British media to cast the army and police in a strong and positive
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light, to minimise and at times ignore their involvement in violence
even when it clearly breached democratic and legal standards and, when
violence emanating from the army and police was reported, to treat it
in an uncritical and sympathetic manner.
Elliott, in his survey of news coverage during 1974 and 1975, found
that, insofar as the army's role in the North surfaced as a news item,
little was reported which undermined its image as an "impartial
peacekeeping" force, or which suggested that its presence in the North
had a direct or indirect impact on the level of violence.
	
When the
army did surface in the news, Elliott notes, it "appeared as almost
above the fray - brave, tormented, but largely inactive except as a
(57)
rather superior Boy Scout Troop". 	 Summarising the general
treatment accorded to the security forces by the British press, Elliott
found that:
almost the only active part the security forces played
in events in the province was issuing warnings of
expected terrorist activity.	 Otherwise their members
were involved in incidents but invariably as targets
though occasionally they returned fire; soldiers and
policemen won awards for bravery, took part in public
parades, occasionally helped ordinary citizens and
were compensated for injuries received.(58)
The British media have not only overplayed minority group violence,
they have also failed to go beyond a condemnatory approach to this
violence in order to examine the complexity of factors that give rise
to it.	 Instead, the tendency of newspapers and television has simply
been to present the violence of minority groups as irrational, senseless
and horrid.	 Elliott found that in its treatment of conflict in the
North, the British media identified three principal sources of violence
which, when taken together, he suggests, contributed to a general image
of a society being torn apart by an irrational and mindless cycle of
violence and counter-violence:
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In general the source of violence was portrayed as
terrorism, the result of inexplicable, asocial forces.
In so far as it wasn't terrorism, it was sectarianism,
the product of another force, equally inexplicable,
but somehow diffused throughout the community.	 Or it
was feuding.	 Feuding was irrational because it
involved death and injury but more explicable because
it occurred among the perpetrators of terrorism and
sectarianism who had put themselves outside of society
and beyond the reach of reason anYwaY.(59)
Looking back over the ten year period examined in his study,
Kirkaldy also found that as far as the British press was concerned,
"The violence of Northern Ireland is generally portrayed as the product
of 'gunmen', 'thugs', psycopaths', 'terrorists' and other such terms
of convenience." (60)
The British media have not only been preoccupied with "terrorism"
as opposed to other forms and sources of violence, but even within this
narrowly defined category they have been selective and sometimes
tendentious.	 As we have already seen, loyalist paramilitary groups in
the North have been responsible for over 600 of the 2,304 deaths
recorded by 1983 and almost all of their victims have been civilians.
Yet despite this, the British media have tended to present "terrorist"
violence as if it were solely the preserve of the IRA and other
republican groups.	 So much so, the "critical" perspective suggests,
that the casual observer of the British media could be forgiven for
arriving at the conclusion that violence in the North emanated
pre-eminently, if not exclusively, from republican groups.	 Elliott
notes how the involvement of loyalists in acts of violence had been
played down to such an extent "that Protestant extremists themselves
had complained about the lack of attention paid to their effortstt.(6U
During the six week period examined by Elliott, the death toll in
the North was 16 Catholics, 6 Protestants, one member of the security
forces and one other.	 Yet despite the fact that Catholics were the
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main victims, the media blamed most of the violence on the IRA or some
other republican group:
There was a paradox implicit in the general consensus
of the British media that most of the violence could be
attributed to the Provisional IRA or another republican
group and that most of the identified victims were law
enforcement agents or members of the Catholic community.
The consensus was that 'Catholics' were both the main
perpetrators and one of the main victims of violence
The paradox was implicit however in the sense that it
emerged only from a numerical analysis of the detail of
the stories and not from an immediate reading of the
news angles the British media used to report violence.(62)
The British media have not entirely ignored the fact that some of
the perpetrators of violence in the North have been loyalists.
Nevertheless, as Elliott points out, the British media have tended to
use the ambiguous label "sectarianism" to identify incidents in which
Protestant extremists have been involved and to couple such reports with
explanations in terms of "loyalist anger, reprisals or a Protestant
(63)backlash",	 explanations which, in presenting loyalist violence as
essentially reactive and defensive, tend to reinforce the image of a
peaceful Protestant community under attack from republican "terrorists". ,
The guarded and ambiguous treatment of loyalist violence, Elliott
and others have noted, contrasts sharply with the treatment of
republican violence which dominates the headlines and attracts the
majority of attributions of responsibility for violence in all sections
(64)
of the British media. 	 While incidents of loyalist violence tend to
be presented as spontaneous and unconnected responses to the violence of
others, republican violence, Elliott observes:
was presented as if the events were related to a
planned campaign, as if there really was a war in
progress, but also as if it were simply senseless
random and unpredictable events.	 The view of
terror as a planned campaign was presented in
various references to who or what were now regarded
as legitimate targets by the Provisionals.(65)
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The view that the British media have tended to define violence in
the North almost exclusively in terms of the IRA is also supported by
Curtis, who documents a number of incidents in which newspapers and
television, usually on the basis of information supplied by the army
or police, have blamed the IRA for acts of violence committed by
others. 66	Criticising the British media's "selective amnesia" when
it comes to the violence of loyalists, Curtis notes how the tendency of
journalists to blame the IRA for most of the violence culminated during
the 1981 hunger strike when sections of the press blamed the IRA for all
the deaths.	 An example cited by Curtis appeared in The Times.
Christopher Thomas began his front page report of the funeral of
Bobby Sands: "The Roman Catholics buried Robert Sands yesterday as
(67)
Protestants lamented their 2,000 dead from 12 years of terrorism".
He went on to refer to the "2,000 victims" of Bobby Sands'
"collaborators".	 The fact that Thomas could confidently make such a
grossly inaccurate statement, Curtis argues, bears testimony to the
bias and distortion that has characterised the British media's reporting
of political violence since the early l970s.
Conclusion
According to the studies examined above, the British media have
clearly failed in their responsibility to provide the British public
with the information it needs to arrive at a rational assessment of the
conflict taking place on the streets of Northern Ireland.	 In response
to external political attack newspapers and television have abstained
from presenting interpretations of the conflict and its underlying
causes which challenge or bring into question the view being promoted
by the authorities.	 Reluctant to upset the powers that be, the British
media have contained their Irish coverage more and more tightly within
a catalogue of bomb blasts, shootings and murders leaving the public to
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arrive at its own conclusions as to the significance and background to
these events.	 The limitations of this approach to the reporting of
violent political conflict are obvious: without an understanding of the
factors that motivate individuals and communities to resort to violence
as a means of securing (or resisting) social and political change, then
the violence itself cannot be fully understood.
According to the "critical" perspective, the inadequacies of the
British media's reporting of Northern Ireland has seriously undermined
the ability of the British people to participate in a rational and
informed discussion on how best to resolve the continuing crisis in the
North.	 This, many conclude, can only be rectified by a more open
approach to the reporting of events in the North.	 In Blumler's view,
such an approach would demand at the very least "a continual attempt to
clarify the options open to the policy makers and to assess how the
course they are steering is working out". 	 "Anything less", he
continues, "is both a denial of politics as an arena of' choice and a
standing invitation to the nay-sayers to press for yet more restrictions
(68)
and controls".
The "anti-terrorist" perspective
As was mentioned in the introduction to this chapter, those working
within the "anti-terrorist" perspective are also critical of certain
aspects of the British media's reporting on Northern Ireland.	 Any
similarity between the two perspectives, however, ends there.	 As many
of the principal arguments deployed by those working from within the
"anti-terrorist" perspective are examined in detail in Chapter Three,
I shall restrict myself here to making a few general observations.
The first, and perhaps the most important, point that can be made
about the body of material examined under the "anti-terrorist"
perspective is that generally speaking, its authors share a common
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understanding that the central issue raised by the coverage accorded to
Northern Ireland by the media is not whether it is accurate, if it
deals with the most important developments, if it is clarifying,
representative, or even fair, but simply - does it undermine the state's
campaign against the "terrorists"? 	 In this respect the range of issues
addressed by the "anti-terrorist" perspective is more restricted than
those examined within the "critical" perspective.
The second point to be made about many of these analyses is that,
unlike much of the work cited in the previous section, they have rarely
been based on any detailed empirical analysis of either the coverage
accorded to Northern Ireland, the process of news production, or the
constraints that many journalists presently operate under.	 As we shall
see in Chapter Three, much of the evidence presented in support of these
analyses has often been of an impressionistic and selective nature,
making unwarranted leaps from correlation to causality.
	
Nowhere is
this more apparent than in the "anti-terrorist" perspective's attempts
to establish a link between the reporting of "terrorism" and the
subsequent levels of "terrorist" activity.
Thirdly, unlike the majority of studies cited in the previous
section which are critical of the degree of control presently operating
within the British media and the consequences these controls have had
for the ability of journalists to address events in Northern Ireland,
many of the analyses provided by those working within the
"anti-terrorist" perspective have called for greater control over the
operations of the media. 	 The controls canvassed by these studies range
from invoking legal sanctions to securing a gentleman's agreement on
a voluntary basis.
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Conclusion
In contrast to arguments outlined in the previous section, the
"antiterrorist" perspective has tended to deny the media an independent
role in the conflict between the British state and those who oppose it
in Northern Ireland.	 Instead, the media are seen as having a positive
duty to support the forces of law and order in their campaign against
titerrorismi t .	 Insofar as these studies have addressed the coverage
accorded to events in the Six Counties by both television and the press,
it has been evaluated in terms of who benefits from it rather than in
terms of the contribution this coverage has made to the wider debate
about political violence and its underlying causes.
The ttinsidersttt perspective
The danger is that when you express a desire to
understand, you run the risk of being labelled a
'sympathiser'; if you want to understand the
Easter Rising and the Fenians, you must be an IRA
sympathiser, and if you want to understand the
Orange Lodges you must be a UVF supporter.(69)
One of the most significant gaps in the literature presently
available on the British media and Northern Ireland, is the general lack
of detailed material on the problems encountered by journalists in the
reporting of Northern Ireland - either within their own organisations
or in the day to day process of newsgathering. 	 Indeed, with the
exception of the occasional article and book here and there, journalists
and the organisations they work for have contributed remarkably little
to the body of material available on the British media and Northern
Ireland.	 Consequently, in order to construct some understanding of how
the problems of reporting Northern Ireland are viewed from the "inside",
this section draws on material from two sources: policy statements and
general commentaries from senior broadcasting personnel, and the
personal accounts of journalists who have reported the conflict at
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various times since 1969.
The View from the Top
Since the early 1970s the criticism levelled at television's
handling of events in the Six Counties has prompted a number of policy
statements from senior broadcasting personnel.	 Generally speaking,
the purpose of these statements (which have usually appeared in the
BBC's house magazine The Listener) has been to clarify and explain what
the broadcasters consider to be their key responsibilities in the day
to day reporting of Northern Ireland.
The central problem, as seen through the eyes of those responsible
for formulating, and ultimately defending, editorial policy within
British broadcasting (and the theme most frequently addressed in these
articles) has been how to reconcile the political pressure for stricter
controls in the reporting of the "terrorists" and their campaign, with
the constitutional and professional responsibility to provide the public
with the information necessary for it to form a rational and informed
understanding of what motivates this campaign. 	 As the recent outcry
over the BBC's Real Lives "At the Edge of the Union" programme most
clearly demonstrated, nowhere has this problem been more acute than over
the issue of granting access to those involved in anti-state violence.
What has made this problem doubly sensitive for the broadcasting
authorities has been the frequent criticism that, in providing access
for those engaged in "terrorism", television actually provides the
"terrorists" with an opportunity to propagandize their cause and thereby
undermine the security efforts of the state.
This conflict between the interests of the broadcasting authorities
and the wider interests of the state, is not insignificant.	 Contrary
to the claims often advanced by "conspiracy theorists" broadcasting is
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not merely a tool of government nor does it automatically reflect the
interests of the state. 	 On the contrary, the relationship between
broadcasting and the state is complex and often divergent. 	 The
complexity of this relationship is perhaps best illustrated by the
example of the BBC.	 According to Kumar, in understanding why it is
difficult for the BBC to act as a simple channel for the attitudes and
values of dominant groups or the short term interests of the state, one
has to take into account two important considerations:
On the one hand, its national standing has turned
essentially on its ability to remain clear of
political affiliations or involvement: to be seen
or thought to be too friendly to the state would
have been the kiss of death ... On the other hand
it has been reminded at every turn of its history
of its ultimate reliance on the state (over matters
such as the allocation of' wavelengths, the renewal of
the charter, the increase of the licence fee). This
latter factor does of' course claim priority. 	 It is
about survival in its most basic sense, and must and
does figure predominantly in the calculations of' the
higher management of the BBC.	 But there is also
survival in the only sense valued by most people who
work for the BBC, in the terms in which it acquired
its cultural significance, especially in the Reithian
era, and in which it marked out its role as an
independent and equal estate of the realm. 	 Its entire
credibility as an institution depends upon it
maintaining some sort of existence in these terms.
This has meant the adoption of particular strategies
which at different times and at various points have
jarred against the ruling institutional complexes and
assumptions ... it has also meant that the medium of
broadcasting retains the capacity for opening up issues
in some surprising and unexpected ways; the mask
occasionally slips, and we are given a glimpse of' a
range of options and possibilities normally closed off.(70)
Moreover, as the Glasgow Media Group point out: "it is incorrect
to see the state as a single unified apparatus able to transmit its
(71)
views at will, via subservient broadcasters". 	 To do so, the
Glasgow Media Group argue, is to ignore the divisions within the state
and between various sections of the state - as between the government
and the military and between different parts of the armed forces)72
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Furthermore, it is also to assume a unity of interests between the
various sections of the media and those who work within these media at
various levels.
The state's ability to secure prominence and complete credibility
for official views on television is also hampered by the nature of the
conflict taking place in the Six Counties.
	 As Schlesinger et al
point out:
At the present time, one of the state's great problems
in its efforts to win the propaganda advantage in the
'war against terrorism' in Northern Ireland, derives
precisely from the fact that it is not waging a war as
such.	 There is no general mobilisation, nor is there
a large enemy power to be defeated.(73)
"Total war", the authors go on to argue, "simplifies matters.	 It
allows the liberal-democratic state to exercise control over the
production of' news, without thereby risking the legitimacy of' the
system because in national emergencies security prevails over free
(74)
expression".
Not surprisingly then, in defining what they consider to be their
key responsibilities in the reporting of Northern Ireland, and in
particular their responsibilities vis-a-vis the state and those who
oppose it, most broadcasters have rejected the argument that they should
give uncritical support to the state.	 Francis 75 and Cox 76 reject
the argument that in situations lacking consensus the broadcasters
should stand by the government in the "national interest" on the grounds
that the national interest lies in solving the problem rather than in
the policies or viewpoints of governments or parties. 	 In defending
this position the broadcasters have stressed their role as a Fourth
Estate.	 According to Francis:
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The experience of Northern Ireland, where communities
and governments are in conflict but not in a state of
emergency or a state of war, suggests a greater need
than ever for the media to function as a 'fourth estate'.
distinct from the executive, the legislature and the
judiciary.	 But if the functions are to remain separate,
it must be left to the media themselves to take the
decisions (within the limits of responsibility) as to
what to publish, as to when, and as to how.	 That puts
a lot of responsibility on all of us to answer these
questions wisely, not, I submit, by adopting special
criteria for Northern Ireland, but by deploying the best
professional skills and by scrupulously fair dealing.(77)
In defending their independence from the state, the broadcasters
have also been keen to stress the positive benefits accruing to society.
Curran refers to the role broadcasting plays in the "enlargement of
enlightenment", 78 Francis, to the "independent information-gathering
process which is our contribution to democratic society". 	 According
to Richard Cox, Chairman of' Tyne Tees Television:
A good broadcasting news service is essential to the
functioning of democracy. 	 It is as necessary to the
political health of society as a good water supply is
to its physical health.
	 This news service must probe
and investigate as well as report.	 The broadcast
journalist must expose and examine the weaknesses and
evils of society, as well as its strengths and virtues.(80)
Nowhere have the broadcasters stressed their right to function
independently from the state more vigorously than over the issue of
programming, and in particular, the right to provide access to the
views of the "enemy".	 Curran 8	and Hill (82) both point to the BBC's
resistance to direct political pressure in the decision to screen the
programme "A Question of Ulster" in 1972, as the clearest example of
the BBC's independence from government. 	 According to Cox;
the ultimate sin of the broadcaster is to keep off the
air, because of his political or social prejudice,
subjects which are relevant and significant.
	 To do
that is worse than to treat them with bias - for then,
at least, they get an airing. 	 Producers need to b
judged as much by what they have not covered as by
their treatment of the subjects they have selected.(83)
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Francis, in a direct reply to criticism over the BBC's decision to
broadcast an interview with a member of INLA, defended the BBC's right
to interview members of "terrorist" organisations on the grounds of
public interest:
The objections to the BBC doing such programmes seem
invariably to come from those who fail to understand
what the role of the media should be in a situation
like the one we face in Northern Ireland. 	 I start
from the presumption that the media have a very real
contribution to make, in particular a contribution to
the maintenance of the democracy which is under threat,
both by providing a forum where the harshest differences
of opinion can be aired, and by reporting and
courageously investigating the unpalatable truths which
underlie the problems of the province. 	 I have no
doubt that if and when the communities of Northern
Ireland reconcile their conflicts, it will be by
understanding them not ignoring them.(84)
The problem according to the broadcasting authorities at an
editorial level, is how to balance the requirements of the public's
need to understand the conflict with the danger of providing the
"terrorists" with a platform for propaganda. Francis talks about
"weighing carefully the possible propaganda risks against the value to
(85)the public of the information to be gained".
	
While Curran in
defending the BBC's decision to screen an interview with IRA leader
David O'Connell, spoke of the need:
to consider ... whether the undeniable wish of the
IRA to make propaganda through such interviews will
be outbalanced by the value of the information which
will be brought to the attention of the British
public.	 The rarity of the permission given indicates
the way in which I have judged these questions.(85)
Writing in his autobiography, A Seamless Robe, Curran admitted that:
"In eight years I agreed to only two such interviews, and I was bitterly
attacked on both occasions". 8	Francis was also keen to stress how
infrequently such interviews were screened:
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In the 12-month period from October 1975 to 1976 there
were six interviews on BBC Northern Ireland Television
with Provisional Sinn Fein and 12 with spokesmen for the
Loyalist paramilitaries, six of them being with elected
representatives.	 These figures compare with a total of
307 interviews with elected representatives of all parties,
including 56 with UK ministers.	 In the same period there
were 41 interviews with official Trade Union leaders and
four with UWC spokesmen. 	 All these were on the basis of
relevance, not according to a representational formula.
So, over the year, the proportion of paramilitary interviews
(18 out of' 325) was extremely low, and incidentally
contrasts with 18 interviews for leaders of the Peace
Movement in the first three months of its existence.
Maybe we have been guilty of under-representing the forces
which have had the most profound effect on everyday life
in the Province?(88)
Together with emphasising the infrequency of interviews with what
Curran calls the "enemies of democracy" 89 the broadcasters have also
stressed that reporting the '1 enemy does not mean supporting the flenemytr.
Indeed, without exception, the broadcasters have rejected the implication
that independence and objectivity means impartiality or neutrality.
Francis summed up the BBC's policy on interviewing ttterroriststl and
reporting their campaigns in the following terms:
Nobody involved in the journalistic coverage of terrorism
is other than sympathetic to the victims or repelled by the
perpetrators of terrorist crimes.	 We do not deal impartially
with those who choose to step outside the bounds of law and
decent social behaviour.	 Not only do they get very much less
coverage than those who pursue their aims legitimately, but
the very manner and tone that our reporters adopt makes our
moral position quite Plain.(90)
The general picture to emerge from the body of material examined
above is that the broadcasters seem to consider that they have handled a
sensitive and difficult problem well. 	 Insofar as the coverage accorded
to Northern Ireland is concerned, most senior broadcasters are of the
opinion that this has been more than adequate. 	 Curran was satisfied
that "there had been enough reporting of the views and activities of the
IRA for understanding to be there".	 In his address to the Royal
Institute of International Affairs, Richard Francis also expressed
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satisfaction over the BBC's reporting of the conflict and its underlying
causes:
Does the BBC as a whole pay too little attention to the
underlying problems of Northern Ireland?	 I don't think
so.	 Despite the diminished news interest, the flow of
analytical programmes has been fairly constant. Over the
last six years, on the BBC television networks alone, there
have been 349 current affairs features about Northern
Ireland (anything from 5 to 50 minutes) - that's rather
more than one a week. 	 Over the last fortnight there have
been two complete editions of The Money Programme on BBC 2
looking into the province's economic difficulties.	 Since
1971 there have also been three major studio enquiries into
the political options for Ulster, 24 documentary films, ten
25-minute programmes (twice repeated) and an accompanying
book on the historical background - coverage far in excess
of any other regional problem in the UK, including
devolution! (92)
As we shall see below, this assessment of television's reporting of
the Northern Ireland conflict is not one shared by many journalists.
The View from Below
The continuing conflict in Northern Ireland has challenged many of
the central principles of liberal journalism. 	 The deeper the crisis
became during the l970s and the more controversial the methods used to
meet it, the greater the strain on the insitutions of broadcasting and
the press forced to choose between the journalist's insistence on the
public's right to know everything and the government's preference,
ostensibly for security reasons, for it not to know too much.	 Since
the early 1970s the experience of many journalists has suggested that,
in choosing between these two options, the British media has come down
firmly on the side of the government.
One of the earliest accounts of the problems encountered by
journalists in the reporting of Northern Ireland was provided by an
anonymous BBC reporter in an article published in the New statesman.
The reporter described how, as a consequence of' the editorial policies
being pursued within his own organisation:
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the BBC is both imposing and encouraging censorship
to such an extent that its employees are forced
increasingly to misrepresent, distort, and suppress
much of what is happening in Northern Ireland.(94)
Pccording to the journalist, who cites a number of censored stories, the
effect of the censorship and restrictions imposed on journalists working
for the BBC had been dramatic:
The censorship and restrictions now imposed on
reporters and editors make it practically impossible
to ask the question 'Why?'
	
Why do Catholics now
laugh openly when a British soldier is shot down and
killed, when a year ago they would offer the army cups
of tea? Why do the Catholics refuse to condemn the
bombing and shootings?	 Why do they still succour
the IRA when they know if they refused, the IRA and
thence the British army would depart their homes?
What influence does the Civil Rights Movement have?
Or the SDLP? The answers to such questions are
fundamental to understanding the problem, crucial to
any judgement of the British policy, yet they cannot
be asked by BBC employees: quite simply the management
of the BBC has decided that it does not want such
questions raised.
	 Its reporters and editors stand
transfixed - censored - in a maze of insuperable
restrictions. (95)
This view of the internal situation within the BBC however, was not
one shared by all BBC reporters.	 Writing in the BBC's house magazine,
The Listener, Martin Bell, a senior and respected Northern Ireland
reporter, dismissed the debate about censorship within the BBC as being
"ill-informed and off target" and as having "little to do with the
realities of news reporting in Northern Ireland". 	 Bell argued that he
had not found himself "overwhelmed by any sense of a corporate doctrine
of what might be permissible to report. 	 Events move too quickly for
that". Bell's argument was that all the reporter did was "talk to both
sides, record their version of events, and leave the viewing public to
(96)judge".
In a subsequent article, Bell again dismissed what he called the
"hypochondria of criticism" over censorship on the grounds that:
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the patient is unable to locate or identify the
illness that he fears.	 Rather he complains of a
feeling of censorship, and a general unease about
the apparatus of supervision through which it
might be applied. 	 The thing itself proves strangely
elusive, as in this context it always has done.
Indeed, some of the original clamour about it caine
from journalists whose acquaintance with Northern
Ireland was extremely slight, and that made over
a telephone and at a range of 400 miles.(97)
while Bell did admit that there had been a tightening of editorial
control within the BBC in its coverage of Northern Ireland, he argued
that the "effects are not in my experience as oppressive as academic
critics suppose t'.	 In effect, Bell went on to argue, the tightening of
editorial control simply meant that in practice "editors edit, which one
always understood was what they were paid to do". (98)
Since 1972, however, a number of articles have been published which
provide further evidence that the political space available to
journalists in which to address events in Northern Ireland has been
substantially reduced.
Thames Television reporter Peter Taylor in his account of the
problems facing journalists within commercial television, is also highly
critical of the degree of internal control operating within British
broadcasting.	 According to Taylor, who provides a highly critical
insight into how the IBA has sought to wield its power over news and
current affairs output:
In principle, the broadcasting authorities should stand
between the media and the state as benevolent umpires,
charged with the task of defending each against the
excesses of the other, guardians of the public interest,
upholders of a broadcasting service alleged to be the
finest in the world.	 In practice, where Northern
Ireland is concerned, they have become committed to a
perspective of the conflict which identifies the publiC
interest increasingly with the government interest.(99)
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According to Taylor, television journalism is hampered by
restrictions that Fleet Street does not and would not tolerate. 	 Using
his experiences with the This Week current affairs programme during 1977
and 1978 as an example, Taylor shows how the IBA has made it almost
impossible for journalists to depart from the government's perspective
on Northern Ireland, or to provide the public with an alternative to the
standard fare provided by news coverage of the conflict.	 Taylor
details how, over this period, the IBA successfully censored, delayed,
and banned This Week programmes on the Queen's Jubilee visit to Belfast,
and a report on Amnesty International's investigation into
interrogation techniques in Northern Ireland.
A former producer of This Week, David Elstein, has also been
critical of the way Northern Ireland has been handled by the
broadcasters.	 According to Elstein: "in ITV producers are slowly
coming to the conclusion that the most honest response to censorship of
programmes about Northern Ireland is simply to stop making them".00
Elsteiri describes how structural differences between the BBC and ITV
have been reflected in the way censorhsip takes place. 	 The fact that
the BBC is an organic whole while ITV is divided by design, Elstein
argues, has tended to make examples of censorship easier to find in ITV.
Despite this, he argues, producers working for both organisations have
been forced to concede ground over their reporting of Northern Ireland.
Elstein concluded:
We worry about sex-and-violence on television.	 We
worry about the materialism and the passivity that
lenthening viewing hours induce.	 But do we ever ask
why it is that television's one redeeming feature -
its capacity to inform a huge audience about the
outside world - has failed with regard to Northern
Ireland? (101)
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The television critic Chris Dunkley has also reviewed televisionts
coverage of Northern Ireland and found it wanting.
	
Looking back over
his eight years as a television critic, Dunkley suggests that "The
exception to television's general rule that the problem of providing
continuous Northern Ireland coverage should be solved by simply ignoring
(102)it, is London Weekend Television's Weekend World". 	 The problem
with this programme, Dunkley suggests, is that its scheduling ensures
that it reaches only a relatively small audience: a point which could
also be made about Dunkley's article, which appeared in the
Financial Times.
The problems that have confronted journalists in their reporting of
Northern Ireland have not been restricted simply to broadcasting or
simply to instances of direct censorship. 	 On the contrary, journalists
from all media have been confronted with a variety of problems in the
daily routine of newsgathering.
One of the few accounts of these problems to be published in the
(103)press is Andrew Stephen's account of "A Reporter's Life in Belfast".
Stephen points to how the emphasis placed on the media by all parties to
the conflict has made journalists vulnerable to mis-information policies.
He notes how the sophisticated information services run by the army and
to a lesser extent the RUC have, on occasions, been used to blacken the
name of their opponents. 	 The main problem, according to Stephen, was
that, in a situation where both sides were keen to use journalists to
their own advantage, and where possible to the disadvantage of their
opponents, it was impossible to take anyone's word at face value.
According to Stephen:
Being an unadventurous journalist in Belfast is very,
very easy.	 The lazy national newspaperman can stay in
his hotel room and lift all his material from the
comprehensive local radio and television news coverage
and the Belfast Telegraph, and still appear well
-117-
informed.	 The skill lies in delving beneath the
public relations smoke-screens while still eschewing
the sensationalised and the bogus but apparently
convincing 'disclosure'
(105)Hoggart in his account of the "Army PR men of Northern Ireland"
also draws attention to the effectiveness of the information services
operated by the army and RUC.	 Though Hoggart denies the existence of
an army "black propaganda machine", he does agree that there "were some
aspects of army PR work which, taken in sum, must look very much like it
(106)to someone with anti-army views". 	 Apart from observing that, on
occasions, the army "feeds anti-IRA stories to journalists", Hoggart
coments significantly on the speed with which information is fed to
certain sections of the media which has given the security forces a
tactical advantage in the information war.	 Hoggart notes how most
journalists are almost completely dependent upon the army and the police
as sources of information about day to day incidents of violence, and
how there is a general tendency among British reporters to take this
information on trust unless the incident seems to be controversial.
Hoggart also draws attention to the various methods adopted by the army
in dealing with what it considers to be "unsympathetic" journalists.
These combined factors, Hoggart suggests, have contributed to a highly
successful informational strategy:
Hardly a word is breathed against the army in the
popular papers or on radio and television in Britain.
If criticism is made, it is invariably in the mouths
of others, and always hedged with a full account of
the army's position - however sceptical the reporter
himself might be.(107)
A number of other journalists have also drawn attention to how the
security forces have sought to influence and control reporters viewed as
"hostile" or "unhelpful" through the application of' various information
sanctions.	 Simon Winchester, in his account of the reporting of the
Irish troubles, recounts how the army press office sought to deprive him
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of information after he had broken an unwritten agreement over how
certain types of information should be handled. 	 Following a story in
which he mistakenly attributed an off-the-record briefing to an army
officer, Winchester recounts, the word went out that he was to be denied
information.	 Winchester also points to how the authorities and the
army sought to gain propaganda advantages by leaking selected
information in advance and by leaking and supplying false information
(108)to journalists.
The Times reporter Robert Fisk, one of the most respected reporters
to have covered Northern Ireland, also draws attention to the various
ways in which the army have attempted to influence journalists. 	 Fisk
recounts how, following a story written by him on the army rules
relating to the arrest of civilians, the army's Chief Information
Officer complained directly to The Times that his work was "snide and
misleading".	 According to Fisk, the same officer also sent a
classified message to all three brigades stationed in the North not to
provide him with any information.
	
In addition, Fisk notes that the
army set up a "black propaganda section" at army HO, Lisburn, under the
command of an officer who had been trained at an American college of
"psyops".	 According to Fisk, this department was involved in a smear
campaign against a prominant Protestant politician, kept extensive files
on reporters, leaked bogus information and, on one occasion, forged
press cards for plain-clothes officers working on undercover
surveillance duties in Belfast. 09)
The general view that emerges from the above accounts suggests that
journalists working in Northern Ireland have been subjected to two
separate but related problems. 	 First, that the sensitivity surrounding
Northern Ireland within the British media has effectively narrowed the
political space in which they work, and, as a consequence, has placed
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certain topics off-limits. 	 In addition to this, journalists have also
encountered a series of practical problems related to their role as
newsgatherers.	 At the heart of these problems has been the emphasis
placed on the importance of the media by all parties to the conflict,
which has elevated newspapers and television as a key terrain over
which the propaganda war is fought.
	 This has not only undermined the
reliability of official sources of information but at the same time
increased their dependency upon such sources.
Conclusion
In the above account of the literature presently available on the
British media and Northern Ireland, I have isolated what I consider to
be three broadly different perspectives.	 Each of these perspectives
has approached the media's reporting of events in the Six Counties from
different directions and each has its own view of the key issues raised
by such reporting.	 In examining the material under the "insiders'"
perspective, I have drawn a distinction between those responsible for
formulating and ultimately explaining and defending editorial policy.
Not surprisingly, perhaps, each of these information sources has
offered different, and often contradictory, accounts of' the role and
performance of the British media in Northern Ireland. 	 As might be
expected, they have also generated different and often contradictory
policy implications.
For those responsible for formulating editorial policy and
explaining and justifying this policy to the wider audience, the primary
concern has been to defend what professional space is presently
available as the minimum necessary for them to perform their public
responsibilities.	 For those approaching the issue from an
"anti-terrorist" perspective, the key concern has been to isolate those
areas where they feel control should be tightened still further. 	 For
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those approaching from a "critical" perspective, be they inside or
outside the media, the primary concern has been to highlight how the
space available for journalists to address events in Northern Ireland
has already been seriously eroded, and how, as a consequence, newspapers
and television are failing in their public duty to provide a
comprehensive and meaningful account of the Irish conflict. 	 As we
shall see in the next chapter, of these perspectives, it is the
"anti-terrorist" perspective which has commanded the attention of those
who control the levers of power within the British media.
However, while each of these perspectives has contributed to our
understanding of the range of constraints and pressures placed on those
responsible for newsgathering in Northern Ireland, and the consequences
these have had for news coverage, gaps in our knowledge remain. 	 In the
introduction to this chapter, I drew attention to the lack of current
research available on the British press and Northern Ireland. 	 In
recent years the picture has improved; it is still, however, far from
complete.	 The main purpose of my own study is to contribute further
to the body of evidence presently available on how the press has come to
terms with the problems of reporting a protracted conflict involving
its own nation state. 	 In doing so, I hope to provide further evidence
in support of those analyses and accounts which have called into
question the adequacy of British press coverage.
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CHAPTER 3
"Terrorism" and the Media; A Critical Analysis
The BBC is often accused of regularly, almost ritually,
recounting the effects of terrorism in our daily news
bulletins and not doing enough to expose the underlying
causes.	 I believe it would be irresponsible and that we
would be failing the public if the BBC, of all organisations
were to be seen interviewing the likes of Mr. Nkomo about
the shooting down of airliners, talking to spokesmen for the
PLO, PFLP and the Sandinista guerrillas, and yet failing to
grasp the nettle in our own backyard. Is the public in a
stable democracy such as ours to be trusted only with those
threats which are distant, and those nearer to home which
can be treated comfortably?(1)
The previous chapter focused on how the British media has sought
to accommodate the problems, constraints and political pressures
engendered by a violent political conflict in close proximity to, and
involving, its own nation state. 	 This chapter casts a wider net and
examines the broader debate over the role and social significance of
the media's coverage of political violence. 	 In many respects, it is
this wider debate concerning the media's coverage of violence in general,
and anti-state violence in particular, that has helped shape the British
media's approach to the reporting of Northern Ireland.
The Background
The debate over the social and political effects of the mass media
is one that has continued almost unabated ever since the possibility of
reaching a mass audience with a single message, or view of the world,
was first realised with the advent of national newspapers, radio, the
cinema and latterly television.	 Underlying this debate has been the
assumption that the media represented a powerful source of messages,
and that in a society characterised by a mass of atomised and relatively
passive individuals, these messages had the capacity to manipulate the
responses and beliefs of individuals who, deprived of first-hand
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experience, could be persuaded of almost anything.
The debate about media effects has often been at its fiercest when
the subject has been violence, and the medium has been television or the
cinema, the assumption being that the visual media were an especially
powerful source of messages.	 Hilde Mosse, a writer who has devoted
considerable time to the issue of media effects, has argued that, in
their representation of violence, the visual media are capable of
influencing individual responses at both a conscious and subliminal
level:
Television and films have an immense impact on emotions.
They reach feelings directly, not via the intellect as
reading does.	 This effect is often subtle and far
reaching.	 It enters our unconscious sphere
Television can, like no other mass medium, manipulate
not only ideas, but also the mood of entire populations.
The people who control it, officially or unofficially,
have a key position in the power structure of any society.
Violence is contagious.	 Television has the power to
spread it or to prevent it from spreading.(3)
The argument that the media, via representations of violence and
violent conflict (be it street rioting, "terrorism", conventional
warfare or simply fictionalised violence), have the power to directly
shape individual and group responses is hardly a new one. 	 Indeed, it
has, and continues to have, an important place within conventional
thinking about the mass media and their social effects. 4	Television
and newspapers have always been something of a soft target for those
seeking simple explanations for complex social and political phenomena.
The fact that research into the media has, as yet, failed to prove in
any conclusive manner the capacity of the media to influence public
attitudes in the short term, has not prevented the finger being pointed
in the direction of television and newspapers when expediency has
demanded a speedy explanation for some new or disturbing social
phenomenon.
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It was hardly surprising then to find that, following the riots
that erupted in Britain during the summer of 1981, the question of the
media and their social effects should have again been brought into sharp
focus.	 The arguments were to follow a well-worn path. 	 Bored and
disaffected teenagers, so the argument ran, took the coverage of rioting
in Toxteth, Liverpool, as a model and cue for their own actions.
Scenes of missiles being hurled at the police in Liverpool, it was
contended, were translated via the television screens into similar acts
elsewhere.	 The phrase "copycat rioters" was quickly coined to explain
the assumed link between these geographically separate incidents, and it
was readily incorporated into popular explanations for those traumatic
events during the summer of 1981.
	
Television was again placed in the
dock; the accusation being that, by its coverage of events in one part
of Britain, it was culpable for similar events elsewhere. 	 Whether or
not the evidence supported the hypothesis that the media were in some
way responsible for the escalation of street violence during the month
of July, 1981, hardly seemed to matter.	 While on the one hand the
accusation that the media were culpable for the escalation of street
violence could simply be dismissed as another case of the messenger
being blamed for an unpleasant message, on the other hand, the debate
which these events stimulated (much of' it in the letters page of
The Times and Guardian) bore testimony to the widespread feeling that
the media had the capacity to instigate profound social change.6
In its coverage of war, the media have been accorded an equal if
not greater power to influence public attitudes and thereby shape the
course of events.	 Indeed, so great is this power assumed to be that
military theorists have come to see the media as a crucial factor in
modern warfare.	 The need to maintain public support at home has
elevated the media, and in particular television, to a position of
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immense strategic importance, so much so that they are now regarded as
an important terrain on which modern wars can be won or lost.
The example most frequently cited in support of this theory is the
American experience in Vietnam.	 One explanation for why America was
forced to withdraw from Vietnam with its army still intact, was that
the daily images of soldiers dying on the battlefields of South-East Asia
provided by American television weakened the resolve of the American
public to continue the fight. 	 As William Small, director of CBS has
put it:
When television covered its "first war" in Vietnam
it showed a terrible truth of war in a manner new
to a mass audience.	 A case can be made, and certainly
should be examined, that this was cardinal to the
disillusionment of many Americans with this war and
the destruction of Lyndon Johnson's tenure of office.
On the surface, the argument that television coverage contributed
to the erosion of public support for the war in Vietnam, is an
attractive one.
	 In many respects the war in Vietnam was television's
"first war".	 Developments of television technology, lightweight
cameras, and fast and efficient lines of comunication enabled the
American public to watch in graphic detail images of war which, prior
to Vietnam, would have been unthinkable. 	 And it would be surprising if
the daily scenes of death and destruction did not have some effect on
their viewers.	 The real question is, what effect? 	 Did they, as some
have argued, lead to a collapse in public morale, and a growing lack of
confidence in, and support for, the army?	 Or did they simply reinforce
and give expression to an existing climate of opinion which, even
without television, would have culminated in direct opposition to a war
that many Americans were increasingly losing support for? 	 Given the
importance attributed to the media in the American defeat in Vietnam,
and given the long term influence that this experience has had on
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official thinking towards the media in times of war, it is perhaps
worth pausing briefly to examine the extent to which such a theory is
supported by the available evidence.
The argument that the media in general, and television in
particular, was a significant factor in the collapse of the American
public'ssupport for the Vietnamese war is, like the argument which
suggested that television was partly to blame for the 1981 riots, hardly
supported by the available evidence. 	 If anything, what evidence is
available tends to run contrary to the notion that television exerted
a negative effect on public attitudes to the war. 	 A survey undertaken
by Newsweek in 1967 found that, rather than leading to a weakening of
publicsupport for the war, television actually had the opposite effect:
it encouraged a majority of viewers to support it. 	 When asked whether
television coverage made them feel like "backing up the boys in Vietnam",
or opposing the war, 64 per cent replied that they were moved to support
the soldiers and only 26 per cent to oppose the war.8
Others have suggested that, rather than producing an aversion
effect on its audience, daily coverage of war actually conditions its
audience to more readily accept 	 As one writer has argued,
while the American public were fed a daily diet of action footage from
Vietnam, television was in fact incapable of presenting the real horror
of war, and that this was inevitable given the nature of the medium.
If anything, the impact of' news footage, regardless of how horrific and
dramatic, was undermined by the medium itself:
in part by the physical size of the television
screen, which for all the industry's advances,
still showed one a picture of' men three inches
high shooting at other men three inches tall.(10)
The proposition that television coverage of the Vietnam war exerted
a negative effect on public attitudes towards the military is also open
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to considerable doubt.	 Hofstetter and Moore, in their study "Watching
TV news and Supporting the Military tt , concluded that:
For several years the military had been in a position
of high visibility within a negative setting, fighting
a losing war and subjected ... to anti-military news
coverage.	 Yet, public attitudes towards the military
seemed more positive than thought; the military image
appears to have fared better than it would without TV
news. Perhaps the live pictures of soldiers fighting
in Vietnam and the anti-military bias of the networks'
interpretations caused the public to react
sympathetically to the military itself.(11)
The "Vietnam Syndrome", which this assumed relationship between
television and the American defeat in Vietnam has been termed, is also
(12)heavily criticised by Michael Mandelbaum.	 According to Mandelbaum:
It is true ... that Americans got most of their
information about the war, as about the world in
general during the Vietnam period, from television.
In the 1960s it became the principal medium of news
in the United States.	 The correlation between the
outcome of the war and the way Americans learned
about it, however, is spurious; or, if not plainly
spurious, at least not proven and not plausible.
It was not the special properties of television,
not the fact that it was this medium and not others
upon which Americans relied to follow events on the
other side of' the Pacific, that shaped American
attitudes towards the conflict.(13)
While Mandelbaum admits that television showed a high proportion
of combat footage in its coverage of the war (partly in an attempt to
attract more viewers), he rejects the argument that this coverage had
any significant impact on public attitudes to the war. 	 Given that
there was little interest in showing footage of the Vietnamese, he
argues, the subjects of this combat footage were "invariably Americans,
who were usually engaged in unspecified, but seemingly successful,
military activity.	 Moreover, this footage was rarely broadcast the
same day, and thus could rarely be used to illustrate a breaking story".
(14)
In the event, Mandelbaum argues, most combat footage appeared as
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background to give viewers a general flavour of the war.
According to Mandelbaum, rather than pushing a negative line on
the war, television coverage in fact contained very little overt
editorial content:
The networks simply presented a series of images,
mainly of' Americans fighting an unseen foe.	 They
provided the public with a kind of "illustrated
wire service".	 Images themselves ordinarily
carry no explicit message. The impression that
they leave depends on the interpretive framework
that the viewer brings to them.(15)
Whatever interpretive framework was applied to the daily images of
war transmitted by television, Mandelbaum suggests, was not provided by
the television networks who showed themselves to be highly reluctant to
provide such a framework, let alone one critical of the policies of the
American government:
Where the networks feared to tread, the government
had the field to itself. 	 It was left. mainly to
government spokesmen to provide the interpretive
framework for the television coverage of the war
in Vietnam. Government officials in Saigon and
Washington, above all the President, had ready
access to broadcast time.(16)
"The United States", Mandelbaum concludes:
lost the war in Vietnam because the American public
was not willing to pay the cost of winning, or avoiding
losing.	 The people's decision that the war was not
worth these costs had nothing to do with the fact that
they learned about it from television.	 Whether it was
based on the fact that many of their fellow citizens
were vehemently opposed to the war, which they also
learned from television, is difficult to say. 	 It is
possible that it was not.	 It is possible that the
public would have reached the same judgement in the
same way over the same period of time - that is, that
the war would have followed the course it did - even
if the cathode ray tube had never been invented.(17)
While this evidence is not in itself conclusive, it does
constitute an important caveat against seeking simple explanations for
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the complex process which led to the American defeat in Vietnam.
The lack of evidence in support of the "Vietnam Syndrome", however,
has not prevented it from being incorporated into official thinking
about the potential effects of "opening-up" the battlefield to the
television cameras in the event of some future war.	 Without doubt,
memories of Vietnam were to play a significant part in the way the
media were handled during the Falklands conflict. 	 As Robert Harris,
in his study of the British media's coverage of the Falklands conflict,
has commented:
The American experience in Vietnam did as much as
anything to shape the way in which the British
Government handled television during the Falklands
crisis.	 To ITN it seemed that the "Vietnam
analogy" was a spectre constantly stalking the
Falklands decision makers and was invoked privately
by the military as an object lesson in how not to
deal with the media.
In the post-war debate over the government's handling of the media
during the Falklarids crisis, the "Vietnam Syndrome" was again to surface
as an important consideration in the military's ability to prosecute a
successful military campaign. The House of Commons Defence Committee,
in its report on the official handling of the media during the Falklands
crisis, believed that the Americans were "over-generous in acquiescing
to the media's wishes". 9	And the Beach Report on The Protection of
Military Information 20 maintained that "there is little doubt that the
media, including television, played a role in the American public's
disillusionment" with the war in Vietnam.(2U
The argument that the media, and television in particular, are
capable of exerting a negative effect on the state's ability to
successfully pursue its policies has not simply been restricted to
conventional warfare between states.
	 On the contrary, the area in
which the "Vietnam Syndrome", or some variant of it, has surfaced most
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frequently, is the debate surrounding the media's reporting of
"terrorism".
"Terrorism": the background debate
In recent years, the debate over the possible role and influence
of the media in its reporting of violence has increasingly centred on
the issue of "terrorism".	 Concern over the possible link between the
media, and what was perceived as an epidemic of political violence, was
itself prompted by a widespread feeling during the 1970s and 1980s that
"terrorism" was the most pressing political problem facing the Western
democratic system.
	 During the 1970s in particular, the Western
democratic system was felt by many to be under attack, both internally,
from indigenous groups such as the Red Brigades, the Baader-Meinhof
groups, the IRA and INLA, and externally, from international
"terrorists" such as the PLO and other Arab groups. 	 During this period
hardly a day seemed to pass by without some new "terrorist" outrage
taking place in Europe.	 "Terrorist" spectaculars like the Munich
Olympic's hostage crisis, convinced many that democracy was losing the
battle against the "terrorists".	 In the public, and not so public,
debate which the activities of' these and other groups was to generate,
the role of the media was again to be brought into sharp focus.
As a consequence of' the publicity accorded to the issue of'
"terrorism" during the 1970s, the subject was to attract considerable
attention from academics in many different fields. 	 Social
psychologists, psychiatrists, military theorists and counter-insurgency
experts have produced a plethora of' books and analyses dealing with one
aspect or another of "terrorism". 	 Many touched on the issue of the
media.	 Before going on to examine this debate in more detail, I would
first like to make a few general comments on the conceptual ambiguity
that has afflicted, and has indeed been the hallmark, of' much of the
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recent work on the subject.
Perhaps the main criticism that can be levelled at much of the
recent work on the subject of "terrorism" is that the field of study
selected by many of its authors has been so narrowly defined as to
ignore much of what, in any ordinary sense of the word, would pass as
"terrorism".	 While many of its authors have professed to be concerned
with political violence and its consequences, in the main it has been
violence of a left-wing or revolutionary character that has attracted
their attention.	 Political violence emanating from other sources,
perhaps most significantly from the state, has generally been ignored.
"Terrorism" for many of the "experts" has constituted little more than
a shorthand for "left-wing extremism".
Paul Wilkinson, one of the key contributors to the debate on
"terrorism" in Britain, in his study Terrorism and the Liberal State22
defines "political terrorism" (which he distinguishes from "repressive"
and "epiphenomenal terrorism") as the:
systematic use of murder and destruction, and the
threat of murder and destruction in order to
terrorise individuals, groups, communities or
governments into conceding to the terrorists'
political demands. (p 49)
In Wilkinson's view, what distinguishes "terrorism" from other
forms of political violence is that it is essentially arbitrary and
unpredictable; it is inherently indiscriminate; that it refuses to
distinguish between combatants and non-combatants and that it rejects
all moral constraints (pp 52-53).
	
What is striking about this
definition is that its salient characteristics could hardly be said to
be the exclusive preserve of the "terrorists", be they the IRA or the
PLO.	 On the contrary, one only has to consider the activities of
certain Latin American states to realise that the use of indiscriminate
violence against individuals, groups and communities to secure political
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goals is by no means the sole preserve of anti-state groups.
Furthermore, the argument that "terrorism" can be differentiated from
other forms of political violence on the grounds that it is inherently
indiscriminate, and refuses to distinguish between combatants and
non-combatants, is also open to serious challenge: if these are the
defining characteristics of "terrorism", how are we to distinguish it
from conventional warfare, which nowadays nearly always involves the
killing of civilians as well as combatants? 	 The author must surely be
aware of Dresden, or more recently, Beirut.
Wilkinson's "typology of terrorism" (pp 56-57) accepts that states
may resort to the use of "mass terror" in order to achieve their goals
(and thus he lists it as a form of "politically motivated terrorism"),
yet it occupies rio place in a book devoted to "terrorism". 	 Wilkinson
also accepts that "large scale terror" often plays a part in conventional
war; however, he distinguishes it from "politically motivated "terrorism"
on the grounds that it has "no specific aim" and that it is "random
rather than deliberately planned and organised" (p 57).
	
On the basis
of such slippery thinking, Wilkinson chooses to restrict the anibit of
his study of "terrorism" to what he terms "revolutionary and
sub-revolutionary terrorism by non-governmental groups" ( p 55).
A similar criticism can also be made of Richard Clutterbuck, another
writer who has done much to shape the "agenda" of the contemporary debate
on the media and "terrorism". 	 In his study Living with Terrorism23
Clutterbuck restricts his analysis of "terrorism" to revolutionary and
anti-state groups.	 Indeed, Clutterbuck writes almost as if there were
no such thing as "state terrorism". 	 He speaks of his concern to help
the "citizen in a society under attack" (p 15), and of his fear that the
"trror1sts" might become "so powerful that they can overthrow civilised
government altogether" (p 57).
	
In his more recent work,
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The Media and Political Violence	 the author treats political
violence as the exclusive preserve of left-wing and anti-state groups.
Another writer who has tended to equate "terrorism" with anti-state
groups is Brian Jenkins of the Rand Corporation, who directs a research
project on international "terrorism" for the State Department. 	 In a
paper presented to an international conference on "terrorism" held in
Florence in 1978, Jenkins equated "terrorism" almost exclusively with
the activities of left-wing anti-state groups. 	 While accepting that
the "total amount of terrorist violence in the world has been greatly
exaggerated", he justified the attention it was attracting on the
grounds that "terrorism" "is not measured by body counts, nor by the
amount of property damage, but rather by the attention it receives and
the effect it producestt.(25)
Other writers do not ignore the importance of "state terrorism"
altogether.	 Schmid and de Graaf, in their study of "terrorism" as
communication (26) rightly point out:
It can be argued - and there are some good reasons
for it - that state terrorism is the main terrorist
problem in a world where as many as 117 states
violate human rights in one way or another.( 2)
They go on to argue that while left-wing and revolutionary "terrorism"
has attracted a disproportionate amount of attention in the media and
within academic circles:
state terrorism is a much more serious problem. In
terms of victims the state terrorism in Guatamala,
for instance, has cost many more lives in one year
than all the international insurgent terrorist
incidents of the last ten years together.( 85)
(27)
While acknowledging that it is "state terrorism', or what Chomsky
and Herman have termed "wholesale terror" rather than anti-state
"terrorism", or "retail terror", that is the main source of political
violence, Schmid and de Graaf do little to rectify the inbalance when,
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in the introduction to their study, they define their objectives to be
an analysis of:
insurgent terrorism (social-revolutionary, separatist
and single issue terrorism aiming at the top of
society) excluding other forms of political terrorism
such as vigilante terrorism and state terrorism. (pp 1-2)
Though "terrorism" is so clearly a political phenomenon, and
though many of the recent works on the subject profess a concern with
"political violence", what is strikingly absent from many of these
analyses is any coherent attempt to address the political dimension of
the phenomenon.	 Indeed, many of the "experts" on "terrorism" have
tended to ignore the political in defining, and theorising about,
"terrorism" and have tended to view the social and political factors
which give rise to it as largely irrelevant in seeking to understand it
as a phenomenon.	 Laqueur, for example, has suggested that "as a rule
of thumb, one learns much more about a terrorist group by looking at its
victims than at its manifestos". 28	And that "Connections between
terrorism and economic trends are at best tenuous". 29	Commenting on
the levels of terrorism in recent decades, Laqueur concluded:
If' any lesson can be drawn from the experience of
several decades of terrorism, it is the uncomfortable
and indeed shocking conclusion that the more injustice
and repression, the less terrorism there is.
	
In other
words, terrorism succeeds only against non-terrorists,
namely groups or governments which refrain from
responding to indiscriminate murder with equally
indiscriminate repression.	 Terrorism continues in
Ulster not because the terrorists are invincible but
because the British government treats the violent men
of both sides decently, unlike the Brazilians or
Iranians, Russians or Yugoslavs.(30)
This may be comforting for government spokesmen seeking to dismiss
"terrorism" against their own states as irrational and criminal, but it
is hardly of much assistance to those seeking to arrive at a precise and
well thought out understanding of "terrorism".
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Having abstracted from the phenomenon of "terrorism" much of that
which could give it meaning, most of the "experts" on "terrorism" have
tended to focus on the moral, tactical, or psychological dimensions of
the subject.	 Yet "terrorism", contrary to the way it is presented in
many of these analyses, is a highly problematical concept, and it is
clear from many of these works that there is in fact no clearly agreed
definition of what "terrorism" is, only an agreement over who the
"terrorists" are.	 In many respects, such studies raise more questions
than they provide answers for.	 Ironically, rather than contributing to
our understanding of "terrorism", the studies referred to above
unintentionally lead the reader to question whether the concept has any
analytical value whatsoever.
The narrowness of the perspective contained within many of the
recent analyses suggests that authors have been concerned less with the
phenomenon of "terrorism" itself than with the use of political violence
in the pursuit of political goals that the authors do not endorse, and
against states whose legitimacy they accept.	 If the influence of
such theories was limited to academic circles only, then this
one-dimensional treatment of "terrorism" would perhaps be of less
significance.	 However, these, and similar theories, have done much to
shape the political debate on the relationship between the media and
political violence, and in doing so have provided much of the ammunition
that has been fired at broadcasters and journalists in recent years.
In the specific case of Northern Ireland, these theories, ill-defined
and often contradictory as they are, have legitimated a continuing
attack on journalists and broadcasters; an attack which has effectively
narrowed the political space in which they work, and one that has
restricted the range of perspectives available to the British public on
an issue of pressing social and political concern.
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"Terrorism" and the media: an unhappy marriage
If the freedom to publish rests, as indeed it must,
upon a general public interest expressed in terms of
"need to know", is this not most sensibly limited by
that other public interest of denying to those who
would damage the common weal the use of this potent,
near irresistible force of the media? 	 There is a
real competition of interests here which must be
resolved on a philosophical plane before the practical
issues can be tackled.	 The terrorist is an urgent
suitor; if he cannot get what he wants by seductive
means, he will not hesitate to attempt rape. 	 The
real problem seems to be uncertainty on the part of
the media whether to play the coy handmaiden or
harlot. (32)
During the early 1970s, the broadcasting authorities in Britain,
and in particular the BBC, were the focus of a sustained, and at times
vitriolic, attack over their coverage of Northern Ireland. 	 It was an
attack which raised serious questions about journalistic ethics, and
one which was to challenge many of the central principles of liberal
broadcasting.	 Central to this attack was the assertion that the
relationship between the media and the continuation of "terrorism" in
Northern Ireland was a close and important one. 	 Some critics went so
far as to suggest that the relationship between the media and "terrorism"
was indeed symbiotic: that the need of the media for news and the need
of the "terrorists" to secure publicity for their cause fed off, and
indeed sustained each other.	 Within such a view, the media were
accused of' being little more than accomplices in the phenomenon of
national and trans-national "terrorism".	 At the more sophisticated end
of this argument, it was contended that the daily representation of the
"terrorists" and their campaigns of' violence on television and in the
press was having a series of' profound and disturbing social effects.
Not least among the effects listed were that:
1. Television provided a platform for the expression of extremist
views which had provoked violence and undermined the authority
of the state;
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2. the reporting of' spectacular terrorist incidents had a
contagion effect which increased the possibility that other
groups and individuals would seek to emulate the violence
being reported;
3. the reporting in excessive detail of both terrorist and
counter-terrorist operations supplied disaffected groups
with tactical and strategic information, and technical
knowledge which makes the resolution of future terrorist
incidents more difficult:
4. the competitive nature of newsgathering places an undue
emphasis on the sensational aspects of terrorist incidents,
which has made entertaining the public with violence more
important to the media than their duty to inform.
In Britain, a country with the oldest "terrorist" problem in
Western Europe, these arguments found particular favour within
conservative political and academic circles - though by no means was it
limited to them.	 The political stalemate which existed on the question
of Northern Ireland, and the apparent inability of the British state to
secure a military victory over the paramilitary organisations in the
Six Counties, led some to seek other explanations for the continuing
violence.	 In the forefront of the attack on the BBC was Roy Mason,
then Secretary of State for Northern Ireland, and a vigorous opponent of
the Provisional IRA.
	 In November, 1976, while attending a dinner
organised by the BBC in the Culloden Hotel on the outskirts of Belfast,
Mason took the opportunity provided by this function to lambast the BBC
for what he saw as a clear dereliction of its duty to the public.
During the course of his speech, Mason argued that the BBC was "disloyal,
supported the rebels, purveyed their propaganda and refused to accept
(34)the advice of' the Northern Ireland Office on what news to carry".
Central to Mason's attack - and this was simply one of many - was the
assertion that the BBC had allowed itself to become an agent for
"terrorist" propaganda. 	 The daily publicity given to the activities
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of the paramilitaries, he contended, was making it increasingly
difficult for the security forces to prosecute a successful campaign
against the "terrorists".	 Indeed, so convinced was Mason that the
media were helping to prolong the conflict, that he proposed a three
month news blackout on all events in the Six Counties in the belief
that, deprived of publicity, the campaign against the "terrorists" could
be brought to a speedy conclusion.
While Mason's words were to find few sympathetic ears among the
assembled BBC personnel, his central assertion that the media were in
some respects a part of the "terrorist" problem has not been short of
support.	 In 1979, the Tory Home Secretary, William Whitelaw, lent his
support to the suggestion that the broadcasters should consider carefully
both the motives of the "terrorists" and their duty to the public before
reporting acts of "terrorism".	 According to Whitelaw:
Terrorists and terrorist organisations seek and depend
on publicity.	 A principal object of their acts of
violence is to draw attention to themselves and gain
notoriety ... they bomb and murder themselves into
the headlines.
In doing so they make war on society and outlaw
themselves from its privileges. 	 The broadcasting
authorities owe them no duty whatsoever, and can owe
society no duty whatever, gratuitously to provide them
with opportunities for the publicity they want.(35)
The growing concern which these and similar attacks on the media
was to stimulate was to become so acute that it led some to question the
efficacy of informing the public about acts of violence in Northern
Ireland.	 Alan Wright, Chairman of the Police Federation for Northern
Ireland, challenged the journalistic commitment to a free flow of
information when he was reported as saying:
Without publicity terrorist acts would lose much of
their effectiveness and very reason for being
Surely it is time for journalists to think long and
hard about the relationship that must exist between
the public's right to know and the public's need to
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know.	 As regards terrorism, the crucial question is,
does it need to know everything immediately. (36)
This conflict between the public's right to know (which is
conventionally regarded as a central principle of democratic society)
and the potential damage that unrestricted coverage of "terrorism" was
assumed to pose for the stability of the social order, has been a
consistent theme in the debate over the coverage of "terrorism". 	 As we
shall see below, it is a view premised on an exceptionally narrow
understanding of the motivating force of political violence, and some
very dubious assumptions about the liberal democratic system and the
role of the media therein.
In attempting to explain the apparent epidemic of "terrorism" in
Western Europe, the "experts" on "terrorism" have focused their
attention not on the specific social, political, economic and cultural
factors which gave rise to political violence in such countries as Italy,
Germany and Britain, but rather on the liberal democratic system itself,
and what were perceived to be its essential weaknesses. 	 This system,
with its tradition of free speech, its commitment to a free and open
media, and its freedom of movement between states, it was argued, was an
inherently fragile political form and one that was vulnerable to
internal and external attack from those who would exploit these freedoms
for their own political ends. 	 Within this perspective, "terrorism" was
a phenomenon which had an uneven impact on the world: the threat being
proportional to the degree of freedom exhibited by a given society.
Generally speaking, the Western democracies were seen as being most at
risk, the communist world least. 	 This view, that the apparent absence
of "terrorism" in the Soviet Union and its neighbouring states flowed
from the undemocratic nature of these states, is one that has been
regularly canvassed by Walter Laqueur. 	 According to Laqueur:
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Terrorism today occurs either in Parliamentary
democracies, or half-hearted, inefficient
authoritarian regimes.
	 In the 19th century,
terrorism was mainly concentrated in despotic
regimes, today terrorism occurs mainly in
democratic societies.	 In a totalitarian regime
terrorist action would not be reported. 	 But
terrorist action by itself is nothing; what
makes it significant is the fact that it is
shown on television and featured in the press.
Unless there is propaganda terrorism is just
not effective.
Moreover, while the "free world" is usually seen as the main victim
of "terrorism", the communist bloc, and in particular the Soviet Union,
is usually seen as the main source of financial and political support
for those "terrorist" groups operating in the West.	 Ignoring the
diversity of "terrorist" groups operatingin the West, which range from
neo-fascist to Marxist, and the diversity of their goals, which range
from national separatism to anti-imperialism, "terrorism" is seen as a
manifestation of the age-old struggle between democracy and communism.
The Soviet Union, in keeping with the Cold War rhetoric of many Western
states, is seen as being at the centre of an international "terrorist"
conspiracy, whose aim is to undermine the stability of the capitalist
system) 38	It is a view which provides the backcloth for the work of
Paul Wilkinson, an influential commentator on "terrorism", who has
argued:
Part of the vast resources of the KGB is undoubtedly
devoted to fostering and aiding terrorist groups
operating in Western societies.
	
There is evidence
that they are prepared to provide indirect and covert
support even to groups which they have little in
common with ideologically, presumably on the grounds
that any disruption and damage sown in Western states
will have the effect of hastening the "collapse of
capitalism". (39)
This commonly asserted notion, that if one looks hard enough it is
possible to find the hand of the Soviet Union behind the activities of
the "terrorists", is one that fits comfortably into the global
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perspective of Britain's main political ally, the United States.
	
The
American Secretary of State, George Shultz, addressed a conference in
Washington on what he called the world "league of terror". 	 In his
speech, Shultz lent further support to the Soviet-terrorist-conspiracy
thesis when he argued that:
The international links between terrorist groups is
clearly understood.	 The Soviets use terrorist
groups for their own purposes and their goal is always
the same - to weaken liberal democracy and undermine
world stability.
When the Soviet Union and its clients provide
financial, logistical and training support for
terrorists worldwide, they hope to shake the West's
self-confidence and sap its will to resist aggression
and intimidation.
In the view of the "experts", what has made liberal democratic
societies particularly prone to "terrorism" is, ironically, a feature
of such societies which has generally been considered to be one of
their strengths - a free and open media.
	 According to Wilkinson:
The crucial advantage of a liberal democratic state
to the terrorist is the freedom of the media.	 The
terrorist operating within such a society knows that
his acts of terrorism will be instantly publicised
by the television, radio and press. And that
pictures of a really sensational attack or outrage
can be relayed round the world with the aid of TV
communications satellites. (41)
Denied recourse to direct censorship, and lacking the repressive
apparatus available to communist states, liberal democracy has thus
become a prime target for "terrorist" groups seeking to bring world
attention to their cause.	 Developments in communications technology
combined with unrestricted media freedom have made liberal democracies
a particularly attractive theatre of operations for the "terrorist".
By removing the geographical constraints on the transmission of media
messages, television satellites have expanded enormously the potential
audience for the "terrorists". 	 The publicity value of a "terrorist"
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act is no longer limited to its immediate audience; in the words of
Brian Jenkins, "The whole world is now their stage. 	 The whole world
is possibly watching")42
According to this perspective, the "terrorists" have been quick to
recognise this inherent weakness in the liberal state, and have devoted
their energies to exploiting it. 	 Safe in the knowledge that the media
will not ignore a good story, the "terrorists" are said to have
co-ordinated their campaigns to satisfy its needs: timing their acts to
fit in with news deadlines, and informing the media when a planned act
is to take place.	 In a key phrase, Jenkins has suggested that
"Terrorists choreograph their violence. 	 Terrorism is a theatre". (43)
This suggestion that the "terrorists" are essentially showmen dedicated
to securing publicity for their cause, is one that has received
widespread support among counter-insurgency and anti-terrorist experts.
A similar point is also made by Laqueur, who has argued that:
Terrorists have learned that the media are of
paramount importance to their campaign, that the
terrorist act by itself is nothing, whereas
publicity is all.	 But the media, constantly in
need of diversity and new angles, make fickle
friends.	 Terrorists will always have to be
innovative.	 They are in some respects, the
superentertainers of our time.(44)
From such a perspective, "terrorist" violence is seen to embrace
the key elements of human interest: drama, surprise and unpredictability;
factors, which it is said, make such violence irresistible to television
and newspapers.	 Its irresistibility is, however, shortlived; the
criterion of news values ensures that for the media what was once
spectacular quickly becomes routine, and, in the process, the headlines
accorded to it become smaller and smaller.	 In order to maintain the
media's undivided attention, it is contended, the "terrorist" is forced
to seek ever new and more spectacular methods of putting his message
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across.	 Hence, it has been argued, a spiral of violence is created
with each cycle of the spiral intensifying the scale and intensity of
the violence.	 Consequently, there is an inflation in the cost of
violence necessary to carry an act of violence around the world in
banner headlines.	 The competition between different "terrorist" groups
further increases the intensity of the violence as each outbids the
other in order to win the headlines.	 Wilkinson has labelled this
"media induced" escalation of violence the "Gresham's Law of terrorism":
"those who spill the most blood get the biggest headlines".46
This widely supported view that "terrorists" are motivated by the
desire for publicity has led some to its logical conclusion: if the
media refused to report "terrorism", it would go away.
	 This is the
conclusion drawn by David Hubbard, an American psychiatrist who has
interviewed a number of hijackers. 	 According to Hubbard, "terrorism"
is motivated by publicity and, in his view, if denied this objective,
the "terrorists" would lose much of their motivation:
They wouldn't even think of bombing and hijacking
unless you guaranteed them a rostrum. So if the
media cut their coverage down to the importance of
other minor news, these men wouldn't act.
On the surface, such a theory of the relationship between the media
and political violence appears highly plausible.	 In theory, at least,
the Western media are characterised by the absence of pre-publication
censorship, and the right to publish without regulation and interference
is a legitimate principle of liberal media theory and one defended
vociferously by its practitioners. 	 And, despite increasing
monopolisation, the capitalist media are located in a highly competitive
market in which success is often defined in terms of getting the story
before one's competitors. 	 Moreover, repetition does tend to blunt the
edge of a story, and even the most newsworthy of stories quickly slips
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down the news schedule unless it constantly regenerates its own news
value.	 If one accepts the attendant argument, that the motivating
force of "terrorism" is publicity, and there can be little doubt that
securing an audience for their propaganda is an important element in
the strategy of many anti-state groups, then it is a short step indeed
to according the media an important role in the phenomenon of
"terrorism".	 As Schlesinger has argued:
In a perspective which sees political violence as
unambiguously effective drama it is not surprising
that media coverage is accorded such importance.
Assuming the simple convergence of the terrorists
actions and the values and needs of capitalist
media, it is no great step to the view that the
media are the willing victims of superstar violence.(48)
However, if one scratches the surface of this theory and examines
the evidence provided in its support, it becomes clear that the
explanatory force of the theory, and many of the assumptions upon which
it is premised, scarcely stand the test of empirical validation.
Advertising violence: the "terrorist" and publicity
There is, in fact, a battle of political wills in
progress, a battle to capture public opinion, and
one way of capturing it is to get established on
television.	 That is the objective of every
kidnapper, every hijacker, every revolutionary
political group using violence - indeed, of every
pressure group.
	
Get on to television and push
the Minister off; make him dance in public to your
tune, and above all, diminish him until he appears
to be a dwarf.(49)
The most consistent theme in the "anti-terrorist" perspective, and
one that commands widespread support among counter-insurgency experts,
politicians, academics and, as we shall see in Chapter Seven, journalists,
is the assertion that the "terrorists" are essentially publicity-seeking
showmen, involved in acts of violence carried out more for their effect
on those watching than for strictly military objectives. 	 Jenkins talks
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(50)
of "terrorism" being "theatre"; 	 Laqueur about them being the
"superentertainers of our timet;(S1) J.C. Stern, of the Metropolitan
Police, on how "terrorists need publicity"; 52
 Miller about how
"Much of terrorism is undertaken solely for dramatic effect";(53
Hooper about how the "terrorist like many of the criminal classes has
always been publicity hungry";	 and how "The terrorist needs the
media as a fish needs water. 	 It is an essential element in his very
existence as a terrorist") 55	Lord Annan, in his report on
television, also accepted without criticism the contention that
"terrorism" depends on publicity:
Terrorism feeds off publicity: publicity is its main
hope of' intimidating government and the public;
publicity gives it a further chance of recruitment.
The acts terrorists commit are each minor incidents in
their general campaign to attract attention to their
cause.	 No democracy can tolerate terrorism because it
is the denial of the democratic assumption that
injustice can, in time, be put right through discussion
and compromise.	 By killing and destroying, the
terrorists are bound to exhort publicity - and hence
one of their ends - because such news will be rePorted.(56)
Central to the argument that publicity is an important aim of
"terrorism" is the assumption that in a rational democratic society,
"terrorism" is the last resort of' desperate men who have little, if any,
support within the communities in which they operate. 	 In the view of
Yonah Alexander:
Terror groups by their very nature, are small and too
weak to achieve an upper hand in an eyeball-to-eyeball
confrontation on the battlefield. 	 Since sheer
violence can accomplish little or nothing in terms of'
ultimate goals, an extension of the duration and impact
of' the violent deed is therefore mandatory in the
terrorist strategy.
Generally speaking then, "terrorist" violence is denied any
strictly military objectives but is said to either satisfy the
individual's craving for publicity, or forms part of a wider campaign
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to publicise the "terrorists'" cause worldwide.
	 According to the
"anti-terrorist" perspective political violence also performs a symbolic
function: advertising the potency of the "terrorists" and serving as a
constant reminder to society that the state has lost control of the
situation.	 Incapable of securing their goals by military means alone,
the "terrorist" iS forced to seek other means of securing a victory.
Violence then, becomes a means to an end; creating a climate of fear
and, in the process, weakening the political will of government to
continue the fight. 	 Tugwell has termed this process the
"asset-to-liability shift".
	 According to Tugwell:
The theory of the asset-to-liability shift allows us
to understand the role of violence in many low-intensity
revolutionary situations.	 To be sure, the murder of
selected individuals, such as police informers and
intelligence officers, has a direct tactical purpose,
as does the destruction of material used by security
forces.	 Such events apart, most violence in situations
where the rebels cannot hope to win in open battle is,
in Brian Jenkins' words, "aimed at the people watching,
not at the actual victims. 	 Terrorism is theatre".
The members of the Provisional IRA were never under the
illusion that they could drive the British security
forces into the sea.	 They appreciated from the start
that theirs would have to be a campaign of leverage,
using the economic, international, and domestic side-
effects of their violence on the British public and
government to cause the necessary asset-to-liability
shift.	 Propaganda and violence were and are two sides
of the same coin.(58)
Herein lies the importance of the media: they represent the
channels along which the message of fear is transmitted.
	 According to
Alexander, the "terrorist" uses the media for two distinct purposes:
First, to enhance the effectiveness of their violence
by creating an emotional state of extreme fear in the
target groups, and, thereby ultimately alter their
behaviour and dispositions, or bring about a general
or particular change in the structure of government
or society; and second, to draw forcibly and
instantaneously the attention of the "whole world" to
themselves in the expectation that these audiences
will be prepared to act or, in some cases, to refrain
from acting in a manner that will promote the cause
they presumably represent.(59)
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The work of Carlos Marighela, the Brazilian guerrilla theorist, is
widely quoted as providing theoretical support for this position. 	 In
his now classic work on the theory of guerrilla warfare, The Minimanual
of the Urban Guerrilla 60 " Marighela advocated a strategy which combined
the conventional guerrilla tactic of hit-and-run attacks on military,
political and economic targets, with a propaganda campaign designed to
demoralise the government and create a climate of political instability:
The war of nerves - or psychological war - is a
fighting technique based on the direct or indirect
use of the mass media ... Its purpose is to
demoralise the government. 	 By it we can spread
false or contradictory information by sowing anxiety,
doubt and uncertainty among the agents of the regime.
In psychological warfare the government is at a
disadvantage, and therefore will censor the means of
communication.	 Censorship of course has a boomerang
effect, since it leads to unPoPularitY.(61)
Thus, the "terrorists" are said to favour psychological warfare
because it stacks the odds in their favour: either way, it is argued,
the government cannot win: if it refuses to censor the media, it
provides the "terrorists" with free publicity for their cause; if it
censors the media it undermines its own credibility.
Schrnid and de Graaf point to the rise and fall of the Tupaniar'os,
a group which operated in Uruguay in the 1960s and lY7Os, as further
proof that publicity is an essential ingredient in the success or
failure of a "terrorist" campaign. 	 During the 1960s, the Tupainaros
mounted a highly successful propaganda campaign which resulted in their
opposition to the regime of Jorge Pacheco Areco attracting substantial
attention in the international press. 	 As a consequence, they argue,
membership of the movement swelled from 50 members in 1965 to over 3,000
by 1970.	 Following the declaration of a state of siege in early 1970,
however, access to the world's media became more difficult and, despite
attempts to secure alternative organs for their propaganda, the
movement went into decline and was eventually defeated by the military.
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According to Schmid and de Graaf, it was this latter failure to
generate publicity for their cause that was the major factor in their
eventual defeat.
	
In securing and extending support for their cause,
(62)they argue, "The media were their best alliestt.
Consequently, the success or failure of a "terrorist" campaign is
said to depend on the "terrorists'" success or failure in gaining access
to the media.	 In order to secure this goal, the "terrorists" are said
to have become remarkably adept at exploiting the media to their
advantage - even to the point of allowing them to shape the nature of
their military campaigns.	 According to Laqueur:
The media act as a selective magnifying glass:
terrorism always exerts a strange fascination,
especially from a safe distance. 	 It has all the
ingredients of a good story - mystery, quick action,
tension, drama.
	 It seems natural, therefore, that
the media shouldgive inordinate publicity to them.
The vital importance of publicity has been realised
bygererationsof' terrorists all over the world: the
terrorist act alone is nothing; publicity is all.
The Algerian rebels of the l950s quite deliberately
transferred their struggle from the countryside to
the capital, even though they suspected that they
could not possibly win the battle for the capital.
As one of them wrote, if ten enemies are killed in
the 'djebel', no one will take notice, but even a
small incident in Algiers will be picked up by the
American press and prominently featured the next
day in New York.	 He was quite right - the Algerians
were beaten in the struggle for the capital, but they
won the fight for publicity which, in the long run,
was the decisive battle. 63)
Another method of securing the attention of the world's media, it
has been argued, is to kidnap, or kill, a leading political or social
figure: the killing of Lord Mountbatten by the IRA, the kidnapping and
eventual assassination of Aldo Moro by the Red Brigades, the kidnapping
and eventual release of the world-famous racing driver, Juan Manuel
Fangio by the Castro-led Cuban rebels, all secured extensive publicity
for these groups, and all are isolated as key examples of how the
"terrorists" have sought to manipulate the media.	 A further tactic,
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and one which was successfully used by the PLO, is for the "terrorists"
to select a media-saturated event arid then hijack it for the purposes
of propaganda.	 In some cases "terrorist" groups, anxious to maintain
the media's attention, have stage-managed incidents for the sole
purpose of inviting the media: the IRA's roadblock at Carrickmore is
viewed by many British counter-insurgency experts as a clear example of
(64)how the media have been used by the "terrorists".
According to the "anti-terrorist" perspective, the success or
failure of "terrorism" lies not in the scale of the violence the
"terrorists" are able to produce, but in the scale of publicity this
violence generates.	 Moreover, in a perspective which isolates
"publicity" as the primary motivating force of political violence, all
publicity is seen as good publicity, and all publicity is beneficial to
(65)
the "terrorists".	 According to Catton:
If publicity is what terrorists seek, then the
attainment of publicity is a "success" and is
rewarding.	 If the media provide terrorists
with publicity, the media therefore reinforce
terrorism. (66)
The argument that "terrorism" feeds off, and is motivated by the
desire for publicity, commands such widespread support that it now
occupies a central place in conventional thinking on the subject.
And, on the surface, its attraction is not difficult to understand.
There can be little doubt that securing a wider audience for their
cause is likely to be an important consideration in the strategy of
many anti-state groups;	 or that the purpose of anti-state propaganda
may be to recruit members for their organisations at home, and financial
and political support for their cause from abroad.	 It may also be
true that the use of political violence, in certain situations, may
increase the news value of anti-state groups, and therefore attract
media attention to these groups.	 Furthermore, the argument that the
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news value of political violence (as indeed of all issues or events)
declines, and therefore attracts smaller headlines and less prominence,
with repetition is also without doubt.	 As we shall see in subsequent
chapters, the duration of the Northern Ireland conflict, together with
the decline in, and predictability of, political violence in the Six
Counties, has led to the marginalisation of Northern Ireland as a news
story in the British media.	 However, it is a big step from these
rather general observations to the argument advanced by the
"anti-terrorist" perspective that the media are the simple dupes of the
"terrorists", or that they provide a free platform and an unobstructed
channel for "terrorist" propaganda. 	 Indeed, when this proposition is
examined in closer detail, a number of significant questions are raised,
questions which the supporters of this argument not only fail to answer,
but, perhaps more significantly, fail to ask.
What is noticeably absent from the "anti-terrorist" perspective on
"terrorism" in general, and the relationship between "terrorism" and the
media in particular, is any real attempt to provide a serious
understanding of the social and political forces which motivate
individuals and groups to use violence as a means of securing their
goals.	 Indeed, by focusing on the assumed need of the "terrorists" for
publicity, the proponents of this argument are relieved of the need to
provide a clear analysis of the social and political objectives of
anti-state groups, and the legitimacy or otherwise of their causes.
Laqueur's suggestion that one learns more about a "terrorist" group by
"looking at its victims than at its manifestos" may be convenient but it
is hardly conducive to furthering our understanding of the political
dimension of "terrorism".	 The net effect of this approach is that
anti-state violence is largely separated from its social and political
causes.	 This tendency to de-politicise "terrorism" is further
reinforced by the failure to differentiate between the variety of groups
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at any given time engaging in anti-state violence.	 By definition,
a group or individual engaged in violence against an established
political order are "terrorists", and by definition all such violence
is publicity orientated.
	 As Schlesinger et al have argued:
Grouping these disparate movements under the unifying
label of "international terrorism" ignores important
differences between them.	 They appear to e the same
because they are shown as engaging in similar actions
(bombing and kidnaps) with similar results (the death
of' innocent people).	 In the process, the complexity
and specificity of the circumstances which have produced
these various movements slides from view.	 They are
detached from their particular histories and redefined
as part of a general phenomenon of our times.(67)
In that it ignores the possible legitimacy of anti-state violence
under certain circumstances and fails to provide a clear analysis of'
either the groups involved in such violence or the level of support
they enjoy within the communities in which they operate, the
"anti-terrorist" perspective ignores much of that which could give
meaning to the phenomenon of "terrorism". 	 As Curtis has written:
Instead the "terrorists" are portrayed as the cause:
they are seen as confidence tricksters, purveying lies
and organising spectacular events to con both their
own community and more distant audiences. 	 The problem
is located not in reality but in the mind: the
"terrorists" are said to manipulate or condition
people into believing lies.(68)
De-politicised and de-legitimised, anti-state violence is explained
either in terms of individual pathology: the "terrorist" is presented
as a psychopathic monster engaged in killing for its own sake; or, more
commonly, in terms of its essential criminality.	 This argument that
political violence, and the publicity it seeks to attract, is best
understood in terms of' individual pathology or criminality, is one
which, since the early 1970s, has increasingly been applied to the
activities of the IRA. 	 Paul Johnson, for example, writing in the
New Statesman, described the activities of the IRA in the following
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terms:
In Britain, as well as in Ulster, we face in the IRA
not a nationalist movement, not a league of patriots,
not "guerillas" nor "freedom fighters' t , or anything
which can be dignified with a political name, but an
organisation of psychopathic murderers who delight
in maiming and slaughtering the innocent and whose
sole object and satisfaction in life is the destruction
of human flesh.	 The misguided patriots who joined the
IRA in the heady days of' 1968 and after have melted
away and have been replaced by men and women who have
far more in common with Ian Brady and Myra Hindley
than with old-style terrorists like Michael Collins
and De Valera.(69)
The significance of this argument in which "terrorism" is denied
a political dimension and is redefined in terms of its criminal nature,
is one that goes far beyond outraged letters and articles in newspapers.
In Britain, it has provided the ideological justification for the
state's anti-terrorist strategy in Northern Ireland. 	 Between 1974 and
1979, the Labour Government devised a policy for Northern Ireland
designed to localise the conflict and remove British troops from direct
involvement.	 The rationale behind this strategy was that, by
presenting the Irish conflict as an internal problem of law and order,
rather than a conflict over the legitimacy of the Northern Ireland
state and Britain's continuing involvement in its affairs, Britain
could extricate itself from a politically embarrassing situation.
The cornerstone of this policy, known as "Ulsterisation", was an attempt
to criminalise the IRA and its activities in the hope of undermining its
standing at home and abroad. 	 To this end "special category status", by
which those convicted of "terrorist" offences were granted special
privileges in recognition of the political nature of their offences, was
removed in 1976.
As we shall see below, the insistence on criminalising violence
which might otherwise be seen as resulting from more complex social and
political motivations, together with the argument that this violence is
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motivated by publicity, have been used by counter-insurgency experts to
justify imposing tighter controls over the media.
A second criticism of the argument that "terrorism" depends on
publicity is that it assumes a trade-off between publicity and an
increase in support for the "terrorists" and their social and political
goals.	 While in the long term the success of a "terrorist" campaign
may well depend upon their ability to secure wider support for their
ends, to assume that all publicity is necessarily good publicity, and
therefore beneficial to this end, is singularly implausible. 	 The
indiscriminate killing of individuals, for example, may well bring
substantial publicity for "terrorist" groups, but may also have
disastrous consequences in terms of public support. 	 Take, for example,
the Birmingham pub bombings of 1974.
	
The bombing of two pubs in
Birmingham in November, 1974, undoubtedly secured extensive publicity
for the IRA.	 And, if' we accept that this was the sole purpose behind
these acts, then the Birmingham bombings were undoubtedly an IRA
"success".	 However, the Birmingham bombings also precipitated the
passing of the Prevention of Terrorism Act, and also led to a backlash
of public opinion, neither of which can be said to have been beneficial
to the IRA.	 Similarly, the bombing of Harrods during the Christmas
rush hour in 1983 was seen by many, including many inside the IRA, as
a major setback to Sinn Fein's attempt to gain a platform for its views.
A third criticism of' the argument that the "terrorists" engage in
violence primarily for the publicity it generates, is that its
proponents have usually had little to say about how "terrorist" violence
is actually handled by the media. 	 Apart from rather general statements
that it is glamourised or over-emphasised, little attention is paid to
the character of news coverage itself nor its possible consequences for
public opinion.	 Indeed, the "anti-terrorist" perspective, as generally
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formulated, allows for no such thing as "bad publicity". 	 Publicity is
either directly beneficial to the "terrorists" in that it leads to
increased support for, and increased awareness of, their political ends,
or it is indirectly beneficial, in that each act of violence symbolises
the state's inability to maintain order and thus underminesits'authority.
Formulated in this way, the precise nature of the publicity given
to "terrorist" violence is of little significance: all publicity, good
or bad, is of utility to the "terrorists".	 Despite the centrality and
the significance of this argument within the "anti-terrorist" perspective,
its supporters are thus relieved of the need to furnish anything in the
way of evidence to show that publicity serves either of these two goals:
that it either leads to increased support and awareness of the
"terrorists'" goals, or that it symbolises the inability of the state to
maintain order and stability.	 If anything, such arguments run contrary
to a growing body of research evidence which suggests that the way in
which the media report anti-state violence, particularly when this
violence is directed against the journalists' own nation state, may
serve none of the goals postulated by the "anti-terrorist" perspective,
and indeed may actually work against them.
Underlying the arguments advanced by the "anti-terrorist"
perspective is the belief that, in its reporting of' "terrorism", the
media play a vital role in shaping public attitudes to it and that,
therefore, the media are a crucial weapon in the battle for public
opinion.	 In attempting to assess the likely impact of media coverage
on public opinion, the nature of' this coverage needs obviously to be
taken into account.	 If we accept that public attitudes to a given
issue are likely to be influenced by the negative or positive treatment
this issue is accorded on television and in the press, then the degree
to which the media reinforce "terrorism" or undermine the state's
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authority in fighting it, is perhaps best assessed by examining the
nature of the coverage accorded to it.
In moving to how the media have reported "terrorism" and those who
engage in it, it becomes clear that, rather than functioning to
reinforce "terrorism" or undermine the authority of the state, media
coverage may actually have the reverse effect.
Epstein, in his study of the coverage accorded to anti-government
violence against American supported states in Latin America in the
American press, found a high degree of press bias in favour of these
regimes and against the "terrorists")° 	 According to Epstein, even
though these regimes were highly authoritarian and often engaged in
serious acts of repression against segments of their own citizenry, the
general tendency within the American press was to "portray most
individuals who are hostile to United States supported regimes as
fanatics who are irrationally bent on violence and destruction")7
Apart from observing that the American press tended to concentrate on
acts of "terrorism" rather than the government repression which often
gave rise to them, Epstein found that the coverage accorded to
"terrorism" ignored much of that which could give some sense or meaning
to it:
No attempt is made to explain why certain groups
might wish to use violent means against these
governments.	 No articles refer to the serious
repressive acts of these same governments against
segments of their own citizenrY.(72)
Indeed, with the partial exception of the New York Times, Epstein found
that the American press rarely pointed their readers to the possibility
that "terrorism" and government repression are perhaps related.
Instead, the general tendency was to portray government repression "as
an unfortunate but necessary 'response' to actions initiated by the
"terrorists". 73	In terms of the general coverage accorded to
-163-
anti-government violence against these regimes, it was Epstein's view
that the American press presented their readers with an interpretation
in keeping with the US government's position. 	 According to the author:
such orthodox views on matters of government policy
(here foreign affairs) act to build or to reinforce
public support for decisions made by a limited group
of policy makers in government. 	 The press plays a
most essential role in conditioning the public to
accept such policy without a serious discussion of
either its implications or its alternatives. Within
the context of a largely co-operative press, one of
the major uses of labels like "terrorism" is to help
shape public opinion.	 Whether or not those running
major newspapers understand or intend the political
function being performed by their newspapers is of
little importance.
In an analysis of the coverage of Northern Ireland in the British
media 75 during two periods in 1974 and 1975, Philip Elliott also draws
similar conclusions.	 Elliott found that while the British media gave
a disproportionate amount of' space to political violence, with few
exceptions, this violence was reported in a simplistic,
de-contextualised, and ahistorical manner which concentrated on the
symptoms rather than the underlying causes of' violence. 	 As a
consequence, Elliott argues, Irish political violence was presented as a
series of unique and inexplicable events.	 Rather than undermining the
legitimacy and authority of the state, it was Elliott's view that the
reporting of' Irish "terrorism" actually served to strengthen that
authority by mobilising society against the threat posed by "terrorist"
activities.
Elliott also offers a cautionary note against the argument often
advanced by the "anti-terrorist" perspective, that television is
attracted to "terrorism" because it embraces the key elements of drama
and visual impact.
	 On the basis of his own content analysis, Elliott
found that:
-164-
The first finding seems to support the claim that the
news on television over-emphasises violence.
	
It is
doubtful, however, whether the results also support the
argument that often accompanies such a claim, that
violence is attractive to television, a visual medium,
because it is a visual phenomenon. 	 For the first
period, data is available for the BBC radio programme,
The World at One.
	
This radio progranirne carried an even
larger proportion of violent incident stories than the
two national television bulletins. 	 Apparently, it is
not the visual impact of violence so much as its
immediacy that is important in accounting for the
emphasis on violence.	 Radio is the fastest medium,
bringing up-to-date news of the latest events.	 Violent
incidents are sudden unexpected events which lend
themselves to this type of immediate reporting.
Many television news stories, including many reports
of violent incidents were simply read by a newsreader
to camera and so could be regarded as visual radio news
of much the same immediate tYPe.(76)
A further criticism of the argument that the "terrorists" engage
in violence simply for the publicity it generates and the wider audience
it secures for their cause, is that it ignores the complexity of the
reasons which may motivate the use of violence.	 To illustrate this,
let us take two examples: the killing of a leading social or political
figure and the killing of a soldier.	 In the case of the former - the
killing of Lord Mountbatten, for example - the motivation may well be
to secure worldwide publicity for their cause, or it could well be the
act of disillusioned, embittered sections of' a movement trying to
undermine formal political or peace initiatives. 	 But can we say the
same for the latter? This act could be undertaken for a variety of
reasons: as a reprisal for a previous act, as a warning to the
government that the group still exists as a viable force, or to boost
the morale of its members or supporters. 	 In each case, the intended
message of the act and its intended audience are different, and in none
of these cases would the group be dependent upon the media to transmit
its message.
Consequently, the argument that "terrorism" depends on publicity
generates more heat than light, and poses many more questions than it
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attempts to answer.	 While accusing the media of giving too much
attention to "terrorist" violence, it ignores the question of what form
this publicity takes, and perhaps more importantly, who it benefits.
While the above arguments are hardly conclusive, they do sound a
cautionary note against a too simplistic reading of the media's role in
the reporting of' "terrorism".	 At the very least, they suggest that the
publicity given to "terrorism" need not necessarily be detrimental to
the state, and indeed may be beneficial.
Violence a contagion
When a hostage taker gets his picture on the evening
news, we can just about predict the epidemic that
follows.	 Some other sick soul grabs his hand gun and
takes a hostage too.(77)
To turn now to the final, and perhaps most controversial, argument
advanced by supporters of the "anti-terrorist" perspective on the
relationship between the media and "terrorism": that is the contention
that the manner in which "terrorism" is reported by the media
contributes to its escalation. 	 Conventionally, this argument has taken
three forms.	 First, it has been argued that the media have glamourised
"terrorist" violence, made public heroes out of its perpetrators, and in
doing so have persuaded more people to emulate their deeds. 	 Secondly,
that the detailed reporting of "terrorist" and "anti-terrorist"
operations has provided disaffected groups with the practical knowledge
and the techniques with which to undertake acts of' "terrorism". 	 And
thirdly, that the mere presence of' the media, and in particular
television, is capable of increasing the scale and intensity of violence
and sparking off new violence.
The argument that "terrorism" is, like a disease, contagious, and
that the media, wittingly or unwittingly, have helped spread its
infection around the world, is one that has received widespread support
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within the "anti-terrorist" perspective.	 Mosse, for example, has
argued that "violence is contagious" and that "television has the power
to spread it or to prevent it spreading further". 78	Wilkinson talks
of how media coverage of "terrorism" "has the effect not merely of
handing the terrorists the advertisement they so crave, but also of
inspiring other groups to emulate them for similar purposes and even to
outbid each other in atrocity". 79	The Gardiner Report on the
disturbances in Northern Ireland argued that the media encouraged
"terrorist" activity by giving publicity to "terrorist" leaders, and by
sensational reporting which gave a false glamour to violence and those
(80)
engaged in it.
Perhaps the most frequently cited evidence in support of the
contagion thesis is that of hijacking.	 During the late l960s and early
l970s hijacking was to reach almost epidemic proportions. 	 For many
individuals hijacking served as a means of ventilating personal
grievances or making financial gain; political groups used hijacking in
order to secure the release of their colleagues and to bring attention
to their cause; while others used it as a means of gaining political
asylum.	 The frequency of hijackings, and the fact that many hijackers
used similar techniques and often made similar demands, fuelled
speculation that the publicity given to hijacking by the media was
assisting in its contagion.
Schmid and de Graaf, among others, cite hijacking as substantial
proof that the media contribute to the spreading of "terrorism" by
providing potential "terrorists" with the techniques for imitation.
"Hijacking", they argue, "is one of the most spectacular phenomena and,
(81)
as such, especially attractive for imitators".	 In support of their
argument, they cite a sequence of 26 hijackings which occurred over a
period of eight years, which they argue constituted a causal chain of
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events in which the media played a key role.	 The first of these
incidents, and the one which they argue provided both the model and the
stimulus for subsequent hijackings, occurred in 1971. On 12th November,
1971, Paul Joseph Cmi, a 26 year old Scotsman, seized an Air Canada
DC-8 en route to Toronto and threatened to blow the aircraft up unless
he was given a sum of money. 	 What was unusual about this particular
case was that Cmi carried on board his own parachute as a means of
escape.	 Despite its failure, the case attracted substantial coverage
in the American media.	 Over the following 7 years, a further 26 cases
of hijacking in which the hijackers used a similar technique were
recorded.	 These incidents took place in countries as far apart as
Brazil, Japan, and Britain, though the majority were in North America.
The writers conclude that the fact that these subsequent hijackings all
adopted the same techniques as the 1971 case indicated that a causal
relationship was at work, and that the media, by giving publicity to
the first of these cases, was, ergo, culpable for the others.
In our view, the media must have played a decisive
role in fostering the twenty-six parachute hijackings
that followed the Cmi example. 	 Had the media not
reported the detail about the parachute, these
imitations in all likelihood would not have taken
place. (82)
This suggestion that the media, simply by giving extensive
publicity to one incident, actually provide the stimulus for subsequent
acts is one that has also been advanced by Wardlaw. 	 According to
Wardlaw:
If one looks at chronologies of events of political
terrorism, it is apparent that during a particular
period bombings, assassinations, or hostage-taking
enjoy a particular popularity. 	 Frequently it is
possible to identify in each series a highly
publicised event of that class.(83)
Yonah Alexander, a frequent proponent of the contagion thesis, has
argued a similar point:
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To be sure, because terrorism, however local, is by
its very nature a world-wide theatrical attraction, it
tends to encourage angry frustrated groups beyond a
particular country to undertake similar acts as a way
out of their helplessness and alienation.	 For example,
several weeks after Argentina's Montoneros removed the
body of ex-President Pedro Aranibura to secure the return
of Eva Peron's body from Spain, Burmese terrorists stole
the body of U Thant for the purpose of using it in
negotiations with the Burmese government. (84)
Apart from this somewhat inconclusive example, Alexander can
provide no firm evidence for such a contention. 	 Instead, he simply
refers to two opinion polls which found a greater public awareness of
the PLO after extensive publicity had been given to its leader Yasir
Arafat, or quotes like-minded academics and politicans who believe a
cause and effect relationship exists.85
In other instances, the evidence provided in support of the
contagion thesis is even less convincing.
	 Brian Jenkins, for example,
in a sweeping generalisation, suggests that:
It also appears that the reporting of terrorism
inspires other acts of terrorism.	 It is difficult
to imagine the South Moluccans doing what they did
in the absence of the publicity previously given to
Palestinian terrorists and other groups. 	 The actions
of West German terrorists probably inspired Italy's
Red Brigades just as the West Germans were themselves
inspired by certain groups - especially the Tupamaros -
in South America.	 Similar incidents follow one
another. Tactics that achieve widespread publicity
are imitated elsewhere ... The news media definitely
play an important role in terrorism.(86)
The argument that the media have played a significant role in the
spreading of "terrorism" throughout the world is, on the basis of such
highly impressionistic evidence, to say the least, hardly convincing.
The mere fact that one act is similar to another does not, in itself,
prove that the reporting of one caused the other. 	 As Schlesinger
et al have pointed out, 8	the techniques adopted by "terrorist"
groups cannot be evaluated in isolation from the particular social and
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political contexts in which they take place.	 To draw causal
relationships between spatially, geographically and culturally disparate
incidents simply on the basis of their similarity ignores other
conditions which may explain why such acts occur, and the circumstances
under which one technique was chosen over another. It assumes, in the
case of hijacking, for example, that the country in which the hijacking
takes place had given extensive publicity to a previous hijacking, that
those involved were aware of this publicity, and, perhaps more
importantly, were motivated by it.
Central to the contagion thesis, and indeed central to the issues
of' media effects in general, is the assumption that the real problem
lies not in the images and messages of' violence per Se, but rather in
the receivers of these images and messages - the audience. 	 The
assumption is that the audience, especially an uneducated and fragmented
one, is susceptible to the reports it reads in its newspapers and the
images it watches on its television and cinema screens. 	 These reports
and images are said to act as a powerful stimulant to social action.
Attractive as this assumption may be to advertising agencies, it has
little basis in empirical research.	 What research has been undertaken
into the relationship between the media's portrayal of violence as a
stimulus to violence in real life has generally been restricted to the
effects of' fictional violence on children and adolescents.
	
Even under
tightly controlled test conditions, the findings have, at best, been
inconclusive while at worst contradictory. (88)	 To put such evidence
at its strongest, the media have been shown to be simply one possible
variable in determining social action.	 Generally speaking, those who
have sought to give credence to the contagion thesis have ignored the
possibility that there may be other factors which are of' equal, if' not
greater, importance in explaining particular forms of social action.
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A further argument contained within the contagion thesis is that
the media, by giving extensive coverage to "terrorist" violence, give
the impression that they sympathise with the "terrorists", and give
their activities an aura of glamour which enlists support for their
cause and persuades people to violence.
	 Such a view has been forwarded
by the British counter-insurgency expert, Brian Crozier, who has argued:
Media publicity tends, very often, to favour the
terrorists because of the drama they represent
it is in the very nature of television as a medium
that it tends to favour the revolutionary side.
This is not a reflection on the people who are
involved in television.	 It is in the character
of the medium itself.
A similar point has also been made by Alexander, who has argued that:
by providing extensive coverage of incidents the
media give the impression that they sympathise
with the terrorists' cause, thereby creating a
climate congenial to further violence.(90)
Such statements are both simplistic and misleading, and again tend
to run in advance of the evidence and ignore the manner in which
"terrorism" is reported by the media.	 As I have argued above, research
on the media's reporting of "terrorism" suggests that, rather than being
sympathetic towards those who engage in anti-state violence, the media
are highly hostile to, and indeed seek to deny the rationality of, such
campaigns.	 The argument deployed by the "anti-terrorist" perspective,
that the media "glamourise" or are "sympathetic" to the "terrorists",
is hardly supported by even a cursory examination of the coverage
accorded to "terrorist" violence. 	 The coverage accorded to the INLA's
bombing of the Droppin Well pub in Ballykelly in December, 1982, can
hardly have been said to have been sympathetic to the "terrorists".
Without exception, the British press condemned those responsible and
gave extensive coverage to the victims of the blast and extensive space
to those critical of the attack. 	 The Daily Mirror, in an editorial
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typical of the response of the British press, described those
responsible for the act in the following terms:
The disco bombers of Ulster are completely mad.
But it is a callous, calculated, unspeakable madness.
It is beyond any sane person's comprehension.	 It
cannot be treated.
The killers of Ballykelly cannot debate, only
destroy.	 They have no arguments but Armalite
rifles and explosives.	 They have no cause but
carnage. (91)
While Shaun Usher in the Daily Mail was to write:
That Monday night disco, where soldiers from the
Cheshire Regiment relaxed in a semblance of
normality, was a symbol and landmark of - by
Northern Ireland standards - an extraordinary
community, deliberately immune to hatred.
For the INLA, with the murder of Airey Neave
included on its battle honours, the peaceful
village was an intolerable affront and dangerous
example.	 Mass murder caine to Ballykelly not in
spite of being a modest oasis of sanity offering
truce in a corner of the forgotten war - but
because of it.(92)
The British press's depiction of those responsible for the
Ballykelly bombing as mindless psychopaths, hell bent on the
destruction of innocent lives, can hardly be said to have glamourised
"terrorism".	 Nor could the publicity given to the "terrorists" be
said to have been favourable.
Despite the absence of any significant evidence in their support,
the theories advanced by the "anti-terrorist" perspective have commanded
a central position in the contemporary debate over the media's coverage
of political violence.	 Since the early 1970s, these theories have
provided the ideological justification for a continuing attack on the
media.	 In the face of this attack, journalists, and especially those
working within television, have increasingly been placed on the
defensive.	 The political space in which they can address "domestic
terrorism" has been eroded, tendencies towards self-censorship have
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increased, and their freedom to address controversial issues has been
restricted.	 While in the short term, the effect of these theories has
led to an increasingly cautious approach within broadcasting, their
long term significance has yet to be fully determined.
	 Given the
widely accepted argument that the media constitute part of the
"terrorist" problem, it is only natural that the critics of the media
should turn their attention to how it could and should be controlled.
During the 1970s, and in the wake of the criticism being levelled at the
media, a variety of information strategies have been advocated by
"terrorist experts", strategies which sought to restrict even further
the space in which journalists could handle the issue of anti-state
violence.
"Terrorism" and the media: strategies of control
The reckless driver does not have to kill anyone,
or even hit anything, to be found guilty. 	 He
merely has to handle his vehicle recklessly.
A television camera can be at least as lethal as
a car.(93)
The barrage of criticism that was levelled at the media's coverage
of "terrorism" during the early l970s brought in its wake increased
demands that the media should put their houses in order. 	 The "experts"
were not slow in suggesting what changes they would like to see
implemented in the way newspapers and television approached the
reporting of "terrorism".	 Central to many of the proposals advocated
within official and counter-insurgency circles was the belief that when
a democratic society was confronted with "terrorism", the media could
not, and indeed should not, remain neutral. 	 If, as was commonly argued,
the media had been used by the "terrorists" in their campaigns against
legally constituted authority, then the converse could also be true:
the media could assist democratic states in their campaigns against
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"terrorism".	 This argument, that the media constituted a weapon which
could be used by either side, has been advanced by the British
counter-insurgency expert Richard Clutterbuck.	 According to
Clutterbuck:
The television camera is like a weapon lying in the
street.	 Either side can pick it up and use it.
If governments use it in this way encouraging their
officials, policemen and soldiers to help the mediarnen,
and answer their questions - it is far more effective
than any kind of censorship or government control.(94)
While the real issue is conceptualised as being one of controlling
the media, the problem was how much control and by whom? The dilemma
facing those who called for greater control over the media in their
reporting of "terrorism" was voiced by Sir Robin Day when he posed the
crucial question:
How, in a liberal democracy, with a tradition of free
reporting and independent broadcasting, can television
be prevented from becoming an ally of terrorism and
other forms of violence used for political ends?(95)
Generally speaking, the supporters of the "anti-terrorist"
perspective have canvassed four "solutions" to this dilemma: the
creation of additional legislation designed to counteract "irresponsible"
journalism by creating a series of "information crimes" backed up by
legal sanctions; direct censorship by governmental bodies of material
deemed to be beneficial to the "terrorists"; a system of formal news
guidelines designed to ensure "responsible" reporting of "terrorism";
and a system of informal co-operation between the media and
anti-terrorist agencies during particular "terrorist" incidents.
For many critics of the media's reporting of "terrorism", the
solution to "irresponsible" journalism was a simple one: the
government had at its disposal a range of existing legislation which, if
used more stringently, could ensure that journalists who crossed the
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line between reporting "terrorism" and encouraging it could face
prosecution.	 In Britain, the Prevention of Terrorism (Temporary
Provisions) Act, 1986, makes it an offence (section 11) for a person to
fail to disclose information which might be of material assistance in
preventing acts of "terrorism". 	 In the Irish Republic, section 31 of
the Broadcasting Authority Act bars the broadcasting of any material
calculated to further the aims of' an illegal organisation.
	 These acts,
it is argued, should be used against any journalist acting in an
"irresponsible" manner.
Others have gone even further and demanded the passing of
additional legislation, including, for example, making it a criminal
offence for the broadcasting organisations to transmit material which
encourages "terrorism" or violence used for political ends. 	 The
broadcasting authorities should be required, under new legislation, to
deposit copies of scripts and tapes of programmes, at least in the
fields of news and current affairs, with a central organisation
(96)
analogous to the British Library.
While the passing of additional legislation designed to strictly
control the media's coverage of "terrorism" may be attractive, few
governments have shown any willingness to travel along this path.
Except in periods of exceptional crisis, real or imagined, the
legislative process is often slow and burdensome, and any government
attempting to curtail the freedom of the media via the courts would be
likely to face stiff opposition.
Similar problems accompany the second of the four options, direct
censorship.	 While direct censorship would appear to be the obvious
solution, given the argument that "terrorism" depends on publicity,
with few exceptions, it is rarely advocated as a viable long term
information strategy for the state, partly because it has rarely been
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necessary.	 In Britain, for example, the mere threat of governmental
control has, more often than not, been sufficient to persuade the
broadcasting authorities to put their own houses in order and instigate
a system of internal control and regulation.	 Indeed, the mere threat
of direct government control is likely to be more effective than its
implementation.	 More important, perhaps, is the fact that, while
direct censorship may bring short term benefits, these are likely to be
outweighed by its long term costs. 	 As Schlesinger has pointed out:
Although mere expediency might seem to dictate outright
censorship in order to deny violent opponents of the
state the supposedly clear-cut advantage of publicity,
matters are not so simple.	 Overt censorship threatens
the legitimacy of the liberal-democratic order, one in
which the perceived conception of press freedom is that
the media are completely separate from the state.(97)
This is not to ignore the importance of censorship, nor to suggest
that censorship has been ruled out altogether; on the contrary,
censorship (often in the form of the D-notice system) has been
frequently employed in the past and will no doubt continue to be a
feature of media-state relations in the future. 	 As was noted in the
previous chapter, the censorship of plays, documentaries and current
affairs programmes and the banning of interviews with leaders of
illegal organisations has been a regular feature of broadcasting's
response to the continuing conflict in Northern Ireland. 	 However,
direct government interference into the affairs of broadcasting in the
past has shown it to be a highly unpredictable and unwieldy strategy of
news management.	 Direct censorship not only threatens the credibility
of broadcasting, it is also likely to create opposition and friction
from journalists. 8	If anything, direct censorship represents an
unpredictable managerial resource and as such it will always be the
last rather than the first resort of government.
The third option, and the one most frequently advocated by
-176-
counter-insurgency experts in Britain and America, is a system of
formal news guidelines designed so as to clarify in advance areas of
potential conflict between the interests of the media and those agencies
seeking to defeat the "terrorists". 	 The attraction of such guidelines
for anti-terrorist agencies is obvious: by regulating the media's role
prior to, during, and after a "terrorist" incident, areas of potential
conflict can be resolved in advance and the media's coverage of such
incidents can be more carefully controlled.
The precise nature of the guidelines advocated has varied from
country to country according to the perceived nature of the "terrorist"
problem, and the objectives of military and law-enforcement agencies.
While the character of such guidelines may vary, their objective has
always been the same: a stricter control over the flow and the
character of information on "terrorism" disseminated by the media.
Generally speaking, the trend towards the use of formal guidelines
in relation to the media's reporting of "terrorism" has been more
pronounced in the United States than in Britain. 	 The major source of
"terrorism" in America has not come from national separatist or
revolutionary movements, as has been the case in Britain and other
European states, but from kidnapping, usually for financial rather than
political ends.
	 And this is reflected in the nature of the news
guidelines demanded by law-enforcement agencies.
In 1976, following a series of widely publicised kidnappings, the
Task Force on Disorders and Terrorism published a report calling for a
rethink on the way the media approached the reporting of "terrorist"
incidents.	 The Report concluded by calling upon the media to implement
the following guidelines in their reporting of "terrorism":
1. The use of a "pool" of reporters to cover the situation on
behalf of all news organisations.
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2. Limitations on direct interviews with hostage-takers during
an incident.
3. Avoidance of enquiries to reveal tactical information that
would be detrimental to police operations if disclosed.
4. Delaying the reporting of details which might inflame the
situation.
5. Avoidance, where possible, of reporting that emphasises the
sensational aspects of the incident.
6. Reliance upon official sources.
7. Balancing of coverage of self-serving terrorist propaganda
with contrasting information from official sources.(99)
As with all attempts to impose news guidelines from the outside,
these proposals were given a mixed reception by the main American
television networks.	 As we shall see below in the case of British
broadcasting, the impetus for the use of guidelines in the reporting of
"terrorism" has generally come from within the broadcasting industry
itself, partly as a response to external criticism and partly in an
attempt to pre-empt government-imposed regulations.
These two factors were undoubtedly influential in the Columbia
Broadcasting Station's decision to become the first major American
broadcasting network to enact a system of internal news guidelines in
April, 1977.
	
During the previous two months, two major kidnappings
forced the issue of the media's coverage of "terrorism" to the top of
the political agenda.	 Both these incidents (the kidnapping of an
Indianapolis mortgage executive on the 8th February, and the kidnapping
of 134 people by the Hanafi Muslim sect on the 9th March) resulted in
widespread criticism over the way television approached the reporting of
"terrorism". (100)	 Ambassador Andrew Young expressed concern about the
contagious effect of the coverage accorded to the Hanafi incident,
stating that such coverage was tantamount to "advertising to neurotic
people" who are inspired to attempt "suicidal and ridiculous acts.U01)
-178-
On the 14th April, 1977, in the wake of the criticism levelled at
American television over its coverage of these two incidents,
Richard S. Salent, President of CBS News, issued seven guidelines to be
followed by CBS journalists. 	 The document began with four assumptions:
first, that there was a real possibility of "contagion" in covering
these kinds of' events; secondly, that suppressing news could adversely
affect CBS News credibility; thirdly, encourage rumour; and fourthly,
(102)distort news judgement for "some extraneous judgmental purpose".
While the guidelines issued by CBS called for restraint and care in the
coverage of "terrorist" incidents, and placed an embargo on live
coverage ("since we may fall into the trap of providing an unedited
platform for him"), except in the most compelling circumstances, CBS
retained the right to make the final decision on how incidents were to
(103)be reported.
Later in the same year, a second major network, United Press
International (UPI), issued its own guidelines based in part on those of
CBS.	 As with CBS, the guidelines issued by UPI reserved the right to
cover incidents according to the criteria of news value:
1. Each station should have established procedures for coverage of
such events, which should include prompt notification of
management.
2. Judge each story on its own and if the story is newsworthy,
cover it.
3. Coverage should be thoughtful, conscientious and show restraint,
and be carried out with an awareness of the potential threatto life.
4. Report demands made as an essential point of the story but do
not provide an excessive platform for those demands.
5. Reporters should avoid deliberately injecting themselves into
the story as intermediaries or negotiators.
6. If there has been no mention of a deadline, no one should ask
the terrorist kidnappers if there is one.
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7. Above all, apply the rules of common sense.(1j)
Despite opposition from some quarters to the use of guidelines on
the grounds that they both amount to self-censo rship and interrupt the
flow of news, the trend towards a more cautious approach to the coverage
of "terrorism" has gathered pace in the United States since the
mid-l970s.	 A survey carried out by Terry in 1977 found that a quarter
of the stations represented in his sample (22 out of 62) claimed to have
adopted written codes for handling a terrorist-hostage situation.
A further 17 stations claimed to be writing a code when the survey was
taken.	 On his sample, only 9 said they would be unlikely to adopt news
codes. 05	Similar developments have also been shown to be taking
(106)place in the press.
In Britain a similar process of external attack leading to internal
control and regulation occurred during the early 1970s. 	 The British
state's apparent inability to prosecute a successful campaign against
the paramilitaries placed the broadcasters in a position where any
attempt to provide an impartial account of events in Northern Ireland
was viewed as an act of' disloyalty. 	 In an attempt to ward off the
possibility of' future attacks and placate those who called for
government-imposed regulations, the BBC drew up a list of rules
applicable to the coverage of all issues relating to Northern Ireland.
As was noted in the previous chapter, these guidelines were first
hammered out in the early 1970s and they are illustrative of how
sensitive the authority had become over the issue of Northern Ireland:
1. News staff sent to Northern Ireland work through Controller
Northern Ireland and News Editor Northern Ireland; they must
be consulted.
2. No news agency report from Northern Ireland should be used
without checking the Belfast newsroom first.
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3. The IRA must not be interviewed without prior authority from
ENCA.	 There can be no question of doing the interview first
and seeking permission for broadcast afterwards.(107)
The rules also forbid the use of broadcasts from illegal radios
and the reporting of bomb scares involving BBC buildings. 	 In terms of
keeping the IRA and other illegal organisations off the air, the rules
proved an undoubted success. 	 Between 1972 and 1977, the BBC was to
carry only two interviews with IRA spokesmen - one in 1972 and the other
in 1974.	 During 1971, a similar system of internal control was also
developed within the IBA.	 Any programme dealing with any subject
related to Northern Ireland had to be approved at the highest level.
These developments have made the Northern Ireland conflict one of the
most sensitive and the most tightly controlled subjects within British
broadcasting.
If the coverage of Northern Ireland during the early l970s was
characterised by a process of external attack leading to internal
control, the coverage of "terrorism" since the mid-1970s has been
marked by a process of mutual co-operation and integration.
	
During
this period, anti-terrorist agencies in Britain have increasingly
pursued a policy of' integrating the news media into the process of news
management.	 The thinking behind this strategy was simple: it was
hoped that by developing closer relations with the media, journalists
could be persuaded of the "realities" of' the "terrorist" problem and
thus be enlisted as allies in the battle against "terrorism". 	 This
strategy, variously described as "mutual aid", "voluntary restraint",
or "responsible journalism", has been widely supported by
"anti-terrorist experts".	 Paul Wilkinson, for example, has argued
that:
government pressures to control the media on the grounds
that a terrorist emergency justifies such measures should
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be strongly resisted.	 The curtailment of a free press
would play directly into the hands of terrorists, being
one more step towards the destruction of democracy.
Fruitful co-operation between media, public, police and
government, in terrorist situations, can only be achieved
by informal understanding and goodwill and by voluntary
restraint on the part of the media.(108)
Co-operation between the media and the state is hardly new, indeed
it has a long tradition in Britain. 	 Leaving aside contacts between
highly placed news editors and state representatives via the "old boy
network", there is the D-notice system which has been in operation since
1912.	 D-notices, which have no legal force, are issued to editors
suggesting that an item, deemed by the government to be relevant to
national security, should receive no publicity.
	
While the D-notice
system is meant for external defence matters, in the past it appears
likely that it has also been used in relation to internal "terrorism".
During 1971, for example, Scotland Yard responded to a series of
bomb attacks carried out by the Angry Brigade by sending a confidential
memorandum to news editors via the Press Association. 	 The memorandum
requested editors to publish no details of two bomb attacks (one on the
home of Metropolitan Commissioner Sir John Waldron, and the other on the
home of the Attorney General, Sir Peter Rawlinson) until enquiries were
(109)
complete.
Generally speaking, however, the relationship between the media and
the police continued to be marked by a degree of suspicion on both sides.
It was not until the arrival of Sir Robert Mark as Metropolitan
Commissioner that this ad-hoc system of news management was replaced by a
more formal system of co-operation between the media and the police.
On becoming Commissioner in 1972, Mark set in train a policy of
"open" press relations which was to mark a radical departure from
previous police policy.	 The new policy was set out in an internal
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Scotland Yard memorandum in 1973.
	
It called for a more open, trusting
and co-operative relationship with the media.
	 In September, 1975, this
policy was to be given further impetus when Mark held a press conference
for the media at Scotland Yard with the aim of working out agreed
(110)procedures for "mutual aid" during "terrorist" incidents.
Before the end of the year, this new policy was to be put to the
test on three separate occasions: the Spaghetti and Balcombe Street
sieges, and the kidnapping of a 17 year old Cypriot girl,
Alio Kaloghriou.	 It proved an unqualified success in each case. 	 Not
only did the media agree to police requests for news blackouts (nine
days in the kidnapping case), but in the Balcombe Street siege, by
leaking a report that SAS snipers had been called to assist in the siege.
As a consequence, the media played a direct role in bringing the siege
to an end.	 In an interview given by Mark in December, 1975, he
announced the new policy to be an unqualified success:
We believe the press have such a high degree of trust
in us that we expect them to believe us when we tell
them the truth, and we are fully confident of a
responsible attitude on their part.	 Any apprehensions
are unnecessary, because it is an entirely voluntary
agreement .. .There is such a degree of confidence and
trust now between Fleet Street and the Metropolitan
Police Force that you almost make a journalist
uncomfortable if he disbelieves
The procedures and machinery of news management developed by Mark
during the mid-1970s were bequeathed to his successor, Sir David McNee,
who quickly endorsed the policy and sought means of extending it.
During the course of 1980, this "special relationship" between the
police and the media was again put to the test with the siege at the
Iranian Embassy.	 Within minutes of arriving at Prince's Gate,
procedures for handling the media were again put into operation.
Once again, the media showed themselves willing to comply with the news
management techniques of the police.
	 During the course of the siege,
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which was to last for six days, in return for regular police briefings,
British television, radio and the press became an integral part of
(113)police operations.
While this policy of voluntary restraint and mutual co-operation
has met with widespread approval among politicians and anti-terrorist
agencies, some critics have argued that it does not go far enough.
Clutterbuck, for example, has called for the establishment of a
professional body along the lines of the British Medical Association
and the Law Society.	 This new body, the Institute for the Mass Media
(1MM), would initially be confined to anyone involved in the editorial
process - though this would later be extended to include all journalists
working within a mass medium.	 The 1MM, Clutterbuck argues, should have
its own code of practice and would be invested with the power to strike
off any media practitioner in breach of this code. 	 Furthermore,
registered members of the 1MM would also be required to blacklist the
work of any journalist who had knowingly broken its code of practice.
Until such a body has been established, Clutterbuck suggests that
temporary legislation should be introduced to enable a Chief Constable
to declare a Local State of Emergency at his own discretion, for a
period not to exceed six hours. 	 During this period, the police would,
by way of an Enabling Act, be able to bring charges against journalists
(114)
who contravened the IMM's code of' practice.
Conclusion
Since the late 1960s, the debate over the media's role in the
reporting of political violence has been elevated to a highly ideological
plane.	 Drawing upon arguments about the social effects of media
representations of violence and the motivating force behind political
violence, which at best constituted a series of tentative hypotheses
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rather than empirically validated facts, a relatively small group of'
academics, counter-insurgency experts and politicians have provided
both the terms of reference and the intellectual backing for a concerted
attack on broadcasting and the press.
In Britain, as in America and Europe, what stimulated this attack
was a growing crisis of legitimacy within the liberal-democratic order.
Trade union and student militancy, unsolved national problems, and. race
relations, contributed to a growing crisis of' law and order. 	 Against
this background, the issue of political violence was to become a major
preoccupation of academics, politicians and the media. 115	Given that
it was through the medium of mass communication that the issue of
political violence was brought to the public's attention, it was hardly
surprising that television and the press should come in for a degree of
criticism.	 During the early 1970s, primarily in response to the growing
crisis in Northern Ireland, arguments about the possible effects of the
media's portrayal of political violence, which during the l960s had
generally lain dormant, were to be increasingly applied to the coverage
of "terrorism".	 And during this period, the argument that the media,
rather than simply reflecting political violence, was actually
contributing to it, was to be increasingly voiced by conservative
academics and politicians as a means of' explaining the continuing
conflict in Northern Ireland.
In Britain, the impact of' the arguments being advanced by the
"anti-terrorist" perspective has been most clearly felt by broadcasting.
As the IRA increased its attacks on the British state and brought the
campaign to the streets of England itself', the broadcasting authorities
became increasingly sensitive to the argument that, in providing access
to the "enemies" of the state, they were possibly prolonging the crisis.
In an attempt to ward off future attacks, the broadcasting authorities
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were to implement a system of internal control and regulation which,
while maintaining the outward appearance of independence, brought them
closer to the definition of the Irish conflict employed by the state.
By the late 1970s, British broadcasting had abandoned any attempt to
provide a critical evaluation of the Irish conflict and had, instead,
in its efforts to avoid controversy, concentrated on the symptoms of the
conflict rather than its underlying causes.
Since the late 1970s, however, the British state's attempts to
control the broadcasting media by external criticism and political
pressure has given way to a policy of integration and mutual
co-operation.	 The long term implications of this strategy have yet to
be fully worked out and, as the recent outcry over the BBC's Real Lives
"At the Edge of the Union" programme illustrates, what little space is
presently available in which journalists can address the issue of
"domestic terrorism" is by no means secure.
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CHAPTER 4
Methodology and Fieldwork
Before returning in detail to the reporting of Northern Ireland in
the following three chapters, this chapter provides an account of the
methodological approaches employed in the study, and reflects on some of
the practical problems encountered during the course of the fieldwork.
The principal research methods employed in this study are those of
content analysis and interviewing. 	 The fieldwork for the project
itself was conducted in three stages.	 The first stage, which provides
the focus for section one of this chapter, was undertaken during the
summer of 1982 when, during a visit to the Newspaper Library of the
British Museum, a content analysis of the reporting of civilian
assassinations in seven British and two Northern Irish papers was
carried out.	 A report on the findings of this analysis is presented
in Chapter 5.
	
Stages two and three of the fieldwork were conducted in
Belfast and London during 1983 and 1984, when a series of interviews
with journalists and representatives of the information services
operated by the British Army and the Royal Ulster Constabulary were
carried out.	 The background to these interviews is examined in the
final section of this chapter and the material generated by them is
presented in Chapters 5 and 6.
Section One: Content Analysis
As a substantial body of literature dealing with the strengths,
limitations, design and general application of content analysis as a
research method within the social sciences is widely available, a
(1)detailed evaluation of the method need not detain us here. 	 Instead,
this section will be more concerned with providing a general account of
the coding schedule employed in the project and the practical and
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methodological considerations which informed its design.
	
Nevertheless,
before turning to the details of the model and procedures adopted in
this study, it is perhaps necessary to say something, albeit briefly,
about the significance that can be attached to an analysis of newspaper
content of the kind discussed below.
Why study press content?
Any study of the press or television must, at some stage or
another, address itself to what is actually there on the page or the
screen.	 For it. is the images, messages, biases and ideologies
contained within media output, and their likely impact on public opinion,
that lie at the very heart of the debate on the social and political
significance of the mass media in contemporary society. 2	Since the
content of mass communication is seen as so significant, social
scientists have sought to devise and routinise methodical procedures
for the analysis of text or document content with the purpose of
extracting from this content its underlying themes, images, stereotypes
and biases.	 The traditional method used by social scientists for
analysing the meaning of mass communication messages is content analysis.
Defined by Berelson as a "research technique for the objective,
systematic and quantitative description of the manifest content of mass
communication", 3
 conventional content analysis techniques record the
incidence of' different types of' content using a previously prepared
coding schedule.	 The strength of' the method lies in producing
frequency counts of different types of content which can be further
cross-tabulated to show the inter- relationship of different themes and
subjects.	 The ultimate rationale behind this attempt at procedural
standardisation, as Beardsworth notes:
is the desire to produce 'hard', 'objective' data.
Such data can then be expected (it is hoped) to show
a high degree of inter-observer reliability. 	 This
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in turn should provide the basis for the building up
of cumulative knowledge concerning document content,
and hence facilitate the production of tscientific'
generalisation. (4)
A general survey of content analysis literature suggests that there
are a number of' reasons for which press content might be analysed.
Among these, two are perhaps the most common. 	 The first, as implied
above, is from the point of' view of the likely impact of' this content
on public opinion, and the second is to gain insight into the
personalities and procedures by which newspapers are produced.
It needs to be made clear, however, that content analysis on its own
cannot provide final answers to either of these questions.
	 Newspapers
make people aware of certain things, and suggest the degree of
importance that different events and issues have by the amount and
prominence of' coverage that they give them.	 And, while there is
reason to think that one of' the main functions of newspapers is to
influence the shape and direction of the public debate by providing
subject matter for discussion and indicating the terms in which the
debate might be carried out, 6 the question of how successfully, if
at all, they fulfil this role is one that content analysis is
ill-equipped to answer.
	
To draw conclusions as to the influence of
newspapers on their consumers simply on the basis of their manifest
content alone, is to assume that the meaning attached to this content
by the analyst is the same as that attached to it by the reader. Such
an assumption, needless to say, it highly problematical. 	 For, as has
been pointed out elsewhere, the perspectives and values that we as
newspaper readers bring to the task of reading a newspaper, may well
influence how we interpret and make use of the information it provides:
If newspapers are not produced in a social vacuum
neither are they read in a vacuum.	 The reader brings
to his paper his own perspectives on the world in terms
of which he interprets what he reads. 	 His perspectives
will have been formed through a continual process of
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communication with others since early childhood, in
particular circumstances of family life, neighbourhood,
educational, work and leisure experience.	 His outlook
is likely to bear similarities to the outlook of others
with similar experiences. 	 The same news item may
therefore be given quite different interpretations by
people in different situations.(7)
Similarly, to draw conclusions as to the procedures by which the
information provided by newspapers is gathered, processed and presented
by reference to content alone, is also problematical. 	 An analysis of
newspaper content may tell us what events and issues regularly feature
in newspapers and how they are presented; it may also tell us whose
views on a given event or issue are most frequently canvassed by
journalists and how they are presented, but it can tell us little, if
anything, about the factors and circumstances that help shape this
content.
Thus, while content analysis may provide strong indications and
hypotheses, if we want to know about the impact and possible influence
of newspaper content on public opinion, or the routines and processes
which govern newspaper production, we must, by necessity, study readers
and production, as well as content.
Consequently, when it comes to the inferences that can be drawn
from an analysis of newspaper content, the analyst needs to be cautious.
He cannot claim to be studying events or their social consequences as
such, nor can he claim to say much about what determines news output.
Instead, as Hartmann, Husband and Clark point out, the content analyst
has to be:
content with saying something about what has been called
'events as news' - that is, the versions of' the world
daily laid before the public as a kind of suggested agenda
for their thought, discussion and action. 	 How these
images originate, and what kind of use is subsequently
made of them are questions for further investigation
by other means.(8)
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Furthermore, it also needs to be recognised that, while content
analysis may be an economical and reliable method for charting the major
categories of news that appear over time in a given medium of
communication, it is not a subtle technique (though this will obviously
depend to some extent on the skill of the analyst and the nature of the
coding schedule used) and it makes no pretence at capturing the nuances
that may permeate any piece of prose.9
Nevertheless, despite these limitations, the appeal of systematic
content analysis techniques for the student of mass media output remains
a strong one.
	 Economical, reliable and systematic in nature, content
analysis clearly has advantages for the systematic investigation of a
wide range of material.	 At the very least, it can provide a reliable
statistical summary of the prominent features of news coverage. 	 And
at best, if rigorously applied according to the formal procedures of
content analysis, the result can be a comprehensive and analytic survey
(10)	 (11)
of the general way in which a given subject (be it race, 	 crime,
(12)	 (13)	 (14)Northern Ireland,	 industrial relations	 or the welfare state,
to name but a few) is treated in the media studied.
Bearing the above observations clearly in mind, I would now like to
turn to look in broad detail at the method and procedure adopted for the
study presented in Chapter 5.
Analysing press content: aims, sample and method
As we have seen in Chapter 2, the question of how Northern Ireland
has been reported by the British media has already provided the focus
for a number of content analyses. 	 As a result of these earlier
endeavours, our knowledge as to the general treatment accorded to
Northern Ireland as a news issue by newspapers and television, though
far from complete, has been expanded considerably in recent years.
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Rather than retrace the steps of those studies cited in Chapter 2
which, in the main, have focused their attentions on the general subject
of Northern Ireland, and have been concerned to establish the relative
prominence accorded to its various dimensions (the socio-economic, the
political and the military), the focus of this study is more specific in
nature.	 It is primarily concerned with the issue of inter-communal
violence (as opposed to violence directed against the security forces or
the paramilitary groups) and, in particular, with the coverage accorded
to civilian assassinations by the press.
Directed against the most vulnerable members of both communities
and accounting for as many as two-thirds of all civilian fatalities
(15)
recorded since 1969,
	
the assassination of civilians represents one
of the most significant forms of political violence in Northern Ireland,
and one that has done much to polarise the two communities in the
North. 6)	 For these reasons alone, an understanding of how this
particular form of political violence relates to, and perhaps influences,
the wider conflict taking place on the streets of Belfast and Derry
could be said to be indispensable to any meaningful assessment of the
situation in the Six Counties.
Taking as its focus a five week period in 1972, the study assesses
the kinds of information on assassinations made available to the British
public.	 It was undertaken with the following three specific aims in
mind:
1. to establish the amount and prominence of coverage given to
civilian assassinations during the sampled period;
2. to assess and compare differences in coverage across the range
of newspapers studied;
3. to assess and compare the range of explanations advanced by
journalists as to the social and political factors that may
have underpinned the assassination campaign, and the
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assessments offered as to its significance in relation to
the wider conflict taking place in the North.
Sampling
In considering a suitable focal point for the study, a number of
factors had first to be taken into account.	 Prominent among these was
the need to ensure that a sufficient amount of material would be
generated to make the undertaking of the content analysis worthwhile.
In view of the intended subject matter of the study, this was by no
means a minor consideration. 	 Since the early l970s, the assassination
campaign waged against civilians has been an important feature of the
conflict in the North.
	 It has not, however, been a constant one.
Instead, like the bombing campaigns that have been waged by the
paramilitary groups on both sides of' the religious and political divide,
the intensity of the assassination campaign has tended to ebb and flow
according to the prevailing political climate, and according to the
on-going political and military objectives of the organisations
responsible for it.	 In the light of this, it soon became clear that if
there was going to be a sufficient volume of reportable activity to make
the study worthwhile, it would be necessary to focus on a period when
the incidence of assassinations was high.
Before arriving at a final decision as to when the study should
commence, it was also necessary to take into account the prevailing
level of press interest in the Northern Ireland story as a whole.
Since the early 1970s, as we have seen in Chapter Two, press interest
in events in the North has diminished significantly.	 As a consequence
Northern Ireland stories, particularly those dealing with "routine" acts
of violence, have been accorded increasingly smaller amounts of space
and, on a growing number of occasions since the mid-l970s, they have
been left out altogether.
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In an effort to overcome these problems and maximise the coverage
given to civilian assassinations, it was eventually decided to commence
the analysis on the 1st July, 1972.
	
This had several advantages.
First, it located the study in a year when press interest in Northern
Ireland, though already on the wane, was still relatively buoyant.
Secondly, it located the study in a period close to the start of the
assassination campaign when the likely news value of such killings was
(17)
still likely to have been high. 	 And finally, by focusing on a
five week period in which the incidence of assassination was
particularly high, it ensured a constant volume of reportable activity.8
Sarnpl e
The arguments presented in Chapter 5 are based on an analysis of
7 British national dailies and, for the purpose of comparison, 2 Belfast
morning papers.
	 The sample of newspapers selected for the project,
together with the number of editions included, is outlined in Table 1.
Table 1
* All editions lost as a consequence of an industrial dispute
during 24th to 27th July, l972
-202-
Method of analysis and coding procedure
Following conventional coding procedures the individual story as
separately presented in each of the newspapers studied was taken as the
basic unit of analysis.	 This not only provided an indication of the
significance attached to the issue of civilian assassinations, but it
also allowed for comparisons to be made across the media in their
treatment of the same story.
An initial pilot analysis, however, revealed that for the purpose
of this study there was a problem with adopting the media-defined story
as the exclusive unit of analysis.	 As we shall see when we turn to the
findings of the analysis in detail in the following chapter, over the
period examined here it was relatively unusual for an assassination to
be accorded separate treatment by the British press.
	
More often than
not, when such killings did surface as a news item, it was as part of a
composite or round-up report, often dealing with several discrete
incidents or developments at the same time. While in some instances,
such composite stories were explicitly presented as round-up accounts,
more often than not there was no indication in the headline or opening
paragraph that the report would move on to other topics (in this case,
assassinations) later.	 Thus, to have coded only those news reports
dealing explicitly with assassinations in the headline or opening
paragraph would not only have neglected the treatment given to
assassinations outside of this news format, but would also have
underplayed the frequency at which they appeared as news. 	 Given that
the decision to present an assassination as part of a round-up report
rather than as a news story in its own right, in itself said something
about the significance attached to the incident by a particular
newspaper, it was felt important that such stories were documented.
In the event it was decided that all news that was in any way connected
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with Northern Ireland should be scanned and the reporting of
assassinations recorded according to whether they surfaced as a news
story in their own right, or as part of a round-up report. 	 This was
important in that it not only provided a further indication of the
significance attached by a particular newspaper to such killings, but
again it also allowed for comparison to be made across the media in
their treatment of the same incident.
Data analysis
As we have seen above, conventional content analysis techniques
operate by establishing certain conceptual categories which are then
quantitatively assessed according to their relative absence or presence
in the material being studied. 	 While such techniques may generate
useful data on the general way in which the subject (be it race, crime
or Northern Ireland) is treated as a news issue in the chosen medium,
they are not well adapted, as Elliott has noted, to dealing with the
treatment of particular stories:
It is difficult to set up categories in advance to
differentiate between various treatments of' the same
story.	 Inevitably such reports overlap in many of
the facts included but diverge in nuances of emphasis,
presentation and selection.
	
It can be argued, of'
course, that the similarities are more important than
the differences but that would be more appropriate as
a conclusion than as a PresumPtion.(19)
Drawing on the model adopted by Elliott in his study of news in
(20)
Britain, Ulster and the Irish Republic, 	 the method and procedures
outlined below were designed to record both the general treatment given
to assassinations as measured by the frequency counts, and the detail
of the way individual assassinations were handled as news in particular
newspapers.
To assist in the management of the material, all reports dealing
with assassinations or their aftermath were recorded on two sheets, the
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media sheet and the story sheet. 	 The media sheet was designed to
record the frequency of assassination-related reports and the ratio of
primary news reports, round-up reports, follow-up reports and editorials
carried by each newspaper.	 It was divided into rows horizontally and
vertically by newspaper, date on which the report appeared, page
location, pictorial representation and type of news. 	 Following this
initial classification, these details, together with a synopsis of the
story, were transferred on to the story sheets.
The synopses recorded on the story sheets were divided under three
headings: actors and acts; news angle; commentators and comments.
As their headings suggest, the purpose of these categories was to
establish the various ways in which individual newspapers handled the
issue of assassinations: the labels they used to identify those
involved and the act of violence itself; the sources of information
sought out by journalists, both to give meaning to the incident and to
supply the possible motives and reasons behind it; and the central
themes around which the reports were structured.
Under actors and acts were listed all the subjects identified in
the report (the victims, eye-witnesses, friends and relatives, and those
identified as being responsible for the incident), together with the
details of the incident itself.	 In recording these details, particular
attention was paid to the labels attached to the victims (for example,
their religious and political affiliations), those identified as being
responsible for the incident (for example, were they identified as being
"gunmen" or "terrorists", republicans or loyalists), and the act of
violence itself (for example, was it described as a "sectarian" murder,
a "tit-for-tat" killing, or an act of "terrorism").
	
Under news angle
were listed the specific aspects of the incident singled out for special
attention in the headline or opening paragraph.
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tinder the third heading, commentators and comments, were listed
all those whose views on the incident were quoted, including those
which the newspaper itself supplied without any other attribution.
In recording these details, particular attention was paid to the range
of commentators sought out by journalists to give meaning to incidents
and supply the possible reasons behind them, and the relative weight
and prominence given to their comments.
Section two: Interviewing Journalists: Aims, Methods and Fieldwork
Where the first stage of the fieldwork was concerned with an
analysis of the coverage accorded to inter-communal violence in the
British press, stage two of the fieldwork focused on the activities and
perspectives of those partly responsible for this coverage - the
journalists themselves.	 One of my aims here was to take the findings
of the content analysis a step further in order to come to some
understanding as to how and why the press report what they do. 	 At one
level, therefore, this stage of the fieldwork addressed itself to the
role performed by journalists in the newsgathering process and sought to
establish what it was about the way journalists go about the routine
task of newsgathering that helped make news about Northern Ireland the
way it is: what are the staple sources of information for journalists
working in Northern Ireland and how do these sources help shape what
emerges as news; how are such concepts as news value, objectivity and
impartiality applied on a daily basis by journalists, and how does their
application influence the selection and presentation of news about
Northern Ireland; what is the nature of the relationship between
journalists on the ground and their newsdesks and how does this
relationship influence the individual journalist's approach to
newsgathering; how much autonomy do journalists enjoy on a daily basis
to determine the selection and presentation of news about Northern
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Ireland, and what are the effective limits to this autonomy. 	 These
were some of the main issues and questions that I sought to examine in
this section of the project.
A further aim of this section of the research as to come to some
understanding of how the reporting of Northern Ireland and the coverage
accorded to the conflict by the British press is viewed from the
"inside".	 News production, like any other social activity, involves
real people doing real jobs about which they are able to reflect.
However, despite the fact that the British media have now been covering
Northern Ireland for the best part of sixteen years, the experience and
perspectives of their journalists have rarely surfaced in any meaningful
way.	 There has, of course, been the occasional article here and there
which has afforded a partial insight into the problems encountered by
journalists in Northern Ireland, but considerable gaps still exist in
our knowledge.	 Northern Ireland's proximity to mainland Britain has
made the political and military conflict in the Six Counties one of the
most sensitive issues in British politics. 	 What problems has this
created for those whose task it is to report it? 	 Journalists who cover
Northern Ireland for the British press are subject to a variety of
different and conflicting pressures.
	
On the one hand, they have a
professional responsibility to report the news in an impartial and
objective manner regardless of their own personal or political
allegiances.	 On the other hand, they are members of, and may share the
values and assumptions of, a state which is a major participant in the
conflict they report.	 How do journalists reconcile their membership of
a nation state under attack with the professional demands of objectivity,
impartiality and balance?
While the primary focus of this section of the research was to be
on the role and perspectives of journalists, a further and related aim
of this section was to come to some understanding of how the role of the
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media in the reporting of political violence was viewed by two of the
main official agencies in the conflict - the army and the police.
Both have a vital interest in how the conflict is reported by the media,
and since 1969, both have adopted sophisticated information strategies
designed to give them the edge in the propaganda war. 	 Moreover, since
1969, both these agencies have occupied positions of immense strategic
importance for journalists as major sources of information.
Having defined my key areas of interest, and before selecting an
appropriate research method, it was first necessary to give careful
thought to the kinds of practical and methodological problems that such
a project was likely to generate.	 How does one approach the practical
problem of contacting and gaining access to journalists? Given the
sensitive nature of the Irish issue, would sufficient journalists be
willing to co-operate to make the project worthwhile? Which research
method would be most appropriate to generating the kinds of information
I required?
The problem of access
If there is any one institutional disease to which
the media of mass communications seems particularly
subject, it is a nervous reaction to criticism.
As a student of the mass media I have been continually
struck and occasionally puzzled by this reaction, for
it is the media themselves which so vigorously defend
principles guaranteeing the right to criticise.(21)
Sociological work on journalists as an occupational group and on
the process of news at the point of production is relatively scarce in
Britain - though the gaps in our knowledge have slowly been filled in
(22)
recent years.	 In part, the relative scarcity of such studies has
reflected the priorities of academic research into the mass media which,
prior to the late 1960s and early 1970s, was dominated by an interest
in the effects/products of mass communications with only marginal
attention being devoted to the working practices and ideologies of the
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communicators themselves.	 This is hardly surprising given the
theoretical assumptions which underpinned orthodox thinking on the role
and social significance of the media in industrial society during the
inter-war and immediate post-war years.
During this period, academic debate on the role and social
significance of the media in advanced industrial society was informed
by two key, yet unproved, assumptions: first, that the mass media were
all-powerful and highly persuasive agencies capable of determining how
individuals and groups thought, acted and understood the world in which
they lived and, secondly, that the nature of the society in which the
messages transmitted by the media were received, made the audiences who
received them highly susceptible to manipulation.
The mass society and media effects theses appeared, on the surface
at least, to support and reinforce each other. 	 Technological
developments during the early and middle part of the twentieth century
had enabled the media to penetrate society on a previously unimaginable
scale, and in a highly powerful way.	 Mass produced and cheap daily
newspapers, radio, and latterly television, had created audiences on a
mass scale.	 Moreover, it was widely believed by a diversity of writers
that industrialisation and urbanisation had fragmented a previously
stable social order and had created a society that was volatile,
unstable, rootless and alienated, and thus inherently susceptible to
manipulation.(23)	 Given the widespread support these assumptions were
to attract, it was hardly surprising that academic research into the
mass media during this period should take the form of' an empirical
investigation into audience reaction to, and use of, the mass media.
As Curran and his colleagues have argued, these two assumptions:
encouraged a relatively uncomplicated view of the media
as all-powerful propaganda agencies brainwashing a
susceptible and defenceless public.	 The media
propelled "word bullets" that penetrated deep into its
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inert and passive victims.
	 All that needed to be
done was to measure the depth and size of penetration
through modern scientific techniques.(24)
Even though these assumptions were to be challenged and overtaken by
new orthodoxies in the 1950s and 1960s,(25) the main thrust of academic
research into the media during the late 1960s and early 1970s continued
to be informed by some notion of media effects.	 This again is hardly
surprising given that each successive school of thought on the media
merely substituted one interpretation of media effects for another.26
However, while the priorities of academic thinking and research on
the media may be the main reason for the disproportionate share of
academic resources devoted to the analysis of the products and effects
of mass communications, it is not the only one.
	
Research priorities,
and research into the media is no exception, are not only shaped by the
theoretical assumptions of the discipline, they are also influenced by
a number of other considerations.	 Among the most important of these
is the availability and accessibility of a suitable database, the
availability of a research method capable of exploiting this database,
and an environment conducive to research. 	 The relative ease with which
these requirements can be satisfied may often be a decisive factor in
the selection of potential research topics.	 For those contemplating	 a
study of media output, these factors are relatively easy to satisfy.
Newspaper output, for example, presents relatively few problems for the
researcher.	 Newspapers produce an abundance of material on a daily
basis.	 Moreover, their output, in printed form, provides a convenient
and easily handled source of raw data for the analyst which can be
culled and analysed with relatively little difficulty. 	 And
technological developments like the video recorder have reduced many of
the problems previously associated with the analysis of television
output.	 Indeed, the ease with which data can be culled may be one
explanation for the frequency of studies on the press.
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Ethnographical research, on the other hand, presents the
researcher with a more difficult task. 	 Unlike research into newspaper
or television output, which allows the researcher to gather sufficient
data with ease, the ethnographer, more often than not, has to gather
data at source.	 Consequently, be the research into street gangs, drug
users or television or print journalists, access, be it for the purpose
of interviewing or observation, has to be secured before such research
can begin.	 Herein lies one of the central problems for those
contemplating research of this nature: the success or failure of the
project may hang on the ability of the researcher to gain sufficient
access to make the project worthwhile.	 Indeed, as we shall see below,
the problem of access has constantly obstructed ethnographical research
into the British media in recent years - a fact which perhaps partly
explains the scarcity of such studies.
Given that I was seeking access to a notoriously defensive group,
and furthermore, was seeking to question its members on matters of a
particularly sensitive nature, it was first necessary to give some
thought to how the task of gaining access should be best approached.
Unfortunately, and for reasons known only to themselves, it would
appear that many researchers (or perhaps more likely their publishers)
regard these practical considerations as being beyond the interest of
the general reader and consequently rarely include a detailed account of
their fieldwork in the published study.	 For example, a recent study on
welfare correspondents 27 provides no account of how the authors
tackled the question of access, despite the fact that such an account
would have been of considerable interest to those contemplating similar
research.	 What accounts were available, however, hardly augured well
for my own intended study. 	 While these accounts more often than not
related to research into broadcasting, they all suggested that the
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question of access has been a frequent stumbling block for many
would-be researchers into the British media.
In recent years, the relationship between independent researchers
and the various sections of the British media has scarcely been an
harmonious, let alone a symbiotic, one. 	 Independent research, and
those who undertake it, is at best treated with suspicion by journalists,
and at worst with outright hostility. 	 For a profession which has made
a virtue of disclosure, journalists, it would appear, are surprisingly
coy and even defensive when it comes to the external scrutiny of their
own activities and practices. 	 The public's right to know, so often a
central and legitimating principle of British journalism, does not, it
would appear, extend to their right to be kept informed on the internal
workings of broadcasting and the press.
Broadcasting, and in particular commercial broadcasting, has an
exceptionally poor record when it comes to providing access and the
other facilities essential for independent research. 	 Its record stands
in sharp contrast to the public pronouncements of senior broadcasting
personnel on the issue of external research. 	 In 1970, for example,
Sir Charles Curran, the Director General of the BBC, put the case for
research in the following terms:
The case for unfettered research into the wide social
issues raised by broadcasting needs no arguing. The
BBC has always been wholly in its favour and it looks
forward to the eventual increase in our understanding
of the process of mass communications which must be
expected. Our view is that research of this kind is
best carried out in an academic institution. It is
only in universities and other establishments of
advanced learning that long-term projects of this
kind can properly be undertaken.(28)
In private, however, the broadcasters have often shown themselves
to be highly resistant to the research they have been so eager to
welcome in public.	 Nowhere has this resistance to independent scrutiny
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been more pronounced than in the area of news production. 	 Despite the
fact that both BBC News and ITN are wedded to an ideology of public
service broadcasting and professional accountability, neither, it would
appear, welcomes the external scrutiny of its news operations. 	 The
attitude of the broadcasting institutions on the issue of access has,
however, varied.
	 In recent years, the BBC has adopted a slightly more
positive attitude to requests for access, even when these requests come
from groups whose aims the corporation is openly hostile to.
	 To date,
the BBC has permitted a number of partial and full-scale inquiries into
its news process.	 The attitude of ITN, on the other hand, has remained
unremittingly hostile to independent research. 	 Philip Schlesinger, for
example, found his own requests to ITN for observational facilities
"rebuffed with sneers and insultst.(29)	 The Glasgow University Media
Group were to fare no better in their dealings with ITN. 	 ITN refused
to allow the group's researcher to spend any time officially inside the
newsroom and the group was forced to adopt more surreptitious means in
order to observe ITN's news operations.
	 Under the pretext of visiting
friends within ITN, the group's researcher managed to snatch five days'
observation within ITN) 30
	Needless to say, research under such
conditions is hardly satisfactory.
Even on those rare occasions when the broadcasters have reluctantly
recognised the claims of independent researchers and have granted access,
the researcher's problems have rarely ended there. 	 Restrictions
attached to access and a frequently hostile environment have, at times,
made the researcher's lot a difficult one.
One researcher who was to fall foul of the BBC's sensitivity to
criticism was Tom Burns.	 Burns, who was granted extensive access to
the BBC in 1963, had given the corporation a veto over his findings and
had subsequently been unable to publish his study in full. 	 According
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to Burns, despite initially welcoming his research, senior BBC
personnel then went to quite extraordinary lengths to prevent his
findings being published: ten years later, however, Burns was surprised
to find himself being invited back to the BBC to undertake a further
period of observation and the restrictions imposed in 1963 were lifted.(3U
The Glasgow Media Group were also to suffer from the BBC's
restrictions.	 In order to supplement their extensive analysis of the
coverage of industrial relations by broadcasting news, the group
approached the BBC for observational facilities (having been refused
access by ITN).	 Despite its open hostility to the group and its aims
(including a slightly veiled threat of copyright action), after lengthy
negotiations, the group was given leave by the BBC for one researcher to
observe the newsroom for a period of two weeks, together with the
provision of other facilities such as transcripts. 32	However, as we
shall see below, the group's success on this occasion did not reflect
their ongoing relationship with the corporation, which was characterised
by an often publicly expressed hostility, even before their full
findings had been published.
Philip Schlesinger, author of an important study on the BBC, (33)
has provided a particularly telling account of the problems and
obstacles that he encountered during the course of his research.
Initially granted generous access to the BBC's News Department,
Schlesinger describes how a growing resistance to his presence was to
develop during the course of his fieldwork.
During the early stages of the fieldwork, carried out during 1972,
Schlesinger found few restrictions placed on his frequent visits to
BBC News.	 Apart from the condition that he notify the newsroom in
advance of his visits, the author managed to secure some thirty full
days in the field.	 By 1973, however, the attitude to his presence
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among senior newsroom staff underwent a noticeable change. 	 Schlesinger
noted how:
By 1973, a certain amount of pressure began to be
exerted on me to be more specific about what I still
wanted to know.	 Mr. Taylor [Editor, News and Current
Affairs], for instance, asked during one encounter
"Has it come to fruition yet?" In general, newsmen
were extremely obliging, but they also made me aware
of the passage of time by referring to the study as
"a big soft story" or as "an ePic".(35)
As Schlesinger was to continue:
The effect of this - apart from sensitising me to the
different values placed upon time in academic and
journalistic cultures - was increasingly to make me
feel that I had to justify my requests for more
access. (36)
In order to placate the powers that be, and in the hope of securing
further access. Schlesinger produced two draft chapters which he then
presented to two senior newsroom personnel on whose goodwill future
access was likely to depend. 	 The tactic worked, and future access was
secured.	 However, the reprieve was to be short-lived; by June, 1973,
Schlesinger noted that there was now "definite pressure from Television
News to 'wrap up' the study") 37	Despite this, however, further
periods of observation were secured which enabled stage one of the
fieldwork to be completed.
Stage two of the fieldwork, which was to be devoted to developing
the study for publication, was to prove more problematical. 	 Despite
having secured clearance from two senior news personnel, Schlesinger
noted an increasingly restrictive attitude on the part of those who
commanded the power of entry. 	 Access, which had previously been
granted on a relatively informal basis for periods of between two and
three days, Schlesinger was now informed, was to be restricted to one
clearly defined period attached to an "overseer". 	 In the event,
Schlesinger was to spend only two further days observation at Television
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News.	 On the first of these visits, Schlesinger spent what he
described as a "bizarre" and "very short day" in which he was kept
away from the newsroom. 8	Undeterred by this, he requested leave to
visit the newsroom in order to update his study.
	
The response to this
request made it clear that the hostility to his continued presence had
not abated - a fact that was to be confirmed on his arrival at the
newsroom:
I wrote to the chief sub to thank him ... and asked
once again whether I could spend a couple of days in
the newsroom to update the study, stressing that I
would be very careful not to offend anyone. 	 The
cold winds of exclusion were still at gale force,
however, and I was informed that I could spend
between 2.30 and 6.00 p.m. on one particular day
inside the newsroom. 	 This, it was said, would be
enough to convey what was currently going on.
I took the opportunity, and was quite surprised at
the unprecedented hostility encountered from
journalists with whom I had hitherto had cordial
relations.
Schlesinger puts the apparent change in the attitude towards his
presence within Television News down to a series of factors which,
though unrelated to his own work, had combined to make an untenable
field situation: ironically one reason he suggests is that a visit by
a researcher from the Glasgow Media Group had angered several members
of the newsroom and this in turn had cancelled out his own credit.40
Schlesinger was proven right when he was subsequently allowed back into
Television News to complete his study, and with no restrictions being
(41)placed on the publication of his findings. 	 Despite the fruitful
outcome to his own project, Schlesinger's experience provides a clear
illustration of the precariousness of the researcher's position, and
the obstacles that may be placed in his path, even after access has
been granted.
Accounts relating to the attitude of the national press, both
collectively and individually, to those seeking to do independent
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research, or accounts detailing the problems encountered by researchers
seeking access to individual newspapers, are less common. 	 In theory,
the less centralised structure of the national press should provide
individual researchers with considerably greater scope for gaining
access.	 In practice, however, it is unlikely that the lack of
centralised control should necessarily make individual newspapers any
less sensitive to the external scrutiny of their activities. 	 On the
contrary, the recent experience of Derrik Mercer suggests that even
research emanating from highly distinguished academic institutions,
which could be of considerable importance to journalists and the
newspapers they work for, does not automatically guarantee the
co-operation of the British press)L12)
In the aftermath of the Falkiands war, Mercer was appointed head
of an officially sponsored, but independent, inquiry into the future
relations between government, the military and the media. 	 The research,
though funded by the Minstry of Defence, was to be undertaken by the
Centre for Journalism Studies at University College, Cardiff. 	 Despite
the credentials of the institution, the official nature of the inquiry,
and the potential implications it might have for the media themselves,
Mercer was to find certain sections of the British press less than
co-operative.	 As Mercer notes, what was surprising about this reaction
was that the project itself had been partly stimulated by complaints
made by journalists prior to, during, and in the immediate aftermath of
the Falkiands conflict:
There was much trumpeting about the public's right
to know and much complaining about the inadequacies,
to put it charitably, of the Government's handling
of press relations.	 Strange, then, that the only
people to spurn the officially sponsored but
independent inquiry into future relations between
governments, the military and the media should have
been some of those very apostles of oPenness.(43)
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While many individual journalists gave generously of their time, Mercer
found those at an editorial level less than co-operative:
Sir David English, of the Daily Mail, was quite
candid.	 He wrote a courteous letter regretting
that he was too busy.	 Brian Hitchen, London
editor of the Daily Star, was initially eager to
talk, but somehow an appointment was never
convenient and my final letter went unanswered.
But at least Mr. Hitchen and Sir David got around
to writing.
Mike Molloy (Daily Mirror), Kelvin Mackenzie
(The Sun), and Tony Chater (Morning Star) failed
to reply to two letters - others posted on the
same day arrived safely.(44)
How then does one explain the apparent hostility that has
characterised the British media's attitude to independent research into
their activities?	 Why is it that a profession which is so quick to
criticise the excessive secrecy of other institutions should be so
averse to a critical eye being cast over their own activities?
At a general level it may be nothing more than the professional's
natural aversion to the external scrutiny of their own professional
practice, a trait which, as Richard Hoggart points out, is particularly
pronounced among professional journalists:
None of us like our professional practices to be
scrutinised by outsiders; 	 and television newsmen
must be near the top of the league in this kind
of defensiveness.	 Sometimes I think the strength
of their defensiveness is in direct proportion to
their refusal to take a good look at just what
they are doing each day. 	 One gets the impression
of a trade which has hardly ever thought out its
own basic premises but continues, come hell or
high water, to rest its case on a few unexamined
assertions.
The response of British journalists, and particularly broadcasting
journalists, when these "unexamined assertions" have come under the
scrutiny of "outsiders", often with findings not to their liking,
clearly demonstrates their hostility to external criticism. 	 In recent
years the automatic response of senior broadcasting personnel to studies
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which have cast a critical eye over their activities has been to
the findings of those studies while questioning the political motives,
methodological approaches, or professional competence of those who
undertook them.	 Over the last couple of decades, the work of
(46)	 (47)
Philip Schlesinger,	 The University of Glasgow Media Group,	 and
several studies emanating from the Centre for Communications Studies at
Leicester university,	 have all stimulated a defensive, and at times
highly hostile, response from senior broadcasters.	 As Schlesinger has
argued, the criticisms levelled against his own study of the BBC's news
process are similar to those which have been directed against the
sociological study of journalism in general.	 These criticisms, he
suggests, may be reduced to three fundamental propositions:
1. that the sociological study of the actual news production process
is in fact focusing on only one set of determinants and giving
these a disproportionate explanatory value;
2. that the sociological approach is incapable of really understanding
the fundamental priorities of journlists, such as the need for
immediacy;
3. that conclusions "drawn in the present tense" are bound to be wrong
because the object to which they refer has, in the meantime,
changed.
As he goes on to argue:
These three propositions constitute a coherent defence
against sociological findings, and are, at the same
time, a positive assertion of the integrity of
journalistic professionalism. 	 In fact, they go
further and deny the entire credibility of the
sociological analysis of journalism ... and ... are to
be found in one variant or another in others' responses
to similar research.(49)
While at an editorial and senior management level, the British media
have resolutely defended their professional practices and their handling
of sensitive social and political issues, the response of journalists on
the ground has more often than not been one of "business as usual".
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It is unlikely that few ever bother to read academic studies of
journalism, even if they are aware of their existence.
	
Others simply
reject such studies out of hand as being politically motivated, or on
the grounds that "outsiders" can never fully comprehend the constraints
and pressures of their profession. 	 This reluctance to take on board,
or to take seriously, external criticism of their professional practices
was also evident during the course of my own fieldwork.
Prior tovisiting Belfast in the spring of 1984, Liz Curtis' highly
critical assessment of the British media's coverage of Northern Ireland
(50)
was published.	 Assuming that the study would have stimulated
considerable interest among journalists presently working on the story,
I took the opportunity of asking those journalists I spoke to for their
response to the criticisms raised by Curtis.	 To my surprise, nearly
six months after its publication, a number of journalists claimed never
to have heard of the study or its author, even though the book and some
of its more critical findings were a frequent bar-side topic for many of
their colleagues.	 Indeed, while many of the journalists I spoke to had
heard of the book, few of them had actually read it. 	 One journalist
said he had been unable to purchase a copy - though it was on open
display in a number of bookshops.	 Despite the fact that few of the
journalists I spoke to were familiar with the arguments laid down in the
book, this did not prevent several of them from attempting to undermine
both the credibility of the author and the validity of her findings.
According to one journalist on a quality paper (who was particularly
scathing about academics in general), the author was simply out to
"grind her own personal and political axe".	 A number of journalists
questioned me as to the author's political affiliations: one described
her as a "troops outer", while another dismissed her as a "republican
sympathiser".	 The assumption that the author's presumed political
sympathies automatically invalidated her findings stands in sharp
-220-
contrast to the journalists' image of themselves as objective observers
and purveyors of "fact".	 A year later, while conducting a series of
interviews in London, I put the question to several other journalists.
One assistant news editor on a quality paper, who had covered Northern
Ireland during the early 1970s, confessed to having "glimpsed" through
the book, while another journalist, who had reviewed the book for his
paper, when asked how the book had been received by his colleagues,
replied, "I don't think anybody has ever read it".	 Another journalist,
when asked whether he and his colleagues ever discussed the standards
and performance of their profession, replied, "It's not the kind of
thing you would address yourself to as a journalist. 	 I mean plumbers
don't sit around discussing the declining standards of' plumbing".
The hostility between journalists and researchers is perhaps
inevitable when, as Stuart Hall has put it, "One set of people confront
(51)
another with a critical image of their own practice".
	
However, as
Halloran, commenting on the response to research emanating from his own
institution, has pointed out, the journalists' hostility towards
independent research does place those engaged in critical research at
a distinct disadvantage:
In our early work on news and current affairs and our
study of the BBC Local Radio experiment, we received
all the necessary co-operation in the planning and
execution stages.	 But the results of both these
projects were not exactly greeted with enthusiasm.
Of course, it would be naive to expect enthusiasm from
those for whom the results were perceived as a
challenge to their professional values, a threat to
their basic assumptions, a criticism of their modus
operandi, a questioning of their policies, or ... a
contradiction of their claims.
	
If the research
results threaten, then the first co-operative
research venture may well be the last.(52)
Part of the problem for those contemplating research into the
British media is the absence of any formal or statutory obligation on
ficles
the part of the media	 to support independent mass communications
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research into their activities. 	 This has led to a situation where the
researcher is the supplicant relying on the benevolence of those who
command the power of entry into the broadcasting and print media. 	 In
effect, this has enabled senior media personnel to act as gatekeepers,
determining what forms of research shall be given support and
encouragement and what forms not.
	 While research seen to be in the
interests of the various media may well be looked upon favourably, it
is unlikely, given the general attitude of hostility and sensitivity
towards "critical" research, that those seen to be on a dangerous
mission will fare well in the selection process.
	 As Halloran, who has
for some time championed the demand that broadcasting and other media
institutions have an obligation to support independent mass
communications research, has commented:
My fear still is that broadcasters may be willing to
accept research only when they see it as reinforcing
their position or serving their interests in some way
or other. "Bad" research is research that produces
results that they don't like.(53)
It was against this background of strained relations between
journalists and researchers that I approached my own project. 	 My
growing feeling of pessimism was compounded when, discussing the project
with friends, I was confidently assured that the majority of journalists
would run to ground at the mere suggestion of co-operating on such
a project.
Selecting and contacting potential respondents
It was clear, having read the above accounts, that considerable
thought would have to be given to how I approached the task of gaining
access.	 Working on the assumption that journalists on a personal level
might be more willing to co-operate than those higher up the news
hierarchy	 I decided upon a strategy of selective targeting. 	 I first
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compiled a general list of journalists who had covered the Northern
Ireland conflict since 1969, together with those who were presently
working on the story.	 From this list, I selected a small number of
journalists for initial contacting.	 This strategy had two main
advantages: first, by contacting journalists personally I was able to
by-pass any possible objections that their superiors in the news process
might have to the project; secondly, by initially contacting only a
small number of journalists, I was able to test the waters before
proceeding any further.
As it was at this initial point of contact that the attitude of the
potential respondent both towards myself and the project would be shaped,
how I presented my request for co-operation was crucial. 	 If the
journalist sensed that the project was less than serious, or that the
potentially sensitive nature of the information I required could have
repercussions for himself, the more likely it was that he would respond
negatively to my request. 	 Consequently, in writing to the targetted
group of journalists, I provided a clear, though suitably general,
statement as to what the aims of the project were, stressing both the
academic nature of the inquiry and the official status of its funding
body.	 At this initial point of contact, I simply asked each journalist
if he would be prepared to co-operate on a personal level and, if so,
whether he could suggest the names of other journalists who might be
likewise inclined.
Though five journalists failed to reply to my letters, the response
to this preliminary approach was encouraging.	 Three journalists agreed
to co-operate, one of whom furnished the names of several others who he
thought might be worth contacting. 	 Those names that were not already
on the list were added and letters posted to all the remaining
journalists, pointing out how several of their colleagues had already
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agreed to co-operate. 	 Though the response to these letters was less
encouraging, a further five journalists agreed to co-operate. 	 One
based in Belfast provided the names of five journalists, four of whom
later agreed to co-operate. 	 In the hope that once in the field I
would be in a position to secure further contacts, I decided that the
project was feasible.
Having secured sufficient contacts to make a trip to Belfast
worthwhile, I then wrote to both the RUC and army press offices
informing them of my intended trip and requesting their assistance.
Bill McGookin, Chief Information Officer for the RUC, replied offering
his assistance and suggesting that I contact his office on my arrival to
arrange a suitable date.	 Though posted at the same time, the army
press office failed to reply to my letter. 	 However, once in Belfast,
a telephone call to the army press office secured the assistance of
Alan Percival, Acting Chief Information Officer who, it transpired, was
in the process of replying to my letter.
This strategy, of selectively targeting individual journalists
rather than attempting to contact them via their news editors, was to be
vindicated some months later after the interviews with the first batch
of' journalists had been secured.	 In February, 1984, I wrote to news
editors requesting information of a factual nature concerning changes in
the staffing levels maintained by individual newspapers since 1969.
Despite the rather uncontroversial nature of' the request, the attitude
of the majority of news editors was to be less than helpful. 	 Of' the
seven newspapers I wrote to, only three replied. 	 Roy Trueman, Managing
Editor of the Daily Star, replied that: "Unfortunately, because of' the
complex situation, I am unable to devote time to the necessary research
to answer your questions".	 Adrian Lighter, Editorial Manager of the
Daily Telegraph, in a short and rather unhelpful letter, made a few
general comments before concluding that: "Beyond these rather general
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remarks I am not prepared to go into the logistics of our news coverage
arrangements".	 Charles Cowen, Assistant News Editor on the Daily
Express, suggested that: "From the tone of your letter I think the
material you want might be better provided by the more serious journals
such as the Guardian or the heavy Sundays which have the time to both do
their daily work and handle gratuitous enquiries".	 Mr. Cowen, however,
did promise to send my letter on to the paper's Northern News Editor who
subsequently sent me a detailed letter on the paper's staffing levels
since 1969.
Selecting a method
Having secured a sufficient degree of co-operation to warrant the
continuation of the project, the next step was to select a suitable
research method.	 Three methods immediately suggested themselves as
being appropriate to such an inquiry: the interview, the mailed
questionnaire and the observational method. 	 All have a long tradition
in ethnographical research and all have been used in various
combinations for research into the mass media. 	 In evaluating which of
the three was best suited to my own particular needs, they were first
judged according to their relative flexibility and economy.
	
Given
that my intended sample was to include journalists who had worked on
the story over a period of sixteen years, flexibility was essential.
The working conditions and experiences of those included in the sample
were likely to vary considerably in some respects; therefore it was
important that the chosen method should be flexible enough to take
account of these differences. 	 The question of economy was also
important given the limited resources afforded by a Ph.D. grant.
Without recourse to research assistants, it was essential that my
limited resources were marshalled in the most effective way, enabling
me to generate the most information at the least possible cost.
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When set against these two requirements, the first method to be
rejected was the observational approach.	 While the observational
approach, such as that employed by Philip Schlesinger in his study of
BBC News, can provide the researcher with an unique insight into the
internal workings of an organisation or professional group, the approach
is not without its problems. 	 One of its most serious shortcomings in
relation to my own project is that it is often time-consuming. 	 An
inordinate amount of observation time may be required to ensure presence
when the crucial events occur.	 A well-designed and thorough
observational study will usually require at least three distinct periods
of observation: the amount of time being consumed by each period will
tend to vary according to the complexity of the group under study.
The first, or preparatory, period will usually be needed in order to
familiarise the researcher with the routines, organisational structure
and language of the group under study: for example, the lay-out of the
newsroom; the lines of authority and communication within it; and the
jargon of those involved in the news process at its various stages.
Even after the main data have been gathered, it may be necessary to
readjust existing hypotheses or to pursue new ones generated during the
course of data gathering. 	 Consequently, even on a carefully planned
study, it is likely that considerable periods of time will need to be
consumed in the field.
A second problem associated with the observational method, and one
that is related to the above, is that, because of the time often needed
to undertake a thorough study, the method is best suited to generating
information on a single organisation or on a closely-knit group. 	 For
a project seeking to draw on a variety of information sources, which
may be based in different locations, the method is less well suited.
To duplicate an observational study would be an impossible task for a
solitary researcher.
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While these problems need not be insurmountable, there is a third
and, to the extent that it is beyond the direct control of the
researcher, perhaps more serious problem associated with the
observational method - that of access.	 Though journalists may be
willing to assist on a project if co-operation merely demands a few
hours of their time, it is unlikely that many would welcome the idea of
having a sociologist at their heels for a day, let alone two or three.
The choice between the remaining two methods, the interview and the
mailed questionnaire, was, on the surface, less clear-cut. 	 The mailed
questionnaire has one obvious advantage as a research method - its
economy.	 For little more than the cost of the stationery, the
questionnaire enables the single researcher to reach a large number of
respondents simultaneously, thus eliminating the cost of travel and
travel time.
	
Given that the majority of journalists included in the
sample were based either in Belfast or London, this was obviously an
important consideration.	 However, the response to the mailed
questionnaire is often highly unpredictable and, as we shall see below,
what the questionnaire gains in economy it often loses in flexibility
and response.	 The interview, on the other hand, though less
economical, does have the advantage of being highly flexible.
In theory, the only significant difference between the interview
and the questionnaire is that in the former the interviewer asks the
questions orally, while in the latter the respondent reads the questions.
There is nothing about the form or nature of the questions or answers
which can reliably distinguish between the two methods. 	 However,
despite the degree to which the two methods may resemble each other,
there are a number of general differences between them which had to be
taken into consideration before a final choice was made.
Gorden, for example, identifies five general differences between
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between the two methods which he lists as "motivation", "interpretation",
(54)
"flexibility", "control" and 'evaluation". 	 Generally speaking,
these differences flow from the presence or non-presence of the
researcher in the field.
Motivation
A perennial problem for the mailed questionnaire is that the
extrinsic rewards for supplying accurate and complete information are
small or non-existent.	 Questionnaires, especially when requesting
lengthy or complex information, often require many hours of laborious
form filling.	 One consequence of this is that the return rate of
mailed questionnaires is notoriously unpredictable. 	 Moreover, the time
and effort often demanded by questionnaires may mean that, even among
those respondents who are willing to co-operate, the tendency to provide
the minimal information required to answer a question may be strong.
Furthermore, the probability is high that as the amount, complexity and
sensitivity of the information required increases, the rewards for
supplying the information correspondingly declines. 	 As Garden has
written:
This motivation factor becomes more decisive as the
amount of needed information increases, as the degree
of answer-structuring decreases, and as the extrinsic
rewards for supplying the information decrease
the respondent will promptly and accurately fill out
an insurance claim form if it is short and simple and
the amount to be collected is high. 	 On the other
hand, the probability is small that a member of a
random sample receiving a form with 200 complex
questions about his premarital life would supply the
information through the mail.(55)
The survey researcher's distance from the field situation leaves
him with few, if any, means of ensuring an accurate and comprehensive
response to the questions he poses.
	
The interview, on the other hand,
provides the researcher with a far greater opportunity to motivate the
respondent to supply accurate and complete information. 	 People usually
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find talking less demanding and more pleasurable than writing, in the
same way that friends are often more communicative on the telephone
than in letters.	 Interaction between the respondent and the
interviewer is also likely to make the provision of information a more
stimulating and rewarding experience for the respondent, insofar as the
interviewer can provide feed-back and encouragement.	 The mere presence
of an attentive and interested listener may in itself provide sufficient
incentive for communication.
Given that my own inquiry required the respondent to provide highly
complex and potentially sensitive information, without any obvious
benefit in return, it was likely that the motivation for providing the
information in questionnaire form would be low.	 Being in the field,
therefore, both to ask the questions and to motivate a full and accurate
response, was an important consideration.
Interpretation
The interview also provides more opportunity for the researcher to
guide the respondents in their interpretation of' the questions.	 When
the questions are of a complex or abstract nature, the ability of the
researcher to clarify the precise meaning of' the question may be
particularly important.	 Moreover, the more varied the respondents in
terms of their experience, interest and understanding, the more the
presence of the researcher may be needed to explain the general aim of
the interview and to interpret the meaning of specific questions.
Control
Another significant advantage that the interview has over the
mailed questionnaire is that it allows the researcher greater control
over the interview situation. 	 Greater control, as Gorden has pointed
out, may be essential in certain circumstances:
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For example, it may be extremely important that the
respondent deal with questions in a certain sequence,
that he answers one question before seeing a
subsequent question, or that he does not change the
answer to a question in view of the context or clue
furnished by a subsequent question. 	 Or it may be
necessary that the respondent not consult others in
giving his answers.(56)
The ability to control the sequence, timing and wording of the
questions is particularly important when the information being requested
is of a sensitive, controversial or ego-threatening nature. 	 The
unstructured interview also enables the researcher to ease himself into
the field situation at an appropriate pace and thereby avoid blundering
into delicate areas or subject matter. 	 If need be, the researcher can
postpone immediate data gathering to cultivate the relationship drawing
out such material only when the informant is ready for it.
Flexibility
Perhaps the greatest advantage the interview has over the mailed
questionnaire is that of flexibility.	 The questionnaire may be an
economical way of gathering information, but it is also a potentially
rigid one.	 Once a questionnaire is posted, it's posted; the form,
sequence and wording of the questions, and consequently how the
respondent interprets and answers them, are thus placed beyond the
direct control of the researcher.	 As Doby has written:
The essence of the survey is the uniform collection
of data by means of a questionnaire, and the use of
these data for establishing quantitative relationships
that enable the social scientist to generalize to a
known population.	 Because of the systematic way that
the survey collects its data, it runs into many problems
of communication - the standard form of the questionnnaire
is not always suitable for the wide variety of field
situations about which the research worker is trying to
gather information.	 The questions may mean different
things to different respondents: the context in which the
question is answered may not be understood; the
categories for classifying the respondent's answer are
rather gross and overlook the subtleties of meaning the
respondents may wish to convey; and so on.(57)
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Under certain circumstances, this may not be an insurmountable
problem: ambiguities or inappropriate questions may be rectified by
repeated surveys.	 However, there may be circumstances when, due to
limited resources or a lack of willingness on the part of respondents,
repeated surveys are not possible. 	 The researcher may then find, to
his dismay and frustration, that he is stuck with the categories he
originally used in formulating the problem under study.
Interviewing in the field, on the other hand, allows for a more
dynamic relationship between the researcher and the respondents.
Questions can be modified to suit the different experience of
journalists, or in the light of information gained in a previous
interview.	 In this way, the interview allows the researcher to
constantly refine and codify the categories and questions in the light
of experiences in the field. 	 Moreover, each successive interview may
open up new areas for investigation or suggest new ways of approaching
the same area.	 In this way, interviewing in the field allows the
researcher not only to constantly modify and refine the questions and
their presentation, but also to shift the focus of the study and pursue
new or emerging hypotheses as he goes along.
	
Unlike the mailed
questionnaire, the interview allows the researcher to marshall his
resources in the most efficient way by adapting his approach to
information gathering in order to suit the specific qualities,
experience and knowledge of each respondent.	 To quote Doby again:
The hallmark of the survey method is standardized data
gathering. A major characteristic of observation and
interviewing in the field is its non-standardization.
In fact, it aims to make a virtue of non-standardization
by frequently redirecting the inquiry on the basis of
data coming in from the field to ever more fruitful
areas of investigation.	 Changes in the research
direction are made in order to chase down more critical
data for the emerging hypotheses.	 Informants are not
treated uniformly but are interviewed about the things
they can illuminate most.	 Each field situation is
exploited to yield the most helpful data without unduly
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worrying about their comparability for statistical
purposes.	 The aim is usually a flexible and skillful
guiding of field work to make the most of the
individual peculiarities of the situation in which
you find Yourself.(58)
While for some projects flexibility may be less important, for my
own it was essential.	 Within the sample of journalists there was
considerable diversity in terms of knowledge, experience and length of
time on the story.	 For example, while some journalists had covered
Northern Ireland since the l950s, others had come to the story as late
as 1981; consequently, questions relating to events and issues in the
l970s would be relevant to some journalists but not to others.
The main advantage accruing from this flexibility, as Gorden points
out, is that it allows the interviewer to adopt a more exploratory
role denied to the survey researcher:
The more exploratory the purpose, the greater the need
for flexibility in determining the wording of the
questions, the sequence of the questions and the
direction and amount of probing used. When the
emphasis is upon discovery as opposed to measurement,
we must give serendipity a chance to operate and allow
the interviewer to pursue hunches and clues he may get
as the interview progresses.(59)
Evaluation
Being in the field both to ask the questions and to observe how
they are answered, as Gorden points out, may also assist in the process
of evaluation:
The interview provides a greater opportunity to
evaluate the validity of the information by
observing the respondent's non-verbal manifestations
of his attitude toward supplying the information.
Although it is possible to supply certain cross-checks
in questionnaires to detect the respondent who is not
serious or who is deliberately lying, it is much
simpler to detect, prevent and rectify such attempts
by the respondent in the interview.	 This type of
evaluation is particularly important when the subject
matter or the circumstances of the interview tend to
be controversial or ego-threatening.(50)
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The survey worker's distance from the field often means that he is
poorly equipped to evaluate the validity of the information supplied by
respondents.	 Without recourse to alternative means of validation, the
survey worker may often have to accept the information supplied in a
questionnaire at face value.	 If the information requested is of a
non-threatening nature, then this need not be a major problem.
However, if the questions threaten, the tendency on the part of the
respondent to provide what he thinks is the "right" response, or the
tendency to modify his attitude or feelings in order to cast himself in
a more favourable light, may be strong.
The problem for the mailed questionnaire is that it not only
affords the respondent the luxury of examining the questions in advance
(and thus deprives the researcher of the element of surprise), but in
doing so, provides him with the opportunity to evaluate the possible
implications of each question.	 If the questions threaten, then there
is a strong possibility that the respondent will place self-protection
over and above accuracy.
The interview provides a far greater opportunity to evaluate the
validity of information supplied by respondents. 	 On the one hand,
the interviewer can make use of impressions and observations gained in
the field.	 By observing how respondents react in a non-verbal way
when asked questions on sensitive subject matters, the interviewer may
be better placed to assess the veracity of the response. 	 While the
impressions and observations gained in the field are hardly a reliable
means of evaluation, they may at least indicate to the researcher that
a certain degree of scepticism should attend the recording of his
statements.	 In addition, the researcher in the field may be able to
secure information from other sources which may assist in the process
of evaluation.
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On a number of occasions during the course of my own fieldwork,
the ability to cross-check or simply trade gossip with other journalists
proved significant when preparing for a coming interview or pondering on
previous ones.	 On one occasion, a journalist had informed me that he
wrote between three and four stories a day on average; later, however,
I was informed by a number of his colleagues, independently of each other,
that the journalist in question was, to put it kindly, one of the least
productive journalists in Belfast. 	 On another occasion, a journalist
who, when interviewed, had stressed to me the need for journalists not
to accept official statements without rigorously checking them first, was
described by a number of his colleagues as being a regular recipient of
police leaks.	 Again, while this may not be totally reliable, it may be
of some assistance in evaluating the veracity of information provided in
the field.
In the field: tactics and problems
The use of interviewing as a research method can at times be a
haphazard means of generating information; much depends on the calibre
and experience of the interviewer and the quality of the interviewing
schedule.	 However, even given the most professional interviewer and
the most thoughtful and penetrating questions which, together and in the
right circumstances, should be capable of generating valuable data, in
the final analysis, the success or failure of the method will be
determined not only by the interviewer and his questions, but by the
respondent and his willingness to co-operate.	 Co-operation will, in
turn, depend on both the ability of the researcher to establish a
relationship of trust with respondents and on the conditions under which
the interview takes place.	 This section examines some of the problems
and frustrations encountered during the course of my own fieldwork
carried out during two separate periods in 1984 and 1985 in Belfast
and London.
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Establishing field relations
Arriving in Belfast in April, 1984, my first priority was to
contact those journalists who had already agreed to co-operate and to
follow up other potential contacts. 	 It was also necessary to
familiarise myself with the geography of the city - where the main
newspaper offices were located, and the local bars popular with
journalists.	 During the early 1970s, when Northern Ireland was a major
story and the national dailies all maintained large staffs on the story,
the centrality and security of the Europa Hotel made it a popular haunt
for many journalists.	 Many worked out of the hotel (and indeed some
still do) and its bars provided a relatively safe and less threatening
environment in which to while away the hours in between stories. 	 In
the late l970s, as the violence on the streets declined, the journalists
returned to the city's bars.
While the image of journlists as drunken hacks, permanently glued
to bar stools, may be something of a caricature, there can be little
doubt that public bars do occupy a central place in the working lives of
many journalists.	 In Belfast, as in London, journalists frequently
congregate in the local bars in between stories, during lunch hours and
often at the end of the day.
	
Locating the bars popular with journalists
was to prove a relatively easy matter.	 The first journalist I was to
interview arranged to meet me in a bar which, it transpired, was popular
with many of them.
Though the interview proved to be one of my less successful ones, it
did provide an early and easy introduction to the target group. 	 Indeed,
once introduced, the bar provided a suitably informal and relaxed
environment in which to meet and chat to journalists.
Meeting journlists in bars was to have many advantages.
Journalists in Belfast belong to a relatively close-knit community and
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certain sections of the profession are almost tribal in their habits.
As with all close-knit communities, the strengths and weaknesses of all
are known by all.	 The names of certain journalists elicit broad grins
when mentioned in conversation, others knowing frowns, others outright
contempt and, in the relaxed atmosphere of the bar, it was often possible
to pick up snippets of information which might prove to be useful later -
even if only for background material.	 Apart from picking up on in-group
gossip, and partaking in a degree of informal participant observation, it
was also possible to chat to journalists working for a diversity of
publications in a relaxed and informal setting.
Perhaps the greatest advantage to be gained from meeting journalists
in an informal setting is that it allows the researcher to meet potential
respondents and gain a degree of acceptance before attempting to
negotiate interviews.	 Once accepted, it may be possible to ask more
direct questions, identify those respondents likely to have relevant or
special information, and identify those journlists who may need to be
handled with special care.
	 Consequently, time spent in this preparatory
stage may often yield rich rewards later.
Generally speaking, most of the journalists I spoke to were willing
to give generously of their time, and many went out of their way to be
co-operative.	 Though arranging interviews was, at times, frustrated by
stories breaking, pressing deadlines, and a host of other anforeseen or
unavoidable problems which often cropped up at inappropriate times, most
journalists were genuine in their efforts to assist in the project.
However, during the course of my fieldwork, a number of journalists
proved to be less than co-operative.	 John Ley, of the Daily Express,
refused to co-operate under any circumstances, even though a colleague
who shared the same office, though working for a different paper, went
out of his way to help me in any way he could. 	 What was more
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frustrating, however, was that three journlists (two in Belfast and one
in London), who initially consented to an interview, were later to back
out.	 These three cases illustrate quite clearly how, and without
formally refusing to co-operate, informants can place obstacles in the
path of the researcher while maintaining an outward appearance of
co-operation.
On one occasion, a journalist on the Daily Mirror (who, for the
sake of' convenience, I shall call James) who was introduced to me by
another journalist on the same paper who I had interviewed previously,
agreed to an interview and told me to contact him at the office the next
day to arrange a suitable time. 	 In the hope of allaying any lingering
doubts that he might have had, I told him what days and times were
already taken up with other interviews.	 The next day, as arranged, I
'phoned the journalist at his office.	 He complained about being tied
up for the rest of the morning and suggested that I try again later in
the afternoon.	 When I 'phoned up later that day, he apologised again
for still being tied up and suggested that I keep on trying. 	 As this
had happened with other journalists who I had eventually got round to
interviewing, I thought no more about it.	 However, my lack of success
on this occasion was to set a pattern that was to be repeated on many
occasions in the coming days. 	 Over the space of the next three to
four days, I repeatedly telephoned the Daily Mirror office only to be
informed, either by the journalist or his secretary, that he was tied up
or out of the office.	 Suspicious that the journalist was attempting to
backtrack on his promise, and reluctant to let a potential interview
slip through my fingers, I tried a different tack: without 'phoning in
advance, I calledi to the Daily Mirror office. 	 I hoped that by
catching him in the office, it would be possible to convince him that any
fears he had about supplying information were unwarranted - and also in
the hope that he might find it more difficult to refuse my request in a
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face-to-face situation.	 The tactic was to fail.	 On my way into the
office I was stopped by a secretary who informed me that the journalist
was out of the office and would not be back until later that afternoon:
the porter who controls access to the building had previously informed
me that the journalist in question was in the office. 	 My suspicions
were confirmed a few days later when talking to a journalist from the
sane paper.	 According to this journalist, James was attempting to get
out of the interview and had told the office secretary to say he was busy
should I call.	 Asking whether he had given any particular reason for
his change of heart, I was informed that he thought I was a socialist.
On another occasion, a journalist employed by the Press Association,
and a drinking partner of James, adopted similar tactics after initially
agreeing to an interview.	 After repeated attempts, both by 'phone and
by calling at his office, I was informed that the journalist had left the
city on holiday.	 A similar strategy was adopted by a journalist on the
Sunday Times who had covered Northern Ireland during the mid-l97Os for
the Observer.	 This journalist had initially agreed to co-operate some
months previously by letter and had reconfirmed his commitment prior to
my visit to London.	 However, no matter how flexible I was prepared to
be, a time convenient for him could never be arranged. 	 After numerous
telephone calls, it became obvious that he had little intention of
being interviewed.
Such experiences are not only frustrating and stressful but also,
and perhaps more importantly, they consume energy, time and money which
could be more productively employed.	 A straightforward refusal, though
no less disappointing, is preferable to being constantly frustrated only
for the same end result.
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Interviewing
Having tied a particular journalist down to a specific day and time,
the next problem that has to be considered is where the interview should
take place.	 Generally speaking, journalists like to meet in bars. 	 If
the purpose of' the exercise is simply to chat to journalists on an
informal basis, then such a setting presents few, if any, problems.
Indeed, as I have mentioned above, away from the office journalists are
likely to be more relaxed and, in the alcoholic atmosphere of the local
bar, also less inhibited when discussing their work. 	 However, while
meeting journalists in bars has its advantages, it also has its
disadvantages.	 First, it is unlikely that a journalist will be
prepared to talk openly on subjects of a sensitive or controversial
nature - although some did. 	 The second problem with interviewing in
bars concerns recording the interview.	 Public bars are hardly quiet
places; juke-boxes, and the usual combination of noises associated with
bars often makes tape recording a precarious, if not impossible, task.
Fortunately, having had my first interview rendered almost worthless due
to background noise, I made a point of suggesting more suitable
locations.
Because the relationship between the research worker and his
informants is the key to effective interviewing, establishing a
relationship of' trust is perhaps the most crucial objective of the
fieldworker.	 While in their own circles journalists may be quite
candid about the constraints and problems of their profession, they are,
and perhaps with some justification, likely to be more wary with
"outsiders".	 If the researcher is to get the best out of' his
respondent, therefore, it is essential that, from the outset, he
cultivates a relationship of trust with informants. 	 The key factor in
establishing such a relationship is time. 	 Ideally, the researcher
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should ease himself into the field situation gradually, building up the
confidence of potential respondents before attempting to negotiate
interviews.
If the researcher is working to a tight budget however, such a
strategy may not always be possible.	 Indeed, this was a constant
problem for my own project.	 Without the luxury of a substantial
research grant, the amount of time I could spend in the field was
limited.	 During the two weeks I spent in Belfast, I had to fit in as
many interviews as possible even if this meant going into some
interviews cold.	 On a number of occasions, my only contact with the
journalist prior to interviewing him was by letter or a brief telephone
call.
Breaking down the barriers to communication that may exist between
the researcher and respondent in the field becomes more problematical
the more sensitive the information requested and the more defensive the
target group.	 During the course of the fieldwork, my status as an
"outsider" was often evident in my dealings with some journalists - and
especially those working for the British press. 	 Indeed, one of the
first questions most British journalists asked was: "How is this
material going to be used?" 	 A further indication of how reluctant many
were when it came to being associated with critical statements either
about their own paper's coverage of events in the North, or about the
British media coverage in general, was that few of the journalists I
interviewed for the study were prepared to be quoted directly. 	 Indeed,
the majority of British journalists (even those who had since moved on
to other stories) made anon,ymity a precondition of their co-operation.
However, even the promise of anonymity did not prevent two journalists
objecting to the interview being taped.	 In fact, one journalist even
went so far as to demand to see the questions in advance, and it took a
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considerable effort on my part before he finally consented to the
presence of a tape recorder.
Failing to know the subject prior to interviewing invariably limits
the interviewer's ability to uncover information which might well be of
a sensitive or controversial nature. 	 Nevertheless, many of the
journalists I spoke to were prepared to stand back and attempt a
critical assessment of their professional practices - even if this
reflected badly on themselves. 	 In one isolated case, however, a
journalist's account of his own working practices was embellished to
such an extent that it was more a case of fiction than honest
self-assessment.
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